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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies the role of private agents in increasing tax compliance and
documents the effects of fiscal and behavioral inefficiencies that distort human capital
formation.
Chapter 1, joint with Keshav Choudhary, analyzes firms’ response to changes in size-
based exemptions from third-party audits and shows that third-party auditors help the
government in raising tax compliance and government revenue. Using administrative
panel data from India, we develop a novel empirical framework that considers dynamic
responses of firm to such exemptions and conduct a difference-in-differences analysis. Our
estimates suggest that firms remit 20 percent higher taxes and report 16 percent higher
taxable income, once they are subject to third-party audits. Using these estimates, we
conclude that the policy is cost effective and raises net social benefit.
Chapter 2, joint with Hoyt Bleakley, analyzes the fiscal costs and benefits related to
schooling decisions. We use a Mincer-like model to characterize the fiscal externality asso-
ciated with an additional year of schooling. Then we estimate the gap between fiscal ben-
efits and costs by combining recently available data on school subsidies with the Nepalese
household consumption survey. We find that within primary school, at a discount rate of
3 %, the fiscal benefits and costs, on the margin, are quite balanced, with subsidies closest
to the present value of future taxes minus benefits. At higher levels of schooling, however,
marginal fiscal benefits exceed costs by 5 percent of per-capita consumption.
Chapter 3 studies the effects of taste-based discrimination on the educational outcomes
of the children in India. Using nationally-representative data, we find that there is a de-
clining birth-order gradient in learning outcomes of both boys and girls. Conditional on
birth-order, boys outperform girls which indicates general son-preferences. Moreover, after
controlling for birth-order effects, boys with no elder brother perform better than boys who
have an elder brother. This indicates preferences towards elder sons in the family. The gap
widens in districts with higher elder-son preferences and results in a steeper birth-order
gradient in those districts. Societal preferences affect learning through differential alloca-
tion of educational resources within a family.
x
CHAPTER I
Notching Really Matters: Effect of Third-party Audit on
Tax Compliance of Firms
From a work with Keshav Choudhary
Abstract
Do third-party auditors act as watchdogs of tax administration or do they help firms mis-
report tax revenue? We answer this question by examining firm behaviour in response to
audit notches—defined as discontinuities in the third-party audit requirement—and exoge-
nous policy-induced changes in these notches over time. Using administrative panel data
from India, we develop a novel empirical framework that considers dynamic responses of
firms to a notch and conduct a difference-in-differences analysis. Our estimates suggest
that firms remit 20 percent higher taxes and report 16 percent higher taxable income, once
they are subject to third-party audits. Using these estimates, we conclude that the policy
is cost effective and raises net social benefit.
JEL Codes: H26 , H32 , M42
Keywords:Third-party audit, Corporate tax, Notch, India
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1.1 Introduction
Various government agencies rely on private auditors to complement their regulatory
functions across wide-ranging spheres of governance. For instance, environment agencies
use private auditors to report polluting firms. Financial regulators rely on the credit-rating
agencies for maintaining financial stability. Tax administrations, the subject of inquiry of
this study, also rely on private agents for various functions such as debt collection, customs,
direct tax compliance, among others. However, in all these contexts, the effectiveness of
these private auditors is not guaranteed because they are often hired and paid by the
agents whom they are supposed to regulate–causing a conflict of interest. Conversely,
factors such as effective regulations, reputational concerns, technical expertise, among
others, can push these private auditors to overcome the conflict of interest and complement
regulatory authorities.
While the role of private auditors has been analyzed in contexts such as environment
(Duflo et al. (2013a)), credit ratings (Fracassi, Petry and Tate (2016), Griffin and Tang
(2011)), social audit of global supply chains (Short, Toffel and Hugill (2016)), among
others, this study is among the first that analyzes the role of private auditors in tax ad-
ministration. We evaluate the Indian income tax department’s use of third-party auditors
to certify tax returns and report discrepancies. In the context of this policy, we investi-
gate whether third-party auditors act as watchdogs on behalf of the tax department, or
whether they instead help firms misreport their income to lower their tax liability. We find
that these auditors are effective in increasing tax revenue despite the potential conflict of
interest. The results are consequential for resource constrained tax administrations that
might not have adequate financial, technical or human resources to effectively enforce tax
law, and thus rely on private agents to augment their capacity.1
India provides an excellent setting to study the role of third-party auditors in tax
administration for two reasons. First, we have rich administrative data that consists of
anonymized income tax returns filed by Indian companies from FY 2009 to FY 2016. This
data includes firm’s revenue, taxable income, reported taxes and other firm-level charac-
teristics. The advantage of using this data is that it provides information on small firms,
both listed and unlisted on the stock exchange, that is not recorded in the conventional
data sets used for analysis of firms in India2. Moreover, the panel structure of the data
1For instance, the Internal Revenue Service in USA has run several programs in the past decade, where
private agencies are entrusted with collecting outstanding debts from the taxpayers. A list of functions
outsourced across countries can be found in OECD (2019).
2Prowess database complied by CMIE, despite being a panel data set, is under-powered for analysis of
small companies. Annual Survey of Industries has data on organized manufacturing firms. It contains
repeated cross-section of 20 percent smaller manufacturing firms that may or may not be registered with tax
2
allows analysis of a firm’s dynamic behavior in response to exogenous policy shocks. Ad-
ditionally, we combine this data with other data sets to compute the differential effect of
the third-party audit based on firm and industry-level characteristics.
Second, useful for our study is a provision in the Indian tax law that creates a disconti-
nuity in the audit requirement – an audit notch. The tax law requires all companies whose
gross revenue exceeds a specified threshold to undergo third-party audit. We can causally
estimate the impact of third-party audit by exploiting a policy change that increases the
audit notch over time, and thus provides quasi-experimental variation. Specifically, we
exploit the change in 2012, when the threshold was increased from Rs.6 million to Rs.10
million,3 providing some firms the opportunity to be exempted from third-party audit. We
document the impact of exemption of third-party audit on a firm’s tax payments.
The key empirical challenge is to estimate the impact of audit notch defined on a vari-
able (revenue, in this case) other than the variable of interest (tax payments). A small but
growing literature addresses this challenge by the using a combination of static bunching
analysis, developed by Kleven and Waseem (2013), and other estimation strategies such
as differences-in-differences (Hamilton (2018)) and regression discontinuity (Bachas and
Soto (2018)). In this study, we use a difference-in-differences design after accounting for
the bunching response of the firms. The first step is to find the treatment neighborhood in
which firms respond to the audit notch by manipulating their revenue to bunch below the
notch and escape audit. Static bunching analysis is the standard method to estimate this
neighborhood.
While the conventional static analysis works well in a static one-shot setting, it may not
work well if the firms have dynamic responses to a notch (Kleven (2016)). Specifically, the
static analysis relies on the ocular method to determine the lower bound of the treatment
neighborhood by assuming that all the bunchers originate from the right side of the thresh-
old and bunch precisely at the threshold. The upper bound of the treatment neighborhood
is found by constructing a counterfactual density so that the excess bunching mass below
the threshold is equal to the missing mass above it. However, we consider the possibility
that bunchers can originate from the left-side of the threshold in a dynamic setting – caus-
ing diffused excess mass. There can be several reasons for the firms to not bunch precisely
at the threshold. For instance, if firms believe that reporting zero growth for multiple time-
periods will increase the probability of getting caught, then they are likely to arrest their
growth to bunch well below the threshold rather than precisely at it. In such a scenario,
authorities. Thus, it is not representative for smaller tax paying firms.
3The average exchange rate from 2009-16 was Rs.55.65 per dollar. This implies that the threshold in-
creased from $10,782 to $17,969.
3
the excess mass will be diffused, causing researchers to miss some of the excess mass while
constructing the counterfactual density using the static method and thus, underestimate
the upper bound.
We develop a novel methodology that accounts for the dynamic responses of the firms
to the notch. We estimate the size of the biggest firm that manipulates its revenue in
response to the audit notch by leveraging the panel nature of the data and exogenous
policy change. If the notch is introduced in year t, we estimate a firm’s probability of
reporting revenue just below the threshold in t+1—firms take at least a year to respond to
the notch—based on its lagged revenue in t−1. However, a firm’s natural growth path can
also cause its revenue to be just below the threshold. We quantify this confounding effect
by estimating the firm’s probability of reporting revenue below the threshold in t− 1, pre-
notch period, based on lagged revenue in t− 3. If the difference in probabilities is positive
for a firm, then it is responding to the audit notch. A placebo test is used to rule out the
possibility of macroeconomic trends driving the differences in probabilities across years.
Using our improved methodology, we estimate that any firm having revenue up to Rs.15
million in 2011 has the opportunity to escape third-party audit by bunching below the
threshold - defined at Rs.10 million. In comparison, the upper bound of the neighborhood
in which the firms respond to the notch as calculated by the static analysis is considerably
lower, at Rs.11.5 million.
Now, we can use a differences-in-differences design to calculate the intention-to-treat
effect of the removal of audit requirement on tax payments. We use RST or restricted
share transfer firms—defined as firms which have restrictions on the sale of their securities
to non-shareholders—as the treated group if their revenue in the year before the policy
change is in the treatment neighborhood. Firms without any restrictions on the sale of
their securities, non-RST firms, who report revenue in the same neighborhood, form the
comparison group.4 Even though non-RST firms are also subject to third-party audit, the
extra audit does not affect their tax payments. In contrast to the RST firms, the managers
of non-RST firms are less likely to be shareholders5 and as a result, their share of extra
profits earned by under-reporting taxes is smaller. Thus, the managers of non-RST firms
are less likely to evade taxes, with or without third-party reporting (Crocker and Slemrod
4We define firms that register as private firms under The Companies Act as RST firms and firms that
register under the category of public firms as non-RST firms. Both kind of firms can be privately held or
government owned. In contrast to RST firms, the non-RST firms have the option to list themselves on the
stock exchange.
5The proportion of shareholders to managers is comparatively larger in non-RST firms than RST firms due
to statutory and operational requirements (see appendix A.1.1). Thus, the probability of a manager being a
shareholder is lower in a non-RST firm than a RST firm.
4
(2005)).6
We have three main findings. First, the firms respond to the audit-notch by bunching
below the threshold to escape third-party audit. We also find evidence that the bunching
of firms is closely related to the shifts in the thresholds during the sample period. Further-
more, firms that bunch below the threshold report lower fee paid to the auditor suggesting
that these auditors are no longer doing tax audits of the firms.
Second, third-party auditors, despite the conflict of interest, raise tax compliance by
increasing tax payments of the firms. We reach this conclusion by flipping the difference-
in-differences result – RST firms reduce their tax payments by Rs.41,000 ($736) once
they have an opportunity to escape third-party audit, as compared to non-RST firms. This
represents a 20 percent reduction in taxes from their base-year mean tax liability. The
decline in the taxable income is Rs.102,000 ($1,832), which is 16 percent of the base-year
mean income.
Third, the audit effectiveness varies with firm and industry-level characteristics. Firms
with fewer workers show greater reduction in their tax payments because their resource
cost of evasion is lower. Additionally, the paper-trails generated by the industry in which
the firm operates is positively correlated with the reduction in tax payments. One possible
explanation could be that third-party auditors can easily verify traceable transactions and
thus, firms with many such transactions have stronger incentives to escape third-party
audit.
Finally, we conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the notched audit policy by using the
estimated coefficients and a framework described in the literature (Almunia and Lopez-
Rodriguez (2018), Slemrod (1994), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1985)). The marginal cost is
the fee charged by the external auditor. The marginal benefit is the reduction in expendi-
ture incurred by firm to cover-up tax evasion. The amount of evasion is itself lowered due
to the extra audit. Our calculations suggest that adding one firm under third-party audit
increases both government revenue and net social benefit. Relatedly, the optimal audit
threshold might be lower than the current statutory limit, under strong assumptions.
This study contributes to several strands of literature. Broadly, by evaluating the role
of private agents in governance, it contributes to the literature on building state capability
to achieve development goals (for an extensive discussion see Andrews, Woolcock and
Pritchett (2017)). Specifically, we speak to the literature on third-party audits where both
theoretical (Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012)) and empirical literature (Duflo et al.
6Crocker and Slemrod (2005) show that penalties imposed on the tax manager are more effective in
reducing evasion than those imposed on shareholders, even in the presence of contracts that incentivize
managers to evade taxes.
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(2013a); Jiang, Stanford and Xie (2012); Griffin and Tang (2011)) have concluded that
conflict of interest overwhelms the effective functioning of private auditors. On the other
hand, some work has shown that a few auditors do serve their clients effectively because of
reputational concerns and demand for quality (Stolper (2009); Duflo et al. (2013b)). This
paper’s finding that private auditors can be effective in raising tax compliance, while being
cost-effective, provides a scalable and sustainable policy option to augment state capacity.
The strength of this study lies in leveraging the administrative data to assess the impact
of third-party audit on the key outcome variables – tax payments and taxable income.
Measuring the responsiveness of tax payments to audit intensity, focus of this study, is
necessary to design the optimal design of tax administration, and to evaluate the trade-off
between improving tax administration versus changing the tax rates to raise government
revenue (Keen and Slemrod (2017)). Additionally, this study complements to the literature
of decreasing tax evasion by using various instruments such as government audits (Basri
et al. (2019), Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2018)); third-party information (Pomeranz
(2015), Kleven et al. (2011)); performance pay (Khan, Khwaja and Olken (2016)), among
others.
Our final contribution is methodological. Bunching analysis has become a preferred
method to estimate the impact of a notched policy in several settings–optimal taxation
(Kleven and Waseem (2013), Bachas and Soto (2018)); housing markets (Best and Kleven
(2018)); fuel economy (Ito and Sallee (2018)), among others. There is a nascent literature
on dynamic bunching that improves the static analysis by incorporating path-dependence
(Marx (2018)) and predicting the counterfactual value of the running variable using non-
parametric methods (Blomquist et al. (2018), Bertanha, McCallum and Seegert (2019)).
We propose an alternate methodology to study the effect of a notch by incorporating strate-
gic concerns.
The third-party audit policy experiment has been studied in a working paper by Tantri
(2017) using Prowess data which, as discussed before, contains a non-representative sam-
ple of small firms. He finds that firms which are exempt from third-party audit pay higher
taxes. The explanation is that under third-party audit firms pay a portion of their taxes
to auditors as bribes, and once these firms are exempt from the third-party audit, they
increase the tax payments as following the law of land increases their utility. The iden-
tification strategy uses firms above the notch, in the year before the policy change, as
control group, while excluding firms below the notch from the treatment group. This can
potentially bias the results because administrative data shows that the firms that were
slightly above the audit notch in the year before the policy change start bunching below
the threshold after the introduction of the notch. These firms, therefore, should be part
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of the treatment group. This paper, on the other hand, develops a theoretical framework
to incorporate dynamic responses of the firms to a notch without any assumptions regard-
ing honesty in the utility function. It also studies a distinct set of questions. We leverage
data from the universe of taxpayers and use a novel identification strategy that combines
dynamic bunching and differences-in-differences methods.
1.2 Context: Tax Law, Third-party Auditors and Companies
In this section we describe the salient features of corporate income tax law, the role
of private auditors in implementing the law, and the differences between restricted share
transfer (RST) and non-RST firms relevant for our analysis.
This study focuses on the firms that register as companies under the Companies Act
and are recognized as a separate category of tax payers under the Indian income tax law.7
The corporate income tax rate was 30 percent for all the domestic companies from 2009-
15 and was reduced to 29 percent in 2016 for companies with revenue less than Rs.50
million in 2014.8 In some cases, the company might have to pay a minimum alternate
tax.9
All companies above a specified revenue threshold undergo third-party tax audit. This
threshold was increased twice during our sample period. It was increased from Rs.4 mil-
lion to Rs.6 million in 2010 and then to Rs.10 million in 2012. This audit is done by
licensed auditors called Chartered Accountants (CA) and the audit reports must be filed
along with the tax returns to the tax department.10. However, the tax department can
officially audit any company independently. The third-party tax audit places significant
compliance requirements on the company, which must now get minute tax-related details
of its books of accounts certified by the CA. Examples of extra information include: (i)
Details of all persons from whom loans have been taken or given during the year; (ii) De-
7There are seven category of taxpayers – Individuals, Hindu Undivided Families, Companies, Partnership
Firms, Association of Persons, Local Authorities and Artificial Juridical Entities
8In addition to the tax, there is a surcharge for companies having net taxable income in excess of Rs.10
million and an education cess of 3 percent on the tax and surcharge paid. Less than 4 percent of the
companies in our sample were liable to pay cess and surcharge in any year. More than 95 percent of the
companies in our sample qualified for the tax rate cut in 2016.
9If the taxes paid by the company are less than 18.5 percent of the book profits then the company has to
pay MAT. The extra tax paid by the company, over and above its normal tax liability is available to it as MAT
credit. This credit can be carried forward for up to 15 years and adjusted against actual tax liability in the
future.
10All firms must undergo another audit, known as statutory audit, which is filed to the Ministry of Corpo-
rate Affairs (MCA). This is also done by a CA which can be the same person conducting tax audit. According
to our conversations with the tax officials, there is no exchange of information between the MCA and the
Ministry of finance which is responsible for tax audits.
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tails of all persons whose tax has been withheld; (iii) Quantitative description of stock; (iv)
Depreciation schedule of every asset; (v) Details of payments to related parties. Besides in-
formation cost, the firms also have to pay an auditor’s fee to the CA. The fee is determined
according to several factors such as complexity of the firm’s operations, location of the
firms, among others. Non-compliance with respect to the tax audit report carries a penalty
of 0.5% of the turnover of the company subject to a maximum penalty of Rs.150,000.
The Chartered Accountants are a class of professional private auditors in India who get
their license after clearing a competitive exam. They are hired and paid by the firms to do
the tax audit, which can create a potential conflict of interest. On the other hand, there are
several checks to help them perform their duty independently. First, the appointment of the
CA must be done by the board of directors. This means that the CAs cannot be ordinarily
removed by the company once appointed unless there are valid grounds to do so which are
required to be recorded. Second, they are regulated by the Chartered Accountants Act and
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), a self-regulating professional body.
This body has drafted an ethical code which mandates that CAs cannot receive excessive
fees, and it has the power to revoke the license in case of violations to the ethical code.
Lastly, if the government agencies find inconsistencies in the report of the CA, they can
recommend imposition of fines and even cancellation of their license to practice11.
Firms under the Companies Act can register themselves as private or public firms, which
affects their tax compliance. The latter have restrictions on the transfer of their shares to
non-shareholders, which is why we call them restricted share transfer firms. Public or non-
RST firms have no such restrictions. Additionally, the minimum number of shareholders of
the company is higher for non-RST firms and the salary of their managers is capped. (Ap-
pendix A.1.1 describes the differences in more detail.) These differences make non-RST
firms more tax compliant for two reasons. First, the managers of non-RST firms might have
to split the gains of tax evasion with more shareholders, while facing similar punishment
as a RST firm’s manager, if they get caught. Second, if a non-RST firm lists itself on the
stock exchange, then it has to release information of any tax dispute in the public domain
which might decrease the valuation of it’s stock. Because of these institutional reasons,
the non-RST firms are more tax compliant with or without the third-party audit and make
for a valid comparison group. We provide evidence of this claim in the Data and Results
sections.
11According to Institute of Chartered Accountants of India Year Book (2018), there are 132,480 practicing
CAs in 2018. Total disciplinary cases considered by ICAI were 598.
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1.3 Theoretical Framework and Empirical Strategy
1.3.1 Strategic response of firms to a notch
We use differences-in-difference strategy to estimate the intention-to-treat effect of the
third-party notch on tax payments. We exploit an exogenous policy change that increased
the revenue threshold of the notch to estimate the treatment effect. In response to the
introduction of audit notch, firms in its neighborhood manipulate their revenue to bunch
below the threshold. Thus, we need to identify the revenue bandwidth in which firms are
potentially affected by the change in the audit notch. The standard method to find this
bandwidth is static bunching model, developed by Kleven and Waseem in 2013.
In the absence of dynamic behavior, the static model works well. It assumes that bunch-
ers originate from the right-side of the threshold and bunch precisely below it. Hence, the
researchers can visually determine the region where the excess mass of bunchers are lo-
cated in response to the notch. The region from where the bunchers originated from is
determined by estimating a counterfactual density after imposing the condition that the
excess mass is equal to missing mass. If firms respond to the notch in a strategic way, then
the treatment neighborhood estimated by the static model might be biased. For instance,
some firms may slow down their growth resulting in diffused excess mass. The visual
method of determining where the bunchers come from may miss some of this excess mass.
Consequently, the upper bound of the region where the bunchers originated from would
be under-estimated.
We now present a formal framework to develop the above intuition, and address the
concerns in the empirical section.
1.3.1.1 Baseline Static Model of Homogeneous Firms
We modify the model presented in Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2018), henceforth
referred to as AL(2018), to analyze the behavior of firms to an audit notch. Consider a
firm that uses inputs x and z to produce output y according to the production function
y = ψf(x, z), where ψ is the productivity parameter and f(., .) is continuous, increasing
and concave in both the arguments. The firms vary according to the exogenous parameter
ψ which is distributed according to the density d0(ψ) over the base [ψ, ψ¯]. The prices of x
and z are w and q respectively, while y is the numeraire good.
Let τ be the tax rate on reported profit, and x be the only tax-deductible input. The firm
chooses to report y¯ and under-report income y by u ≡ y − y¯. There is a strictly increasing,
continuous and convex resource cost of under-reporting given by k(u). The probability of
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the firm getting caught, in any period, is given by δ = φh(u), where φ is the effective audit
intensity faced by the firm. This includes audit by both the tax authorities and the CAs12.
h(.) is increasing and convex in u. If the firm get caught, it faces a penalty rate of θ on
evaded taxes. The firm also pays an audit fee of c to the auditors.
The firm chooses x, z and u to maximize expected profits, given by: E[pi] = (1 −
τ)[ψf(x, z)− u− wx]− c− qz − k(u) + u− φh(u)[τu+ θτu]. The FOCs are:
ψfx(x, z) = w
ψfz(x, z) = q/(1− τ)
τ [1− φh(u)(1 + θ)] = ku(u) + τu(1 + θ)φhu(u) (1.1)
Since all the firms are similar in terms of production technology and the functional
forms of resource cost of under-reporting and audit intensity; ∃ density function of re-
ported revenue g0(y¯) which is decreasing and convex in the domain [y¯(ψ), y¯(ψ¯)].
1.3.1.2 Multi-period Model of Heterogeneous firms with Strategic Mis-reporting
In this sub-section, we depart from the AL model by assuming a multi-period model
where firms experience growth of revenue. We also model the change in the audit in-
tensity by introducing the audit notch. A combination of heterogeneous resource cost of
evasion and the belief that reporting zero growth for multiple time periods can increase
the probability of caught causes diffused excess mass - contrary to what is presumed in the
static analysis.
At t0, the firms get a random productivity drawn from the underlying distribution, and
then grow by a factor of γ in each period. For analytical simplicity, in the counterfactual
baseline situation all firms are subject to third-party audit which makes them report their
true income in all the time periods. The shift in the density from time period t0 to t1
is shown in Figure 1.1. Note that because firms differ in terms of resource cost of eva-
sion, there now exists a a joint distribution of firms with density g˜(ψ, h(u)) on the domain
(ψ, ψ¯)× (k(u), k¯(u)).
Now, instead of all firms being subject to third-party audit, an audit-notch is introduced
in t1 at the income level yρ. Firms below this threshold are exempt from the third-party
audit. The exemption decreases the audit intensity by dφ. Firms that have lower cost
of evasion can evade more, once they are exempt from third-party audit. Figure 1.2 de-
picts the change in the density due to introduction of the audit-notch. The green dashed
line represents the density in presence of audit-notch. According to the behavior in the
presence of notch, the firms can be classified into 4 categories:
12φ represents “monitoring effort parameter ” in AL(2018)
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1) Small firms – Let y¯L be the income at t0 where an income growth of γ results in
income of yρ in t1. Therefore, y¯L is equal to yρ/(1 + γ). Firms with productivity draw in
the range of [ψ, ψL) and income [y¯(ψ), y¯L) get exempt from the third-party audit after the
introduction of the notch. These firms don’t undergo third-party audit even if they report
their entire growth. On average, the small firms will under-report some portion of their
growth resulting in downward shift of the density.
2) Potential Left-origin bunchers – Firms with income in the range [y¯L, yρ) in t0 will
grow above the threshold limit in t1. Firms with small resource cost will bunch below the
audit-threshold. A proportion of bunchers will strategically mis-report to be well below
the threshold rather than at the threshold, if they think that reporting zero growth can
substantially increase their probability of getting caught13 [See A.1.2 for a formal proof
of this claim]. These firms will report small incremental growth in future time periods to
remain below the threshold, and avoid the attention of tax authorities. As a result, the
bunchers will not be concentrated precisely below the notch, but diffused in an area below
the notch. This is shown as a plateau in Figure 1.2 for illustrative purposes.
Firms that have high resource cost will not react to notch, and report growth. Conse-
quently, there would be diffused mass above the threshold instead of a hole in the density
– which is also predicted in the static model.
3) Potential Right-origin bunchers - There would be a firm with income y¯H in t0 such
that y¯H > y¯ρ, which will be indifferent between remaining above or bunching below the
notch. For this firm, the E[x, z, u | φ, ψH , c] = E[x, z, u | (φ− dφ), ψH , 0]. Among firms with
reported income in the range [yρ, y¯H) in t0, a proportion will bunch below the threshold
if their resource cost of evasion is not high. As compared to left-origin bunchers, smaller
fraction of right-origin bunchers will strategically under-report far below the threshold.
The reason is that they are mis-reporting more than the left-origin bunchers in terms of
levels to get below the notch, which increases their resource cost of evasion.14 The re-
maining firms with high resource cost will not bunch and continue to be under third-party
audit.
4) Big firms - For all the firms with income above y¯H in t0, the cost of bunching (resource
cost and increase in probability of getting caught) is strictly greater than the benefit. These
firms will report the growth and continue to be under third-party audit. This implies that
13Not all the bunchers will strategically mis-report, because of heterogeneity in resource cost. There could
be other sources of friction like uncertainties in returns on investment which translate into stochastic growth
and firms are not able to reach the notch precisely. Such factors are similar to optimization frictions that
result in diffused missing mass in the static model of Kleven and Waseem (2013).
14Also, the optimization frictions would be less for right-origin bunchers as compared to the left-origin
bunchers, because they have to misreport on y¯0 to reach the notch. In contrast, the left-origin bunchers have
to make investments with uncertain returns to grow from y¯0 and reach the threshold precisely.
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in Figure 1.2, the density in t1 after the income level of y¯H + γy¯H remains unaffected due
to the introduction of the notch.
Bias in static analysis: In the empirical application of the static analysis, the lower bound
(the minimum value of the running variable where the bunchers locate themselves) is de-
termined visually to be the point where the density has positive slope. In figure 1.3, this
would be y¯SL. In our model, the excess mass of bunchers starts from y¯L due to strategic
mis-reporting and optimization frictions. Error in determining the lower bound will cause
under-estimation of the actual mass of bunchers. The upper bound of bunching (maximum
value of running variable where the bunchers come from) is estimated by fitting a coun-
terfactual density so that the excess mass is equal to the missing mass. The upper bound
in the Figure 1.3 is y¯SH which is an under-estimate of the true upper bound: y¯H + γy¯H .
1.3.2 Empirical Strategy
Given the concern that the estimates from static analysis can be biased, we first describe
a novel method to identify the treatment region where the firms manipulate their revenue
in response to the introduction of the notch. Then, we explain our difference-in-differences
model to estimate the effect of third-party audit on the firm’s tax payments.
1.3.2.1 Estimation of the treatment neighborhood
Recall that the policy change relevant for our analysis is the change in audit notch from
Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million. Hence, the lower bound of the treatment neighborhood is
equal to Rs.6 million as all firms between Rs.6 million and Rs.10 million are now exempt
from the third-party audit. To estimate the upper bound of the treatment neighborhood,
we calculate the probability of being in the bunching region conditional on lagged income,
where the bunching region is defined as the revenue bin just below the notch. A firm i is
placed in bin bt of width ω if its reported income in a year t, y¯it ∈ [b, b + ω). For all the
firms in the bin bt−1, the probability of being in the bunching region(BR) in the year t is
given by:
Πt,bt−1 =
∑
i
[1(y¯it ∈ BR) | (y¯i,t−1 ∈ bt−1)]
/∑
i
1(y¯i,t−1 ∈ bt−1) (1.2)
For our analysis, if the policy change happens in period t, then we calculate the probability
of being in the bunching region one year later (t + 1) conditional on income in the year
before the policy change (t − 1). This probability is calculated one year after the policy
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change as firms take some time to adjust their revenue levels in reaction to the policy
change.
However, a firm can also be in the bunching region due to other reasons such as natural
growth. We estimate the effect of these other reasons by calculating the probability of
being in the bunching region before the introduction of the notch (Πt−1,bt−3) conditional
on two-year lagged income. The difference between the two calculated probabilities will
capture the incentive of firms to be in the bunching region in response to the notch. The
upper bound of the treatment region is b∗ such that,
Πt+1,b∗t−1 − Πt−1,b∗t−3 = 0 and b∗ > yρ
where, yρ is the revenue-level of the notch. Any firm with yi,t−1 ∈ [yρ, yb∗+ω] has the
opportunity to modify its revenue, once the threshold moves to Rs.10 million. Firm with
revenue above b∗ in the year before the policy change is too big to react to the introduction
of the notch. In the Results section, we also develop a formal method to test if the prob-
ability of being in the bunching region is significantly different for firms in the treatment
region versus non-treatment region.
A potential concern with our method is that inter-temporal macroeconomic changes
in the economy can lead to mechanical differences between the predicted probabilities
of being in a particular bin across years. To alleviate such concerns, we calculate the
probability of being in a placebo region that is unrelated to any notch. We expect the
difference in probabilities to be insignificant for the placebo region, to rule out the effect
of macroeconomic changes.
1.3.2.2 Difference-in-Differences Analysis
After identifying the treatment region, we can calculate the intention-to-treat (ITT)
effect E[Zi | Ti = 1]− E[Zi | Ti = 0], where Zi is the outcome of interest of firm i and Ti is
the treatment assignment. We consider RST firms in the treatment region to be affected by
the notch (Ti = 1), whereas the non-RST firms in the treatment region remain unaffected
by the notch(Ti = 0). The institutional reason behind non-RST firms being more tax
compliant are discussed in Section 1.2.
We use a difference-in-differences strategy to ensure that the differences in means be-
tween the RST and non-RST firms capture the effect of the audit-notch and not any other
confounder. Taking advantage of the panel structure of the data, we estimate regressions
of the form:
TaxDueist = αi + βtreati × aftert + λt + γst+ uist (1.3)
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where the dependent variable is tax paid by firm i operating in industry s at year t. The
coefficient of interest is β which is interpreted as the difference in tax payments between
the comparison and treatment firms, before and after the change in policy in 2012. Re-
gressions include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant differences across various
firms. Year fixed effects capture any macro-economic changes that affect both the treat-
ment and comparison group in any given year. Finally, we also include industry-specific
time trends to control for any heterogeneous trend in the tax payments across different
industries.
To validate the Difference in Difference estimates, we establish the absence of any
pre-trends between the treatment and comparison group by conducting an event-study
analysis. We obtain year-wise diff-in-diff coefficients from a regression of the following
form:
TaxDueist = αi +
∑
j
βj treati × 1(year = j)t + λt + γst+ ist (1.4)
where the coefficients of interest are βj which are equal to the difference in tax payment
between the treatment and comparison firms in year j, as compared to the base year. The
base year is defined as the year before the policy change.
1.4 Data
Our primary data source is anonymized tax returns filed by small companies in India
from 2009-16 which are obtained from the Ministry of Finance, India. It also includes
the profit and loss account and balance sheet of the company. For our analysis, we use
the reported revenue; details of expenses; auditor’s fee; and profit before interest, taxes
and depreciation(PBITD) from the profit and loss statement of the company. As discussed
before, the firms hire auditors for both tax and statutory audit. The tax form records the
total fee paid and doesn’t contain audit-wise fee details. Information on taxable income
and tax liability is obtained from the tax schedule of income tax form. The data also has
information on the basic characteristics of the company like the sector of activity which we
use for heterogeneity analysis.
Next, we describe the construction of the sample used in the analysis. Due to the large
differences in the mean and median of the variables, except revenue (see Table 1.1), we
remove the effect of the outliers by winsorizing the data above the 97th percentile to that
level for each year. For variables that can have negative values, we censor the tales of the
distribution at 1.5th and 98.5th percentile. There can also be extensive margin responses
to the change in audit notch. For instance, a firm might split into two firms and both
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may report revenue just below the notch. This might affect the composition of the sample
after the policy change. Therefore, we use a balanced sample of firms in our main analysis
and test if the results are sensitive to this assumption. We also observe that some firms
in the sample report zero revenue. These firms could be shell companies and might react
very differently to third-party audit. Thus, we exclude them from our main analysis and
only include them in the sensitivity analysis. Finally, some firms switch between RST and
non-RST firm status. Less than 5 percent of the firms switch their status in any given year.
Among the firms that do change their status, 58 percent firms change their status more
than once in the sample period, which suggests errors in coding or mistakes while filling
up the tax form. We include such firms only in the sensitivity tests. Our final sample
consists of around 21,800 firms.
The summary statistics also validate the assumption of using non-RST firms as com-
parison group as they tend to more tax compliant than RST firms. For instance, before
2012, when both treatment and comparison firms were under third-party audit, the tax
to revenue ratio of non-RST firms was, on average, 2.4 percent while for the RST firms
it was 1.6 percent. A possible reason is that RST firm report lower business profits as a
proportion of revenue.15. Business profits are considered to be most manipulable part of
the tax return as the taxpayers do not need to submit any supporting documents to verify
the level of business income. RST firms report only 11 percent of their revenue as profit,
while the non-RST firms report around 20 percent of their revenue as profits.
Finally, non-parametric evidence indicates that RST firms react sharply to the changes
in audit notches while non-RST firms are not that responsive. Appendix Figures A.1 to A.8
show that as the audit notch increases, the mass of RST firms disappears from below the
old threshold and appears instead at the new threshold. On the other hand, the non-RST
firms bunch at round numbers that may or may not be related to the audit thresholds.
Appendix Figure A.9 shows the comparison in bunching behavior between RST and non-
RST firms. The data is pooled for all the years after the introduction of the notch to
increase the sample size of non-RST firms.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Size of the treatment neighborhood
In this section, we estimate the upper bound of the treatment neighborhood using the
difference in probabilities method described in Section 1.3.2.1. The lower bound is Rs.6
15Business profits are called PBITD in the tax returns, that is, Profits before interest, taxes and deductions
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million where the previous notch was defined. First, we calculate the probability of a
firm to report revenue in the bunching region after the introduction of the notch at Rs.10
million, conditional on its revenue before the introduction of the notch. The bunching
region is defined as Rs.9 million to Rs.10 million.16 The blue curve, in Figure 1.4, shows
the probability of being in the bunching region in 2013, conditional on revenue in 2011.
We calculate the probability in 2013 instead of 2012 (the year of the policy change) to
allow firms to react to the policy change. However, the firms can in the bunching region
for reasons other than the effect of the notch. We estimate the effect of these other reasons
by calculating the probability of being in the bunching region in 2011, the year before
the introduction of the notch, conditional on revenue in 2009 – shown by the red line in
Figure 1.4. The revenue bandwidth in which there is a positive difference between the two
probabilities is where the firms changed their revenue in response to the notch. Figure 1.4
shows that the firms with revenue between Rs.8 million and Rs.15 million are more likely
to bunch below the notch after the introduction of the notch in 2012. Thus, we consider
Rs.15 million to be the upper bound of the treatment neighborhood.
A concern is that the slowdown in the Indian economy during these years can mechan-
ically drive the differences in probabilities, as firms grow slowly. To alleviate this concern,
we conduct a placebo test where we graph the probability of being in revenue bins that are
unrelated to the notch. We calculate the probabilities of a firm reporting revenue between
Rs.18-19 million and Rs.24-25 million, before and after the policy change. Appendix Fig-
ures A.10 and A.11 show that there are no systematic differences in the probabilities.
Next, we use the difference-in-probabilities method to provide evidence that non-RST
firms are a valid comparison group. Appendix Figure A.12 shows that only some non-RST
firms on the left-side of the notch are more likely to report revenue in the bunching region
after the policy change. If a small proportion of public firms do respond to the notch,
this will cause the difference-in-differences estimates an under-estimate of the treatment
effect.
Finally, we use a regression framework to test if the firms that were in the treatment
neighborhood, before the policy change, are more likely to report revenue in the bunching
region after the policy change as compared to firms that are were just outside the treatment
neighborhood. The later type of firms are either too small or too big to react to the change
in the audit notch. We run the following specification at the level of revenue bins:
16Any firm below the notch is exempt from undergoing third-party audit. So ideally, we should calculate
the probability of reporting revenue less than Rs.10 million. We don’t do this, because the notch was pre-
viously defined at Rs.6 million. Thus, the probability of being just above Rs 6 million will be lower in the
pre-period which can inflate the differences in probabilities across time-periods.
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Πt,bt−2 = αb + β1.aftert + β2.1(bt−2 ∈ [k1, k2])× aftert + t,bt−2 (1.5)
where Πt,bt−2 is the probability of a firm reporting revenue in the bunching region in
year t, conditional on reporting revenue in bin b in the year t − 2. k1 and k2 represent
the lower and upper bounds of the treatment neighborhood. From Figure 1.4, we infer
these to be Rs.8 million and Rs.15 million, respectively. We expect β2 to be positive and
significant for RST firms when we correctly specify the bunching region. Appendix Table
A.1 shows that if a RST firm was in the treatment neighborhood, then it was 2.18% more
likely to be in the bunching region after the policy change as compared to a firm that
was not in the treatment neighborhood (see column 1). On the other hand, for non-RST
firms, the coefficient is statistically indistinguishable from 0 (column 4), suggesting that,
in comparison to RST firms, the non-RST firms are not as responsive to the change in audit
notch. We also conduct a placebo test by mis-specifying the bunching region and using
the sample of RST firms. Columns 2 and 3 show that, as expected, there is no significant
change in the probability after the policy change .
1.5.2 Effect of third-party audit on government revenue and firms
After identifying the treatment neighborhood, we calculate the ITT effect, where treat-
ment is defined as getting exempt from third-party audit after the audit notch was moved
from Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million in 2012. RST firms, which have revenue between Rs.6-
15 million in 2011, form the treatment group, while non-RST firms in the same revenue
bandwidth form the comparison group.
First, we calculate the effect of policy change on tax payments using the difference-in-
differences estimation strategy given by equation 1.3. After the change in the policy, the
RST firms reduce their tax payments by around Rs.41,000 as compared to the non-RST
firms (see columns 1 and 3 of Table 1.2), which is equal to 20 percent of the average tax
payment or approximately 5 percent of median business profits in 2011. Thus, exemption
from third-party causes a significant drop in the tax payments of the firms. If we flip
this result, it implies that third-party auditors are effective in increasing the government
revenue, despite a potential conflict of interest. This result is also consistent with the
bunching of firms observed just below the audit notch as the firms try to avoid paying
extra taxes.
The identification strategy relies on the absence of pre-trends between the treatment
and comparison groups before the change in the policy. We use an event analysis approach
as described by equation 1.4 to test pre-trends. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 1.2 show that
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before the change in the policy in 2012, there are no significant differences between the tax
payments of RST and non-RST firms. The differences becomes negative and even grows
over time after the change in the audit notch (see Figure 1.7). This is expected because
some of the treated firms might slow down their growth to remain below the audit notch,
while the comparison group firms will continue to grow.
To decrease their tax payments, the firms might reduce their taxable income by under-
reporting income. We find that there is a significant drop in the taxable income reported
by RST firms after the policy change. The decline in the taxable income is approximately
Rs.102,000, which is equal to 16 percent of the average taxable income in 2011.17 Some
sources of income are easier to manipulate than others. For instance, business profits can
be mis-reported with relative ease since firms don’t have to give any extra information on
the tax form to prove the accuracy of their claim. Conversely, it is harder to mis-specify
other sources of income such as rental income or claim tax-exemptions like area-based
exemptions, which require documentary proof. Columns 1 & 2 of Table 1.3 show that RST
firms, as compared to the non-RST firms, decrease their business profits after the policy
change. There is an average decline of around Rs.700K (56 percent of the average profits
in 2011) in the PBITD i.e. profit before interest, tax and depreciation. To rule out pre-
trends, we estimate year-wise difference-in-difference coefficients, and plot them using
Figure 1.8-1.10. Reassuringly, the difference between private and public firms for all the
variables is insignificant before the policy change.
Finally, we check if there is a decline in fee paid by the company to the auditors as firms
are exempt from the third-party audit. Table 1.3 also shows a significant decline in the fee
paid to the auditors by the RST firms. The decline is modest in magnitude (9 percent of the
average fee paid in 2011) as the firms report combined expenditure on both the statutory
and tax audit in the tax form.
Sensitivity Analysis: Here, we address concerns regarding sample selection and describe
placebo tests to show that our results are not driven by factors unrelated to the policy
changes such as slowdown in the economy.
Appendix Table A.2 shows the difference-in-differences results as we relax the con-
straints imposed while constructing the sample. In our main analysis, we censored the
variables at the 97th percentile to remove the effect of the outliers. Panels A and B show
that as we include these outliers, the treatment effects become more salient. Thus, the
17The decrease in tax payments, found eariler, is not exactly equal to 30 percent of the decline in the tax
base. The difference might be because of the minimum alternate tax (MAT) provision in the tax code. In the
appendix table A.5, we show that firms that pay taxes under MAT show more decline in the tax payments
than firms that pay taxes under the regular income tax schedule, although the coefficient is not significantly
differently from 0, as only a few firms pay MAT.
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magnitude of the treatment effects that we find in the main analysis can be viewed as
conservative estimates of the true effects. To exclude the extensive margin responses to
the policy change, we used a balanced panel of firms in the main analysis. If we use the
unbalanced sample instead, the results remain statistically unchanged (see Panel C). In
Panel D, we include firms that report nil revenue in the sample period. These firms were
excluded in the main analysis because they could be shell companies. We find that the re-
sults are similar to the ones found in the main analysis. We now include firms that change
their status between RST and non-RST firms during the sample period. Panel E shows that
the magnitude of the coefficients decreases, however, they remain qualitatively similar to
ones we found earlier. As discussed before, some of the observed switching might be due
to errors in coding which can potentially introduce measurement errors in the values of
other variables and bias the magnitude of the coefficients towards zero. Finally, in the last
panel of the table , we run our main specifications on the entire sample without imposing
any restrictions. The results remain qualitatively unchanged.
In our main analysis, we use the value of the old audit notch, Rs.6 million, as the
lower bound of the treatment neighborhood. A potential concern is that firms just above
Rs.6 million in 2011 had an opportunity to bunch as they were close to the threshold.
Including these firms in the sample could cause selection bias as they chose to not bunch
at the old threshold. To alleviate this concern, we restrict the treatment neighborhood to
firms that are potentially too large to bunch at the old threshold in 2011. We now use a
treatment neighborhood of Rs.10 million to Rs.15 million. Appendix table A.3 shows that
the magnitude of the treatment effect is now larger than what we found earlier. This is
expected because now we are only including the right-origin bunchers who, contrary to
left-origin bunchers, would have to decrease their revenue to bunch below the threshold
and get exempt from the third-party audit.
Finally, we conduct a placebo test by mis-specifying the treatment region that gets
affected in response to the policy change in 2011. In theory, the big firms, as defined in
the model, should not get affected by the notch because the cost of manipulating their
revenue to bunch below the threshold is too high for them. Thus, we consider private
firms with revenue between Rs.16-28 million in 2011 as the treatment group. All the
public firms in the same revenue bandwidth form the comparison group. Appendix Table
A.4 shows that the coefficients are insignificant, except for audit fee which is significant
only at the 10% level. Moreover, the magnitude of the change in profits, taxable income
and taxes is comparable to what we found in the main analysis, even though the average
firm size is twice as large now.
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1.5.3 Comparison with the static model
In this section, we analyze how the treatment effects change if we estimate the upper
bound of the treatment neighborhood using the static bunching analysis. We construct
a counterfactual distribution, representing the state of the world without audit notch, by
fitting a polynomial function on the observed distribution after excluding observations in
the bunching region. The lower bound of the region is determined visually as the point
where the slope of the distribution becomes positive. Then, we guess the upper bound of
the region as a point just above the notch and keep increasing it till the excess mass due to
bunching is equal to the missing mass. Here excess (and reduced) mass is the difference
between observed and counterfactual distribution. (For more details on static bunching
analysis, please refer to Kleven and Waseem 2013.)
Coming to our context, we first graph the frequency distribution of the firms using
combined data of all the years after the policy change in 2012. Figure 1.5 shows the
distribution, where the firms are grouped in revenue bins of Rs.0.5 million. We visually
determine the lower bound as Rs.8.5 million, and construct the counterfactual distribution
by fitting a fourth-degree polynomial equation:
Cb =
4∑
i=0
βiY
i
b +
yub∑
b=ylb
δb1(Yb = b) + ηm + b (1.6)
where Cb is the actual count of firms in the bin b. A firm is in bin b if its income
yi ∈ [b, b + 0.5million). The β coefficients represent the polynomial terms, and δ coeffi-
cients are the dummies for bins in the omitted region and are interpreted as the difference
between the actual and counterfactual density. We also control for potential round-number
bunching by including dummy for whether the bin contains multiple of Rs.1 million. These
are represented by ηm in the equation. The standard errors are estimated by using a boot-
strapping procedure.
According to the static analysis, the upper bound of the treatment neighborhood is
Rs.11.5 million 18. The counterfactual density is shown in Figure 1.6. As discussed before,
this might be an under-estimate of the actual upper bound. In Appendix Table A.7, we
define the treatment neighborhood as spanning from Rs.6 million to Rs.11.5 million and
estimate the treatment effects. All the coefficients are smaller in magnitude than what we
found in our main analysis. This is expected because the new treatment neighborhood
excludes larger firms that responded to the audit-notch. However, none of the coefficients
18We calculate alternative estimates of the upper bound by changing the width of the revenue bins in the
appendix table A.6
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are significantly different from the estimates we found earlier because the proportion of
firms that get treated in the range of Rs.11.5-15 million is much smaller than the pro-
portion of treated firms in the overlapping region across the two alternative treatment
neighborhoods.
1.5.4 Heterogeneity in the effect of third-party audit
In this section, we explore if the effectiveness of the third-party audit changes as the
audit intensity faced by the firm or the cost of under-reporting income changes. We find
that, if the firms face high audit intensity or if they have low resource cost of under-
reporting , then they report lower taxes, once they are exempt from the third-party audit.
The audit intensity faced by the firm under third-party audit is correlated with the
paper-trails it creates during business transactions. Paper-trails help the auditor to catch
discrepancies in the tax form. We use the place of the firm in the supply chain as a proxy
for the paper-trails it generates. Under a value added tax(VAT) regime, firms which sell in-
termediate goods generate more receipts than the retail firms which sell final-consumption
goods. The reason is that both the supplier and consumer of an intermediate goods pro-
ducer demand receipts to claim tax credits under VAT. On the other hand, the final con-
sumer of a retailer doesn’t need a receipt as he can’t claim any tax credit. [Pomeranz
(2015), AL(2018)].
Since we do not have transaction-level data at the firm level, we use industry-level
supply-use tables(SUTs)19 that provide information on the final use of each industry’s out-
put. We match the industry description given in the SUTs to the industry codes reported by
the firms in the income tax form.(Details of the matching are given in the appendix table
A.8.) Each firm is given a score which is equal to the proportion of sales it makes to other
industries instead of the final consumer. Higher score implies higher paper-trails and thus,
more thorough audit by the private auditor.
We use the differences-in-differences framework used before, but now include a triple
interaction term (treati x afteri x UpstreamRatio) in equation 1.3. Table 1.4 column
1 shows that as the proportion of intermediate sales increases, firms decrease their tax
revenue. The bottom panel of the table shows that for firms operating at 90th percentile
of upstream ratio, the treatment effect is around 34% higher than what we found earlier.
On the other hand, firms that sell most of their products to final consumer do not find
it worthwhile to decrease their revenue to bunch below the threshold, as they face low
audit-intensity during the audit.
19We use the supply-use tables from 2011 which are compiled by the Ministry of Statistics and Program Im-
plementation. These tables can be found using the link: http://mospi.nic.in/publication/supply-use-tables
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Another factor that can affect the efficacy of third-party audit is the resource cost of
under-reporting incurred by the firm. We know from previous studies that an increase in
the number of agents who know about evasion decisions leads to an increase in the cost
of under-reporting (Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (2016)). Firms find it difficult to sustain
the collusive arrangements across several such agents who can whistleblow against the
firm due to reasons like monetary incentives from the government or preferences towards
honest behavior. These economic agents can be well-informed workers or incentivized
final consumers (Naritomi (2019)).
The tax returns do not contain information on the number of workers. We use the
ratio of expenditure on employees to the total expenditure of the firm to instrument for it.
However, labor intensity may not be perfectly correlated with the total number of workers.
Therefore, we also use the total labor expenditure of a firm as an alternative indicator for
number of employees.20
We find that firms with more workers do not change their tax payments once they have
an opportunity to get exempt from the third-party audit (see columns 2 & 3 of Table 1.4).
On the other hand, firms that employ fewer workers decrease their tax payments by 54
percent more than the average effect we found earlier.
1.6 Cost-Benefit Analysis and Optimal Audit Threshold
In this section, we develop a framework to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the third-
party audit policy with a notch, and use the estimates from our empirical analysis to assess
the net benefit of the Indian policy.
Building on the baseline model, the total welfare is equal to the after-tax profit of
the firms and the net government revenue. The change in audit-intensity, due to third-
party audit, changes the aggregate welfare only because of two factors - resource cost of
evasion and administrative cost of audit. In the absence of these two factors, welfare is
unaffected by the changes in audit intensity. Firms do not change their real output in
response to shocks to audit intensity. They only change their reported income21 which is
simply a transfer between the firms and the government and doesn’t affect total welfare.
Conversely, if the two factors are present, then an increase in audit intensity, on one hand,
20One potential issue with using total labor expenditure is that firms with highly productive workers
might have high labor cost but low number of workers. Therefore, we use both total and proportional labor
expenditure as a proxy for the total number of workers. The results using both the measures are consistent
with each other.
21This is because production and under-reporting decision are additively separable in our model. The
FOCs for the use of inputs in equation 1.1 do not depend on the audit intensity. Keen and Slemrod (2017)
and Basri et al. (2019) also use similar models.
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increases welfare because firms incur lower resource cost of under-reporting as they report
more income. On the other hand, increasing audit intensity causes reduction in welfare
because the firms have to pay for the audit22. The net impact of the change in audit-
intensity on welfare depends on these two countervailing effects.
We now modify the baseline model to develop the above intuition on the lines of AL
(2018). Let W represent the aggregate welfare. We now assume that the cost of audit,
borne by the firms, is a function of the audit-intensity and represented by c(φ). Further,
c(φ) is increasing and convex in φ. The audit intensity is chosen by the government. The
expected value of the welfare is given by the following equation:
E[W ] =
∫ y¯(ψ¯)
y¯(ψ)
{(1− τ)[ψf(x, z)− u− wx]− c(φ)− qz − k(u) + u− φh(u)[τu+ θτu]} .g0(y¯) dy¯
+
∫ y¯(ψ¯)
y¯(ψ)
{τ [ψf(x, z)− u− wx] + φh(u)[τu+ θτu]} .g0(y¯) dy¯
The first term in the curly bracket represents the expected after-tax profit of the firm, while
the second term represents the expected revenue of the government. Since the firms have
already chosen the inputs and under-reported income optimally, we can use the envelope
theorem while taking the derivative with respect to φ for the first term. The change in
expected welfare due to the change in audit-intensity is given by :
dE[W ]
dφ
=
∫ y¯(ψ¯)
y¯(ψ)
[
−τ du
dφ
+ φτ(1 + θ)
(
h(u)
du
dφ
+ u
∂h
∂u
du
dφ
)
− cφ(φ)
]
.g0(y¯) dy¯x
=
∫ y¯(ψ¯)
y¯(ψ)
[
−ku(u)du
dφ
− cφ(φ)
]
.g0(y¯) dy¯ (1.7)
The second equality follows by substituting the first-order condition obtained by taking the
derivative of the net profit of the firm with respect to the under-reported income in the
baseline model (see equation 1.1). The net welfare change is a function of total change in
resource cost of under-reporting and administrative cost.
To calculate the welfare change associated with the notch at Rs.10 million, we ask what
would be the welfare gain/loss if one more firm comes under third-party audit as a result
of lowering the notch by an epsilon rupee amount. By conducting the marginal analysis,
we don’t have to make assumptions across the entire distribution of firms using parameters
that are estimated locally. The average taxable income in the dominated region23 above
22Chetty (2009) develops analogous analysis in the context of personal taxation
23We estimated that firms under third-party audit pay Rs.2197 to the auditors. Data shows that firms
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the notch is Rs.496,626. According to the difference-in-differences estimates, the reduc-
tion in taxes and reported taxable income due to the notch is Rs.41,285 and Rs.102,575
respectively. This implies that the firms that were unable to bunch had to pay at least
Rs.41,285 extra, which is equal to 8.3 percent of the average reported taxable income.
Thus, ku(u) is 0.083. If we assume that this is locally constant for the firms, then the total
resource cost of evasion is 0.083 times the reduction in taxable income, which is equal
to Rs.8,514. This is the marginal welfare gain of auditing one more firm. The marginal
cost is the extra fee which firms pay to the auditors when they undergo tax-audit. In the
empirical section, we estimated this cost to be Rs. 2,574. Thus, the total welfare gain of
extending the third-party audit to one more firm is Rs.5,940 (US$107).
Finally, we use back-of-the-envelope calculations to obtain optimal audit threshold. If
we assume that the marginal resource cost of evasion is same for all the firms in the entire
distribution, then ku(u) = 0.083. Let the average change in the reported tax base as a
proportion of turnover (∆u/y¯) be equal to 102, 575/10, 000, 000 = 0.0102. The increase in
the administrative cost is Rs.2,574. Thus, the optimal threshold (y¯∗) can be derived from
the following formula: [∆u/y¯]× y¯∗ × ku(u) = cφ(φ). This gives us the optimal threshold to
be Rs.3,040,396. In 2009, this would imply adding around 51,000 firms in the third-party
audit regime24. Thus, under the above assumptions, it would be welfare enhancing to have
more firms under the third-party audit by reducing the audit-threshold.25
1.7 Conclusion
In this study, we evaluate a notched policy implemented by the Indian tax department
where, conditional on reported revenues being greater than a specified threshold, firms are
required to undergo a third-party audit before filing their tax returns. Since the auditors
are chosen and paid by the firms, they face a potential conflict of interest. Despite this,
we find that the policy is effective in increasing government revenue as firms report higher
taxable income. Firms, also try to escape the audit by bunching below the audit notch.
The effect of the policy is heterogeneous. First, firms that generate substantial paper
having turnover between Rs.10 million and Rs.10.1 million have profit equal to 6 percent of the turnover.
This implies that the no firm should be located in the region between Rs.10 million and Rs.10.036 million,
as the auditor fee is higher than the profits the firms will get. This is the dominated region.
24We do this calculation for 2009 because the threshold at that time was Rs.4 million and the density from
Rs. 7.4 to Rs.10 million is less likely to be affected by that threshold. The calculated number of firms is still
an upper bound as some of the firms will bunch below the new threshold.
25If we use the estimates calculated from the treatment neighborhood found from static-bunching analysis,
then the reduction in taxes and taxable income are Rs.40,462 and Rs.81.007 respectively. As a result,
ku = 0.0815 and ∆u/y¯ = 0.008. The optimal threshold is Rs.2,516,871
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trails report more taxes when their accounts are scrutinized by private auditors. Second,
employing greater number of workers makes evasion difficult and such firms do not change
their tax payments when subjected to extra audit. We also conduct a cost-benefit analysis
and show that the net benefit of extending the policy to one more firm is substantial.
In future work, the findings of this paper can be extended in at least two directions. The
change in tax income because of third-party audit can be due to reduction in economic ac-
tivity by the firm or misreporting of profits or both. While there is a nascent literature that
attempts to disentangle the changes in reported income into real and evasion responses
(Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2018), Velayudhan (2018)), it remains an area of active
research. Second, the effects of third-party audits can vary according to characteristics of
auditors such as reputation and quality. For this, data matching auditors characteristics to
tax returns will be required.
It is becoming increasingly common to outsource the government’s regulatory functions
in both developed and developing countries, especially in sectors such as emissions control
and food safety. With the enforcement budget of tax agencies like the IRS in USA on the
decline26, there is a case for privatizing more regulatory functions in the realm of tax
administration. However, there are concerns that private auditor will not deliver desired
results because of factors like conflict of interest, corruption etc. In this study we show that
third-party audits were effective in increasing tax revenue in the context of India. Given
that developing countries often suffer from low tax compliance and limited state capacity,
our paper suggests that outsourcing this regulatory function in particular could be hugely
beneficial.
1.8 Tables
26The percentage of Corporate Income tax returns examined by the IRS has fallen from 1.4 percent in
2013 to 0.9 percent in 2018 (IRS (2013-18))
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Table 1.2: Effect of removal of third-party audit on tax payments
Table 2: E↵ect of removal of third-party audit on tax payments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Tax Paid Tax Paid Tax Paid Tax Paid
Treat x Post2012 -41,691*** -41,285***
(15,139) (15,114)
Treat x FY2009 -11,086 -11,493
(12,436) (12,458)
Treat x FY2010 -8,891 -9,805
(11,108) (11,104)
Treat x FY2012 -25,909** -25,973**
(11,642) (11,624)
Treat x FY2013 -33,659** -33,764**
(14,618) (14,579)
Treat x FY2014 -61,597*** -61,866***
(19,841) (19,852)
Treat x FY2015 -48,447** -48,189**
(21,863) (21,846)
Treat x FY2016 -72,136*** -72,204***
(25,978) (25,980)
Sectoral Time trends No No Yes Yes
Observations 174,432 174,432 174,432 174,432
R-squared 0.602 0.602 0.603 0.603
Robust standard errors (clustered at Company level) in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note–This tables shows the estimates from equations 3 and 4. The treat-
ment group consists of restricted share transfer (RST) firms with revenue
between Rs.6-15 million in 2011, a year before the audit threshold was
moved from Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million. The comparison group consists
of non-RST firms within the same revenue bandwidth in 2011. The treat-
ment is removal of third-party audit requirement because of the change in
the threshold. All the regressions in the table include firm fixed e↵ects and
year fixed e↵ects. The data comes from Corporate Income Tax returns
from 2009-16.
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Robust standard errors (clustered at firm lev l) in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note–This tables shows the estimates from equations 1.3 and 1.4. The treatment group consists of restricted
share transfer (RST) firms with revenue between Rs.6-15 million in 2011, a year before the audit threshold
was moved from Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million. The comparison group consists of non-RST firms within the
same revenue bandwidth in 2011. The treatment is removal of third-party audit requirement because of the
change in the threshold. All the regressi ns in the table include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects. The
data comes fr m Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-16.
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Table 1.3: Effect of removal of third-party audit on firm’s behavior
Table 3: E↵ect of removal of third-party audit on firm’s behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES PBITD PBITD Taxable Income Taxable Income Audit Fee Audit Fee
Treat x Post2012 -703,408*** -102,575** -2,574***
(147,840) (47,659) (752.4)
Treat x FY2009 -100,890 -15,892 -153.5
(124,377) (39,985) (751.8)
Treat x FY2010 -24,412 -18,324 89.71
(108,415) (35,615) (718.9)
Treat x FY2012 -248,640* -67,561* -451.1
(127,024) (38,190) (641.6)
Treat x FY2013 -534,433*** -68,220 -1,326
(137,117) (45,563) (827.8)
Treat x FY2014 -964,452*** -121,879** -2,107**
(187,319) (58,000) (947.3)
Treat x FY2015 -866,987*** -106,650 -4,412***
(214,124) (66,030) (1,100)
Treat x FY2016 -1.113e+06*** -205,776** -4,687***
(258,201) (82,736) (1,254)
Observations 174,432 174,432 174,432 174,432 174,432 174,432
R-squared 0.581 0.581 0.603 0.603 0.726 0.726
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note–This tables shows the estimates from equations 3 and 4, where the dependent variable is mentioned in
the column. PBITD refers to Profit before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation. The treatment group consists
of restricted share transfer (RST) firms with revenue between Rs.6-15 million in 2011, a year before the audit
threshold was moved from Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million. The comparison group consists of non-RST firms within
the same revenue bandwidth in 2011. The treatment is removal of third-party audit requirement because of the
change in the threshold. All the regressions include firm fixed e↵ects, year fixed e↵ects and sector-specific time
trends. The data comes from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-16.
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Robust standard errors (clustered at firm level) in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note–This tables shows the estimates from equations 1.3 and 1.4, where the dependent variable is mentioned
in the column. PBITD refers to Profit before Interest, Taxes and Depreciation. The treatment group consists
of restricted share transfer (RST) firms with revenue between Rs.6-15 million in 2011, a year before the
audit threshold was moved from Rs.6 milli n to Rs.10 million. The comparison group consists of non-RST
firms within th sam revenue bandwidth in 2011. Th treatment is removal of third-party a dit requirement
because of the chang in the threshold. All the regressions inclu firm fix d effects, year fixed ffects and
sector-specific time trends. The data comes from Corporat Income Tax returns from 2009-16.
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Table 1.4: Heterogeneity in the effect of third-party auditTable 4: Heterogeneity in the e↵ect of third-party audit
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Tax Paid Tax Paid Tax Paid
Treat x Post2012 -4,210 -72,574*** -74,956***
(21,853) (15,242) (15,237)
Treat x Post2012 x UpstreamRatio -60,179***
(8,392)
Treat x Post2012 x WageRatio 144,423***
(11,766)
Treat x Post2012 x Wage 0.0161***
(0.00134)
Treat x Post2012 + Treat x Post2012 x p(25) -5,968 -63,991*** -63,526***
(21,808) (15,177) ( 15,137)
Treat x Post2012 + Treat x Post2012 x p(90) -55,359 ** 8,818 5,613
( 21,655) (15,901) (15,785)
Observations 77,855 174,392 174,432
R-squared 0.614 0.604 0.605
Robust standard errors (clustered at Company level) in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note- This table shows the estimates from an augmented version of equation 3, which
includes triple interaction term mentioned in the table. UpstreamRatio is defined as
the proportion of sales that are used as intermediate inputs by other industries. This
is calculated at the industry-level. Wage ratio is the proportion of total expenses
of a firm spent on the employees one year before the policy change in 2011. Wage
represents the total wage payments by the firm in 2011. Both the variables proxy for
the total number of employees in a firm. The bottom panel calculates the treatment
e↵ect at the 25th and 90th percentile of the extra variable used in the triple interaction
term. All the regressions include firm fixed e↵ects, year fixed e↵ects and sector-
specific time trends. All the tax and expense data for this table is derived from
Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-16. To calculate the upstream ratio, we
use the Supply and Use Tables of 2011-12, complied by Ministry of Statistics and
Program Implementation.
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Robust standard errors (clustered at firm level) in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note- This table shows the estimates from an augmented version of equation 1.3, which includes triple in-
teraction term mentioned in the table. UpstreamRatio is defined as the proportion of sales that are used as
intermediate inputs by other industries. This is calculated at the industry-level. Wage ratio is the propor-
tion of total expenses of a firm spent on the employees one year before the policy change in 2011. Wage
represents the total wage payments by the firm in 2011. Both the variables proxy for the total number of
employees in a firm. The bottom panel calculates the treatm nt ffect at the 25th nd 90th percentile of the
extra variable used in the triple interaction term. All the regressions include firm fixed effects, year fixed
effects and sector-specific time trends. All the tax and expense data for this table is derived from Corporate
Income Tax returns from 2009-16. To calculate the upstream ratio, we use the Supply and Use Tables of
2011-12, complied by Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation.
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1: No Audit-NotchTables and Figures
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Figure 1A: No Audit-Notch.
Note–This figure shows the distribution of firms without audit notch. The horizontal axis represents
the running variable–reported revenue of the firms. The black and red lines represent the density
in the time periods t0 and t1, respectively. At t1 firms grow by a factor of  . We assume that every
firm undergoes third-party audit in both the time periods and therefore, report their true income.
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Note–This figure shows the distribution of firms without audit notch. The horizontal axis represents the
running variable–reported revenue of the firms. The black and red lines represent the density in the time
periods t0 and t1, respectively. At t1 firms grow by a actor of γ. We assume that every firm undergoes
third-party audit in both the time periods and therefore, report their true income.
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Figure 1.2: With Audit Notch
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Figure 1B: With Audit Notch.
Note–In this figure, we show which firms react to the audit notch. An audit notch is introduced
at t1 and all the firms below the notch are exempt from third-party audit. The green dashed line,
labeled as “with notch”, represents the density when the audit-notch is defined at y⇢. Let y¯L be
the income at t0 where an income growth of   results in income of y⇢ in t1. Therefore, y¯L is equal
to y⇢/(1 +  ). The left-origin bunchers will have y¯0 2 [y¯L, y⇢). Consider a firm with income y¯H in
t0 which is indi↵erent between reporting true income or bunching below the notch in t1. Then, the
right-origin bunchers will have y¯0 2 [y⇢, y¯H). Note that some of the bunchers will strategically mis-
report their revenue to be well below the notch, rather than bunch just below it, if they believe that
reporting no growth in revenue for multiple time-periods will increase their probability of getting
caught. This will result in di↵used excess mass well below the notch, which is shown as a plateau
in the density.
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Note–In this figure, we show which firms react to the audit notch. An audit notch is introduced at t1 and all
the firms below the notch are exempt from third-party audit. The green dashed line, labeled as “with notch”,
represents the density when the audit-notch is defined at yρ. Let y¯L be the income at t0 where an income
growth of γ results in income of yρ in t1. Therefore, y¯L is equal to yρ/(1 + γ). The left-origin bunchers will
have y¯0 ∈ [y¯L, yρ). Consider a firm with income y¯H in t0 which is indifferent between reporting true income
or unching below the notch in t1. Th , the right-origin bunchers will have y¯0 ∈ [yρ, y¯H). Note that some
of the bunch rs will strat gic lly mis-report their revenue to be well below the notch, rather t an bunch just
below it, if they believe that reporting no growth in revenue for multiple time-periods will increase their
probability of getting caught. This will result in diffused excess mass well below the notch, which is shown
as a plateau in the density.
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Figure 1.3: Bias in the Static Bunching Analysis
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Figure 1C: Bias in the Static Bunching Analysis
Note–The lower bound of the bunching region, according to the static analysis, is the point where
the observed density slopes upward just below the audit-notch, that is, y¯SL. Using this lower bound,
if we fit a counterfactual density (solid blue line in the diagram) by equating excess mass to the
missing mass, then the upper bound of the bunching region will be biased downward. This is
because some of the excess mass is di↵used and not accounted for while fitting the counterfactual
density. In this figure, the estimated upper bound is y¯SH , while the actual upper bound is y¯H + y¯H .
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Note– The lower bound of the bunching region, according to the static analysis, is the point where the
observed density slopes upward just below the audit-notch, that is, y¯SL. Using this lower bound, if we fit a
counterfactual density (solid blue line in the diagram) by equating excess mass to the missing mass, then
the upper bound of the bunching region will be biased downward. This is because some of the excess mass
is diffused and not accounted for while fitting the counterfactual density. In this figure, the estimated upper
bound is y¯SH , whil the actual upper bound is y¯H + γy¯H .
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Figure 1.4: Estimating upper bound using the difference in probability method for RST
firms
Figure 2: Estimating upper bound using the di↵erence in probability method for RST firms
Note–In this graph, we plot the probability of being in the bunching region based on two-year
lagged revenue. The notch was introduced at Rs.10 million in 2012. The blue line represents the
probability of reporting revenue between Rs.9-10 million (bunching region) in 2013, conditional on
revenue in 2011. Similarly, the red line represents the probability of reporting revenue in the same
range in 2011, conditional on revenue in 2009 – both the years are before the change in policy. The
di↵erence between the two probabilities shows the e↵ect of the notch on firm’s bunching response.
The upper bound estimated from this graph is Rs.15 million, which is larger than the upper bound
estimated by static bunching analysis. The bin size used in this graph is Rs.0.5 million. All the
data for this graph is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-13.
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Note–In this graph, we plot the probability of being in the bunching region based on two-year lagged rev-
enue. The notch was introduced at Rs.10 million in 2012. The blue line represents the probability of report-
ing revenue between Rs.9-10 million (bunching region) in 2013, conditional on revenue in 2011. Similarly,
the red line represents the probability of reporting revenue in the same range in 2011, conditional on rev-
enue in 2009 – both the years are before the change in policy. The difference between the two probabilities
shows the ffect of the notch on firm’s bunching sponse. The upper bound estimated from this graph is
Rs.15 million, which is larger than the upper bound estimated by static bunching analysis. The bin size used
in this graph is Rs.0.5 million. All the data for this graph is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns from
2009-13.
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Figure 1.5: Frequency distribution of RST firms from 2012-16
Figure 3A: Frequency distribution of RST firms from 2012-16
Note–We use the ocular method to estimate the lower bound of the bunching region for the static
analysis. This is Rs. 8.5 million, where the slope of the distribution becomes positive. All the data
for this table is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2012-16.
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Note–We use the ocular method to estimate the lower bound of the bunching region for the static analysis.
This is Rs. 8.5 million, where the slope of the distribution becomes positive. All the data for this graph is
derived from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2012-16.
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Figure 1.6: Estimating upper bound using the static bunching analysis
Figure 3B: Estimating upper bound using the static bunching analysis
Note–This figure shows the actual and the counterfactual distribution estimated by
using the static bunching analysis. The counterfactual distribution is estimated by
using a fourth-degree polynomial. The lower bound is determined visually as Rs.8.5
million, while the upper bound is estimated as Rs.11.5 million by equating the excess
mass to the missing mass. In the figure, the upper and lower bounds are represented
by dashed lines, while the notch is represented by the solid line. The bin size is Rs
0.5 million. All the data for this table is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns
from 2012-16.
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Note–This figure shows the actual and the counterfactual distribution estimated by using the static bunching
analysis. The counterfactual distribution is estimated by using a fourth-degree polynomial. The lower bound
is determined visually as Rs.8.5 million, while the upper bound is estimated as Rs.11.5 million by equating
the excess mass to the missing mass. In the figure, the upper and lower bounds are represented by dashed
lines, while the notch is represented by the solid line. The bin size is Rs 0.5 million. All the data for this
graph is derived from Cor orate Income Tax returns from 2012-16.
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Figure 1.7: Effect of removal of third-party audit on tax payments
Figure 4A: E↵ect of removal of third-party audit on tax payments.
Note–In this graph, we plot the di↵erence-in-di↵erences coe cients and the 95% confidence
intervals using the equation 4. The notch was introduced at Rs.10 million in 2012. The treatment
group consists of RST firms that reported revenue between Rs.6-15 million in 2011, while the
comparison group consists of non-RST firms in the same revenue bandwidth. The dependent
variable is tax payments in INR. All the data for this graph is derived from Corporate Income
Tax returns from 2009-16.
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Note–In this graph, we plot the difference-in-differences coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals using
the equation 1.4. The notch was introduced at Rs.10 million in 2012. The treatment group consists of RST
firms that reported revenue between Rs.6-15 million in 2011, whil the comparison group consists of non-
RST firms in the same r venue bandwidth. The dependent variable is tax pay ents i INR. All the data for
this graph is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-16.
36
Figure 1.8: Effect of removal of third-party audit on taxable income
Figure 4B: E↵ect of removal of third-party audit on taxable income.
Note– In this graph, we plot the di↵erence-in-di↵erences coe cients and the 95% confidence
intervals using the equation 4. The notch was introduced at Rs.10 million in 2012. The treatment
group consists of RST firms that reported revenue between Rs.6-15 million in 2011, while the
comparison group consists of non-RST firms in the same revenue bandwidth. The dependent
variable is taxable income in INR. All the data for this graph is derived from Corporate Income
Tax returns from 2009-16.
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Note–In this graph, we plot the difference-in-differences coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals using
the equation 1.4. The notch was introduced at Rs.10 million in 2012. The treatment group consists of RST
firms that reported revenue between Rs.6-15 millio in 2011, while the mpar son group consists of non-
RST firms in the same revenue bandwidth. The dependent variable is taxable income in INR. All the data for
this graph is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-16.
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Figure 1.9: Effect of removal of third-party audit on PBITD
Figure 4C: E↵ect of removal of third-party audit on PBITD
Note–In this graph, we plot the di↵erence-in-di↵erences coe cients and the 95% confidence
intervals using the equation 4. The notch was introduced at Rs.10 million in 2012. The treatment
group consists of RST firms that reported revenue between Rs.6-15 million in 2011, while the
comparison group consists of non-RST firms in the same revenue bandwidth. The dependent
variable is PBITD (profit before interest, tax and depreciation) measured in INR. All the data
for this graph is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-16.
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Note–In this graph, we plot the difference-in-differences coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals using
the equation 1.4. The notch was introduced at Rs.10 million in 2012. The treatment group consists of
RST firms that reported revenue between Rs.6-15 million in 2011, while the comparison group consists of
non-RST firms in the same revenue bandwidth. The dependent variable is PBITD (profit before interest, tax
and depreciation) measured in INR. All the data for this graph is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns
from 2009-16.
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Figure 1.10: Effect of removal of third-party audit on auditor’s fee
Figure 4D: E↵ect of removal of third-party audit on auditor’s fee
Note–In this graph, we plot the di↵erence-in-di↵erences coe cients and the 95% confidence
intervals using the equation 4. The notch was introduced at Rs.10 million in 2012. The treatment
group consists of RST firms that reported revenue between Rs.6-15 million in 2011, while the
comparison group consists of non-RST firms in the same revenue bandwidth. The dependent
variable is audit fee measured in INR. All the data for this graph is derived from Corporate
Income Tax returns from 2009-16.
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Note–In this graph, we plot the difference-in-differences coefficients and the 95% confidence intervals using
the equation 1.4. The notch was introduced at Rs.10 million in 2012. The treatment group consists of RST
firms that reported revenue between Rs.6-15 million in 2011, while the comparison group consists of non-
RST firms in the same revenue bandwidth. The dependent variable is audit fee measured in INR. All the data
for this graph is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-16.
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CHAPTER II
Mind the Gap: Fiscal Externality, Informality and
Schooling in Nepal
From a work with Hoyt Bleakley
Abstract
While increasing average years of school has been a development priority for decades, the
associated fiscal costs and benefits have been less studied, in part because of the lack of
appropriate data. Recently UNESCO organized a project measuring the extent of subsidies,
by level of schooling, from all levels of government, in eight developing countries. One of
these countries was Nepal, which also has a household budget survey that permits us to
estimate the degree of formality, tax payment, and benefit receipt as a function of years of
schooling. Using a simple Mincer-like model, we estimate the fiscal externality associated
with an additional year of school. Using a discount rate of 3%, we find that within primary
school, fiscal benefits and costs, on the margin, are quite balanced, with subsidies closest
to the present value of future taxes minus benefits. At higher levels of schooling, however,
marginal fiscal benefits exceed costs by 5 percent of per-capita consumption.
JEL Codes: I2, J2, H3
Keywords: Taxation, Subsidies, Schooling Decision, Nepal
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2.1 Introduction
Raising levels of education has been a development priority for over a half-century.
Around the world, governments subsidize education in part to encourage school atten-
dance. Numerous studies (c.f., Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2018)) show that children
who get more years of schooling earn more as adults. Therefore the government’s edu-
cation spending might be thought of as an investment in expanding the future tax base.
This combination describes a fiscal externality: ‘fiscal’ because the government’s taxes and
spending are involved, and ‘externality’ because the student (plus his family) do not pay
the full cost of additional schooling nor receive the full benefit. Is there a gap between
these benefits and costs, and, if so, how large is it?
The challenge in quantifying this gap has been the incomplete measurement of the
extent of education subsidies in less developed countries. Recently, however, UNESCO or-
ganized a pilot project for “national education accounts” (NEA) in eight countries. The
NEA reports measure public educational spending from all levels of government and de-
compose by all levels of schooling. Two of the eight countries (Nepal and Uganda) also
had contemporaneous household budget surveys, which permit comparison of public and
private spending.
We complement the subsidy data with estimated tax payments, made from a Nepalese
budget survey. In these data, more educated workers have higher purchasing power, con-
sistent with the literature. To this, we add a less-documented result: workers with more
education also have substantially higher probabilities of being in the formal sector. Of
workers with zero to two years of schooling, the percentage in the formal sector is in the
low single digits. The fraction of formality rises to approximately half of workers with post-
secondary education. Thus, more educated workers contribute more to the government’s
coffers because they spend more (higher VAT) and because their earnings are higher and
more likely to be in the formal sector (higher income taxes). (Section 2.2 describes these
data sets and summary statistics.)
We develop an empirical model in the spirit of Mincer (1958) to compare fiscal costs
and benefits of an additional year of school. In the model, the student receives a marginal
benefit in the form of higher future earnings, but pays contemporary marginal costs in the
form of direct costs (tuition, books, transport, etc.) and of opportunity costs (foregone
earnings). The government’s problem is qualitatively similar, with higher future taxes
(from higher future wages) being the marginal benefit and subsidies plus foregone taxes on
foregone earnings being the marginal costs. With both linear and quantile regressions, we
estimate the relationship between tax payments and years of schooling. These estimates
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combine with the subsidy data and an interest-rate to form the estimated gap, or fiscal
externality. (We describe the model in Section 2.3 and present results in Section 2.4.)
We find that substantial fiscal costs and benefits associated with another year of school-
ing, although how the two balance varies by level. For finishing primary school, subsidies
are close to the present value of future taxes, with a deficit of less than a few US$ per year,
itself about 0.5% of household consumption per capita (among those with primary school
only). For secondary school, the gap leans negative as well, especially at lower quantiles of
distribution, although the mean effect is an even smaller fraction of household consump-
tion than it is for primary school. For tertiary (university/higher) education, the opposite
is seen, with positive gaps (benefits in excess of costs) for the mean and especially for the
upper part of the distribution. This gap amount to five percent of household consumption,
a significant surplus. The difference by level makes intuitive sense. The lower levels of
education are highly subsidized and most of the workers with such education have low
labor-market formality; therefore, the government recoups its investment mainly through
the 13% VAT. In contrast, higher education, while more costly, is less proportionately sub-
sidized, and its graduate earn more in formal employment and thus subject to the income
tax. (This conclusion therefore relates to work by Johnson (2006) who argues that higher
education subsidies are progressive if we consider the higher taxes paid by higher-income
households whose children are disproportionately enrolled in higher education and that
those children end up paying higher taxes as workers.)
We subject this result to sensitivity analysis in Section 2.5. We show that this result
is not sensitive to alternative definitions of school levels, household, or formality. The
results are also robust to alternate strategies for controlling for household characteristics,
defining taxes, or accounting for emigration. In the main analysis, we use three percent as
the default interest rate. We show that the interest rate would have to be drastically lower
to convert all of the estimated gaps to positive. We then offer conclusions in Section 2.6.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
To quantify the fiscal balance at different levels of education, we require information
on the taxes paid by household, their educational attainment and the non-household ex-
penditure on education. The information on the latter is hard to come by, especially for
developing countries, as there are various stakeholders involved in financing education
and aggregating their expenses has been a challenge. Moreover, for our analysis we need
information on the non-household expenditure according to different education levels.
This issue has been addressed by the creation of National Education Accounts for some
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developing countries. We use this data along with a nationally representative household
survey data and the Nepalese tax schedule to conduct our empirical analysis.
2.2.1 Education Subsidies
The National Education Accounts (NEA) of Nepal has information on expenditure by
all the financial stakeholders –household and non-household– at different levels of edu-
cation1. This information has been complied by UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS),
International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) and Global Partnership for Educa-
tion (GPE), not just for Nepal but for seven other developing countries (IIEP, UIS and IIEP
Poˆle de Dakar (2016a); IIEP, UIS and IIEP Poˆle de Dakar (2016b)).2
Nepal’s NEA data capture education expenditure per student across 7 levels of edu-
cation. These are pre-primary, primary (1-5 grade), lower secondary (5-8), secondary
(8-10), higher secondary(10-12), technical education, and higher education (college edu-
cation). The main providers of educational resources are governments (central, state and
local); households; NGO’s; and schools. The expenditure per student varies depending on
whether the student is studying in a public school or not. In our main analysis, we are
interested in the total non-household education expenditure on a student which is defined
as the expenditure by the government, NGOs and the school.
Figure 2.1 shows the ratio of non-household expenditure to total expenditure on each
student by level. For public schools, this ratio is high. At the primary level, the non-
household expenditure is NPR 7,209 per student which is 84 percent of the total expen-
diture. The government accounts for 95 percent of the total non-household expenditure
per student-year. At higher education level, the proportion of non-household to total ex-
penditure declines to 52 percent, but it terms of levels it increases to NPR 30,385. This
pattern is markedly different for private schools, with households accounting for the bulk
of the expenditure. Accordingly, at the primary level, the non-household expenditure is
NPR 1,106, which is 6 percent of the total expenditure. For the higher-level private in-
stitutions, the non-household expenditure is NPR 14,337 per student which is 17 percent
of the total expenditure. Comparing the distribution of subsidies in Nepal to Uganda, a
country for which NEA has comparable data, the proportion of non-household expenditure
to total expenditure is higher in Nepal across all the education categories.
1NEA data can be accessed using the link http://uis.unesco.org/en/news/national-education-accounts
2The seven other countries are – Coˆte d’Ivoire, Guine´e, Lao PDR,Senegal, Uganda, Vietnam and Zim-
babwe. Only Nepal and Uganda data distinguishes the per student government expenditure between public
and private schools and also includes household expenditure.
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2.2.2 Household data
We use the third round of Nepal Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), which
was conducted in 2010-11 by the Central Bureau of Statistics of Nepal and the World Bank
to capture the demographic and consumption details of the households3. Useful for our
analysis, the survey contains individual-level information on education, business and job
characteristics, benefits received and migration status of the household members. It is
a nationally representative survey and the cross-sectional data consists of 5,988 house-
holds and 28,760 individuals (CBS (2011)) 4. We restrict our sample to households whose
household-heads are aged between 20 and 80 years and whose education details are not
missing. This reduces the number of households to 5,886.
We use the total household consumption data from the survey to impute the tax pay-
ments described in the next sub-section. The survey uses seven day recall period method
to determine the consumption expenditure. There is a positive consumption gradient with
education. The median per capita annual consumption of households whose head has fin-
ished primary education is around NPR 27,000, and this increases to NPR 65,000 if the
household head has finished bachelors degree (Table 2.1).
Our main independent variable is the years of education completed by the household
head, as reported in the LSMS data. For the grades 1 to 12, the number of years of edu-
cation completed is equal to the school grade. The household heads with bachelors and
masters degree are coded as having completed 15 and 17 years of education because the
duration of bachelors and masters degree in Nepal is of three and two years respectively.
Table 2.1 shows that around 65 percent of the household heads have highest education
grade that lies within the primary education category, 18 percent have secondary educa-
tion and the rest have some level of higher education. We also construct two additional
measures to capture the education attainment of the rest of the household members -– first,
total years of education of all the household members after excluding the household head
and second, the maximum educational grade achieved by a member except the household
head. We use these measures as controls in the empirical specifications.
3The details of the survey can be found at https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/
catalog/1000/study-description
4We do not use the Nepal Labor Force Surveys (NLFS) which were conducted in the years 2007/08 and
2017/18 and do not overlap with the data in the NEAs which runs from 2009-15. Like most labor force
surveys they do not record information on total consumption, the type of school attended by the individual
and benefits received from the government. The national Census was conducted in 2011, but it doesn’t
record consumption or income. We choose the setting of the analysis to be Nepal over Uganda because the
data from Uganda do not permit certain robustness checks.
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2.2.3 Taxes, Formality, and Benefits
In this subsection, we briefly describe the methodology used to calculate the total tax
payments of a household after adjusting for formality. There are two primary taxes paid
by the households: income tax and value added tax (VAT). We impute the income tax
payments of the household heads engaged in the formal sector by, first, constructing a tax
table that delineates the income tax payments for each level of income according to the
income tax schedule. Then, the household’s consumption, c, equals f(s) − T (s), where
f(s) is the taxable income, a function of years of schooling s, and T (s) is the income
tax payment. Next, we merge the income tax table with the LSMS data by matching the
imputed consumption from the tax table to the reported consumption in the survey data.
Thus, we can assign the taxable income and tax payment to each household in the survey
data using the tax table. We calculate income tax payments only for household heads that
are employed in the formal sector because those in the informal sector, in practice, do not
pay income tax.5
To define tax-formality, we rely on the result that wage earners whose income is sub-
ject to third-party reporting are more likely to be tax-payers (Kleven et al. (2011), Slemrod
(2007)). Therefore, anyone whose income is reported to the government by the employer
or who benefits from social security net is considered to be in the formal sector (Azuara
and Marinescu (2013); Camacho, Conover and Hoyos (2014)). According to our preferred
definition, a wage earner is considered to be in the formal sector if any job that she does
displays at least one of the following features - tax is deducted by the employer, employee
contributes to the provident fund, pension on retirement, or subsidized medical care. Since
self-employed are less likely to pay taxes, we consider only those businesses who are regis-
tered with the government as tax-payers (in an alternate definition, even these businesses
are considered to be in the informal sector. These alternate definitions are discussed in the
appendix). All other economic activity, in particular, agriculture is considered to be in the
informal sector. Of the sample of household heads aged between 20 and 80 years, around
16 percent of 5886 household heads are in the formal sector.6 No matter which definition
of formality we use, the proportion of household heads in the formal sector increase as
the years of education increase. For example, about 4 percent of people without school
5A more detailed explanation of the methodology used to calculate income tax and a description of
Nepal’s income tax schedule is given in the appendix.
6Of the 16 percent, 11.6 percent of the household heads have an income that is subject to non-trivial
marginal income tax rate. (Unlike most countries, the marginal tax rate of lowest income bracket in Nepal is
non-zero and equal to 1 percent.) This number compares favorably with the estimates of registered taxpayers
in Nepal who are 10 percent of the total number of households (Inland Revenue Department Report (2015)
and CBS (2012)).
45
education are employed in the formal sector, while 62 percent of people with a masters
degree are engaged in the formal sector (Figure 2.2).
The value added tax (VAT) rate in Nepal is 13 percent for all the commodities. Some
commodities like rice, pulses and other essential food items are zero-rated. In the main
specification, we assume that the VAT is paid on the entire household consumption, al-
though we exclude food consumption from the VAT tax base in the sensitivity analysis.
The total tax contribution of the households is the summation of Income tax and VAT7 .
Figure 2.3 shows a steep positive gradient of total taxes with education. The positive slope
is due to the combined effect of increase in the tax base (income and consumption) and
formality levels. People with higher education tend to be in the formal sector and thus, pay
both income and value-added tax to the exchequer. Conversely, those with low education
are mostly engaged in the informal sector and end up paying only VAT. For instance, people
with no education on average pay NPR 18,757 in total taxes of which the VAT represents
95 percent. In contrast, people with higher education pay NPR 68,607 as taxes, of which
VAT is only 60 percent.
From the government’s standpoint, we also need to consider the transfers that the
government makes as part of various welfare schemes. We can expect that more education
leads to lower take-up and dependence on the welfare schemes. In the household survey
we have information on the payments received by the households on seven major cash-
transfer programs 8. The magnitude of benefits provided under these schemes is much
lower than the taxes remitted (Figure 2.3). Hence, we only include the benefits in the
sensitivity analysis, and verify that our results remain robust.
2.3 Model
In this section, we analyze the choice of years of schooling in a stylized model based on
the seminal work of Jacob Mincer (1958). We include taxes and subsidies in the analysis
and use this framework to derive the fiscal externality (the gap) associated with an addi-
tional year of school. An individual starts school at t = 0 and faces an interest rate of r.
The direct cost of schooling in year t is c(t), which includes tuition, transport, uniforms,
books, etc. The government contributes a subsidy of γ(t), so the student only sees the net
7Contributory deductions from income, such as contributions towards provident fund, are not included in
the total tax payments of an individual because the taxpayer gets back the return on these deductions over
her lifetime. Thus, such contributions will be taken into account by an individual while deciding the level of
schooling, and are therefore not a fiscal externality.
8These programs are - old age pension, widow pension, disability allowance, endangered ethnicity’s
pension, maternal incentive scheme, martyr’s family benefits, and people’s movement victim benefits
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cost. The student leaves school at time s, which also represents the total years of schooling
accumulated. At that time, the now former student starts earning f(s), for f ′(s) > 0. (We
use primes to denote first derivatives.) Once working, the person has to pay a tax of τ(s).
(Taxes are generally functions of earnings instead of schooling, so we could have written
τ(f(s)), e.g., but we treat it directly as a function of s for notational simplicity.)
The person’s lifetime income, net of taxes and direct costs, is∫ T
s
e−rt [f(s)− τ(s)] dt−
∫ s
0
e−rt [c(t)− γ(t)] dt
if the person stops working at T . From the individual’s perspective, this object is the
present value of his/her human capital. Let r˜ ≡ r
1− e−r(T−S) , which we can think of as a
required rate of return, adjusted for number of years a person works(T − S).
What choice of years of school maximizes the individual’s human capital? If we take
the derivative with respect to s, we attain the following first-order condition (FOC) for
optimality:
(f
′ − τ ′)/r˜ = (f − τ) + (c− γ) (2.1)
The left-hand side is the marginal benefit associated with additional time in school. This
includes the increase in labor productivity (f ′), but also the change in taxes (τ ′). These
changes apply to future flows, and the interest rate accounts for the accumulation of these
flows over time. The marginal costs are found on the right-hand side of the equation and
are grouped into two concepts. The first is the opportunity cost. While a person is in
school, he is not working, but neither does he pay taxes on income that he does not earn.
The second is the direct cost, net of the subsidy.
This equation has an intuitive interpretation. If dollar’s worth of time invested today
yields a future flow of payments greater than r˜, then the student should continue in school.
When the flow payment per dollar drops below r˜, the student should leave school.
Government policies can shift the choice of schooling, although there are combinations
of taxes and subsidies that deliver the socially optimal decision. If taxes and subsidies are
both zero, the condition for optimality reduces to the following:
f
′
/r˜ = (f + c) (2.2)
This condition defines the undistorted optimum for s. But other, nonzero combinations
also leave this choice undistorted. If
τ ′/r˜ = τ + γ (2.3)
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then these terms drop out of equation 2.1, which leaves us with the undistorted optimum
for s. A simple example of this would be a proportional income tax paired with school
subsidy of exactly the same proportion.9
In general, however, there is a gap between the government’s marginal benefits and
costs. This represents a fiscal externality: changes in the private choice of years of school-
ing spill over onto the government’s budget. The marginal benefit for the government is
τ ′/r˜, the taxes received per unit increase in schooling. But an additional year of education
costs the government τ + γ, the fiscal opportunity and direct-subsidy costs. If this gap
is positive (MB > MC), then the government receives more revenue per marginal year
of school than it incurs in costs. Policies that raise schooling, such as compulsory atten-
dance or higher subsidies, might well relax the government’s budget constraint and bring
schooling closer to optimum. In contrast, a negative gap has the opposite implication.
To estimate the gap for various years of schooling, we need to calibrate the tax (τ)
and subsidy (γ) functions. The NEA data gives information about subsidies for different
levels of school, both public and private. We use data from the LSMS expenditure survey
to compute taxes and then calibrate τ(s).
2.4 Empirical Model and Results
We use a quantile regression to examine effect of education on tax payment at the
median, as well as, at the 25th and 75th percentiles. We also use an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression to consider effects at the mean. These methods provide a convenient
estimate of the level and (conditional) gradient of tax with respect to years of schooling
for the various summary statistics. Let τh be the total tax payments of the household h.
The primary dependent variable is the number of years spent in school, Eduyearih, by
the household head i living in the household h. Xih is a vector of other demographic
characteristics of the head such as age. Zh is a vector of household characteristics like
the total years of education of other household members. Then, the θth quantile of the
conditional distribution of τh, given the covariates, is a linear function,
Qθ(τh|Eduyearsih, Xih, Zh) = α0θ + β1θEduyearsih + X′ihδ1θ + Z′hδ2θ + uθih (2.4)
Now, we can test how far is the fiscal gap in Nepal from the condition defined in equa-
tion 2.3 and hence, the undistorted optimal choice of schooling. The fiscal gap, defined as
9A proportional tax and subsidy of λ yields an individual FOC of (1 − λ)f ′/r˜ = (1 − λ)(f + c), which
reduces to equation 2.2 if λ < 1.
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the difference between the marginal benefit and the marginal cost, is calculated by using
the following formula:
βˆ1θ − r(αˆ0θ + βˆ1θ ∗ S + X¯′ihδˆ1θ + Z¯′hδˆ2θ + subsidySθ), (2.5)
where r is the discount rate and S is the point at which the fiscal balance is calculated. βˆ1θ
represents the marginal benefit (τ ′), while the term in the parenthesis represents the fiscal
opportunity and direct-subsidy cost (τ + γ).10 While calculating the subsidy cost, we use
the θth quantile of subsidy at grade S.
For OLS regressions, we use the following statistical model:
τh = α0 + β1Eduyearsih + X
′
ihδ1 + Z
′
hδ2 + uih (2.6)
Then, the fiscal gap is:
βˆ1 − r(αˆ0 + βˆ1 ∗ S + X¯′ihδˆ1 + Z¯′hδˆ2 + subsidyS), (2.7)
where subsidyS is the mean subsidy at grade S.
Since the NEA dataset has subsidy information at aggregated education levels such
as primary, secondary etc. and not at individual grades, we categorize household heads
into three education categories: primary (0-5 grades), secondary (6-10 grade) and higher
education (11-17 or masters grade). Subsequently, we conduct our empirical analysis
within these education categories.
We find that an additional year of school is associated with substantial government
spending and government revenue. For an interest rate of 3%, these fiscal costs and bene-
fits are approximately balanced, though tilting negative, for primary and secondary school.
For higher (tertiary) education, they instead tilt positive. Table 2.2 contains these results.
For primary school, fiscal marginal benefits are generally less than fiscal marginal costs,
although only by a small margin. Panel A of Table 2.2 shows these results. Consider first
the median outcomes, which are shown in the first column. Another year of school is as-
sociated with a median tax payment that is higher by NPR 610 (approximately US$8.47 at
the time of the survey). This fiscal benefit is akin to a dividend that is paid continually in
the future. But there are two upfront costs. One is the opportunity cost: the foregone tax
payments that are not made because the student is in school instead of working. We esti-
10In our analysis, we demean the controls included in the vectors Xih and Zh, so that the term in the
parenthesis reduces to αˆ0θ + βˆ1θ ∗ S + subsidySθ, where αˆ0θ + βˆ1θ ∗ S is the fiscal opportunity cost. In other
words, the intercept αˆ0θ can be interpreted as θth quantile of tax payments of the household whose head has
zero years of schooling and mean value of other observables.
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mate these to be almost NPR 18,750, which is the model’s prediction for tax remittances
by someone with five years of schooling and the mean of the other observables. The other
fiscal cost is the school subsidy itself, which we compute as NPR 7209. We multiply these
two costs by the 3% discount rate and subtracted from the benefit to obtain a gap between
marginal benefits and costs of NPR 169 (US$2.35). This is not significantly different from
zero at conventional levels of confidence. This amounts to 1/2 of a percent of household
consumption per capita.
Given the simplicity of this calculation, we can take a moment to discuss the effect
of a few small modifications. First, getting fiscal costs and benefits to exactly balance in
this calculation would imply a break-even interest rate of 2.35%. This calculation is for
an infinitely lived person, and therefore we require an even lower interest-rate to break-
even, if mortality and retirement were taken into account. (Bleakley (2018), discusses
incorporating death rates into interest-rate calculations for human capital. He argues that,
for modern life tables in developing countries, interest rates typically need to modified by
less than 100 basis points.) Another simple modification is to evaluate the fiscal gap for
a student stopping at four rather than five years of school. By assumption, the marginal
benefit and marginal subsidy cost would be the same, but the opportunity cost would be
lower by NPR 610. This would only close the discounted gap, however, by NPR 18 (610
times .03), approximately a 10th of the total gap. (We discuss more complicated sensitivity
analysis below.)
For other statistics of the distribution, we also find slightly negative balances of fis-
cal benefits and costs. These are found in the remaining columns of Panel A, where we
consider the 25th percentile, 75th percentile, and mean as outcomes. In all cases, years
of schooling predict higher tax payments, with the larger effects being at the higher per-
centiles and for the mean. As before, however, this flow of future benefits is arrayed against
substantial costs in the beginning.11 For a 3% discount rate, the net fiscal balance remains
negative, however it is closer to zero than it was at the median. These numbers also reflect
relatively small gaps when compared to household consumption per capita. Indeed, at the
mean, this gap is less than one part in one thousand of household consumption.
Next we consider secondary education, for which fiscal balances turn somewhat more
negative. These results are found in Panel B. Tax payments rise with education for all four
11Survey respondents report whether they attended a public (government) or private school. We use this
information to impute different subsidy rates to each individual. Therefore, the implied subsidy for each
column will depend on the mix in the data. For those reporting primary school as their highest level of
education, nearly all of them report having attended government schools. So, the subsidy amount is the
same across the three quartiles. Because a small number did report attending private schools, the subsidy
rate at the mean is slightly lower. In the next table, we present some decompositions meant to better isolate
the government support of schools.
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of the statistics considered, however the strongest gains are at the 75th percentile and
for the mean. Marginal fiscal costs come in between NPR 1700 and NPR 2200 (US$23
and US$31). These gaps are over 1% of the value of household consumption per person,
except at the mean.
Finally, we turn to higher (tertiary) education, which starts at grade 11 in Nepal. These
results are found in Panel C. An additional year of education is associated with substantial
increases in tax payments for this group. This arises in part because of the effect of ed-
ucation on income, but what really distinguishes this group from the others is the much
higher rate of formality by those with tertiary education. (Recall Figure 2.2.) As a result,
this group pays more in direct taxes on the margin as its income rises. These gaps are
substantial. At the 75th percentile, the gap between fiscal marginal benefits and costs is
almost NPR 3737, which represents over 2.5% of household consumption per capita. At
the mean, this is even larger: the gap is almost NPR 5400 (US $75), or over 5% of con-
sumption. This represents a substantial fiscal benefit to encouraging higher education.This
contrasts with the results from primary and secondary education, where the net fiscal im-
pact is likely negative, albeit often difficult to distinguish from zero. Viewed in a different
way, this represents a significant disincentive to attain higher education.
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
The results above are qualitatively robust to a variety of alternate strategies for mea-
surement and modelling, as we show in this section. The main set of robustness checks are
found in Table 2.3, where we report estimates of the gap between fiscal marginal benefits
and costs.
The first set of checks explore robustness to measuring funding levels. In row 1, we
repeat the analysis from Table 2.2, but only with household heads who reported attend-
ing public schools. Estimates of the fiscal loss or gain are similar to the baseline, with
the exception of primary school, where the losses appear worse, yet still less than 1% of
consumption. In the second row, we continue our restriction to only public schools, but
also consider only the government’s contribution to the public-school subsidy. This moves
the fiscal balance associated with your school in a positive direction, but only by a little
bit. This is because non-government subsidies to schools are dwarfed by those from the
government. In the third row, we treat higher education as extending all the way through
to the Masters level. There appears to be a fiscal gain at this level as well, although this
represents a trivial part of the sample. We turn next to the anomalously large administra-
tive expenditure associated with grade 10. Nepal conducts national-level exam at grade
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10 which is compulsory for all students to graduate to the next level. The cost incurred in
conducting this exam can explain the jump in the subsidy reported in the National Edu-
cation Accounts data. Removing the administrative cost component from the subsidy data
reduces the gap at the secondary level and brings it closer to zero.
Next, we tweak our model for taxes on the household. The VAT in Nepal excludes
certain food items, although the survey did not provide enough information to separately
disaggregate covered versus non-covered expenditures. In row 5, we simply exclude all
food consumption expenditures from the base use to compute that payments. This makes
essentially no difference for the results. The next row reports the gap using the self-
reported total expenditure on land, property, housing and income taxes in the LSMS data ,
instead of imputed income taxes. We do not use the self-reported tax variable in the main
analysis because we suspect measurement error in the variable. For instance, professionals
whose income is subject to third-party reporting, like government employees, tax officials
etc., report less than 1% of their consumption in tax payments12. This seems very low
because at the mean level of consumption, they should be paying 13% of their consumption
in taxes, according to the tax schedule. Since the taxes of the formal sector workers are
remitted by the employers, such workers may not perceive tax payments as expenditure
and forget to report them in the survey – which can explain the low levels of self-reported
taxes. The fiscal gap at the primary and secondary level remain unchanged because income
tax is a small proportion of the total taxes at those educational levels. For higher education,
the fiscal gap reduces because of lower level of self-reported tax as compared to imputed
tax.
Another concern is that tax payment is only part of the fiscal story. If education reduces
poverty, the first effect might not be to increase tax payment, but to reduce benefit receipt.
Nepal has various cash and in-kind benefits.13 The survey has information on these, and
thus we can measure net tax payments (taxes minus benefits). While this sounds like it
could possibly change the results, in practice the effect is quite small, and Figure 2.3 shows
why. There we plot taxes paid and benefits received as a function of years of education.
The slope of taxes with respect to education is evident in the graph. The relationship
between benefits and education is, in fact, quite small and sometimes not even sloping
upwards.14 Accordingly, when we use a measure of taxes net benefits as the dependent
12Several studies like Kleven et al. (2011) show that tax evasion rate is close to zero for people whose
income is subject to third-party reporting.
13Note that we are not treating the subsidized access to schooling as a benefit for the household here. This
is because we examine the subsidy looking forward from the perspective of the student whose income and
tax payment will be higher, not of the parents whose children might go to public school.
14On one hand, we expect the slope of benefits to increase with education because more educated people
might be more aware of their legal entitlements. This is more important if the access to these programs is not
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variable, the results are hardly different from baseline. This is seen in Row 6.
Our final modification to the model of taxes is to use a more conservative definition of
formality which reduces the proportion of people employed in the formal sector at each
level of education. Reduction in the formal sector employment causes a reduction in the
imputed income tax payments, which in turn affects both the tax gradient with respect to
education and the opportunity cost of spending an extra year in school. Row eight shows
that for most of the specifications, the fiscal gap worsens due to decline in income tax
payments.
In the next five rows, we consider a few alternative ways of accounting for differences
in household composition. Our sample consists of households whose household-heads are
aged between 20 and 80 years. This includes some household heads that currently pur-
suing higher education and still enrolled in school. In Row 9, we only include household
heads that have finished schooling which reduces the sample in the higher education cat-
egory from 893 to 808. The fiscal balance now becomes significant at the lower quantiles
of the distribution and increases in magnitude for all the specifications. In Row 10, we re-
strict our analysis to male-headed households only. For primary and secondary education,
the fiscal balance associated with an additional year of schooling looks worse, but looks
slightly better for tertiary. None of the resulting changes are especially large, however,
when considered as fractions of household consumption. Next, we consider alternatives to
our default strategy of controlling for the education of other household members. There is
a substantial correlation of education within a household, and it would not make sense to
credit the household head’s education with increases in expenditures that came from the
increased earning power of a spouse, for example. Accordingly, the fiscal balances tend
to look better when we drop the control for years of schooling held by other adults in the
household (see Row 11), but this suffers from an omitted-variable problem. As an alter-
nate approach to using the sum of years of schooling held by other household members,
in Row 12, we use the maximum instead. These results are quite similar to the baseline.
Finally, we test our strategy of using the education level of the household head in our
analysis. We do so because we assume that household consumption is a function of her
education. This may not be true. To understand the effect of this assumption, we redo our
analysis by using the education level of a random working member of the household and
universal. In our sample, only 16 percent of the households report receiving money under any cash-transfer
program. On the other hand, the slope can be negative if the benefits under the social protection programs do
not form a significant proportion of consumption and there are pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs in getting
access to entitlements. Average payments to the entire household under the old age pension program, for
instance, are 3 percent of the mean per capita income of households whose heads have completed higher
education. We find that the two effects mostly cancel each other – leading to an almost flat gradient of
benefits with education.
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control for the sum of education of the rest of members. Row 13 shows that the results
remain statistically indistinguishable from the baseline .
In the next two rows, we modify the definition of education intervals for secondary and
higher level. In Row 14, we change the starting grade of secondary education to grade 5
which is the last grade of primary education. Similarly, the beginning of higher education
is taken as grade 10 instead of grade 11. Now, the tax gradient not only captures the
effect of increasing education within secondary or higher level but also transitioning from
previous level to the current level. This does not change the results very much, though
the gap improves a little for all the specifications in the secondary level. This is possible if
there are larger gains in income from transitioning from primary to secondary level than
increasing years of education within secondary level. Lastly, we modify the definition of
completing grade 10. The LSMS data distinguishes between people who have completed
grade 10 versus those who have passed the national-level exam at the end of grade 10.
The next education grade reported in the data is graduating from grade 12. Thus, anyone
who drops out of grade 11 or 12 is coded as having passed the national-level 10th exam.
Due to this peculiar feature of the data, we assume that anyone who passes the national-
level grade 10 exam has 11 years of education. In Row 15, we use an alternate definition –
people who passed national level education have only 10 years of education. This increases
the sample size at the secondary level and reduces it at the higher level. Row 15 shows
that the fiscal balance improves at the secondary level, but it worsens at the higher level,
due to this modification.
Finally in Table 2.4, we employ alternative discount rates. When we lower the discount
rate from 3%15 to 1%, the fiscal gap improves as the discounted value of marginal cost falls
(see equations 2.5 & 2.7). At higher level, the fiscal gap is now positive and significant at
all the moments of the distribution. On the other hand, for primary and secondary level,
the fiscal balance is quite balanced in majority of the specifications. Once, we increase the
discount rate above the baseline, the fiscal balance, as expected, worsens (see Panel B and
C of Table 2.4). At a discount rate of 5% the fiscal gap is negative for all the levels except
for higher education, while at the rate of 9%, the marginal fiscal cost is higher than the
marginal benefit for all the levels of education.
Next, we consider how migration would affect these calculations. (In the sample,
around 32 percent of the households report having a member outside Nepal.) On one
hand, migrants leave Nepal after their school years take within their human capital, which
was built with a government subsidy to some degree. On the other hand, those migrants
15In the main analysis, we use the discount rate of 3% which is close to the average real interest rate of
Nepal from 1975-2010 (Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.RINR?locations=NP)
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(many of whom left home in search of higher incomes) might very well send back remit-
tances. These remittances would, if spent, expand the national tax base. We attempt to
characterize the magnitude of these effects by using information on the migrant’s educa-
tion and remittances .
First, we calculate the probability of migration (P ) for each household head based on
her school grade 16. This probability is equal to the proportion of people who migrated
conditional on school grade. For instance, there are 7 international migrants out of 139
people, aged between 20 and 80 years, who have completed one year of education. Then,
the probability of migration is 5 percent for household heads who have finished one year
of schooling. Appendix Table B.3 contains these probabilities for each education grade.
Next, we modify the tax payments using the migration probability. If the household head
migrates, then she doesn’t pay any taxes. In other words, we assume that the migrant
leaves for work immediately after finishing school. This implies that there are no fiscal
opportunity costs in terms of foregone tax payments on domestically earned income, be-
cause the government doesn’t loose tax revenue if a future migrant remains in school for
an additional year. However, the household members in Nepal must pay VAT when they
consume the remittances, R, sent by the migrant. We assume that the household head, if
she migrates, will send back money equal to the average remittance sent by a migrant of
same education level. If the household head doesn’t migrate then, there is no change in
the tax payment. Thus, the migration-adjusted tax payments (M), are given by:
M = (1− P )τ(s) + 0.13× PR,
where VAT is 13 percent of remittances. Row 6 of the Appendix Table B.3 contains the
average tax payments adjusted for migration at each education level. Table 2.5 shows that
result do not change much if we use the migration-adjusted tax payments of the household
heads. The fiscal balance improves a little for both higher and secondary levels in most of
the specifications, while it worsens a bit for the primary level.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that government’s investment in education can be analyzed in
terms of expanding the tax base. This fact is not internalized by the individual as she
16In the LSMS survey, the household head, by definition, cannot be away from the household for more
than 6 months in the last year and hence, is not classified as a migrant (CBS (2011)). Hence, we calculate
the probability of migration of the household head by using the education information of the household
members present at the time of survey and the migrants.
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neither bears the full cost of education, because of subsidies, nor does she realize the
entire benefits of education due to taxes. We find that, on average, these distortions–
taxes and subsidies–do not cause deviations from the optimum choice of schooling at the
primary and secondary level. However, at the tertiary level, the fiscal gap is positive and
significant. This study provides a novel explanation for this: people with higher education
are more likely to be in the formal sector and hence, pay income taxes. We subject our
findings to a variety of sensitivity analyses, including the effect of emigration, and show
that the results remain robust.
While the positive fiscal gap implies that the government can reap significant fiscal re-
turns from investing in higher education, there can be spillover effects of such investment.
On one hand, higher average education may cause a rise in transfers at lower levels of
income (and education) which can worsen the fiscal balance at those levels. On the other
hand, increasing higher education can speed-up formalization of the economy resulting in
an increase in formal sector participation of people with primary and secondary education.
This can improve the fiscal balance at lower levels of education. Measuring the magnitude
of these effects is a subject of future research.
In future work, we would also like to match the subsidy data to administrative tax data
and a survey that tracks individuals over their lifetime to improve our estimates. Lastly, this
study would not have been possible without access to information on aggregate govern-
ment spending per student at different levels of education. To the best of our knowledge,
disaggregated information on subsidies is not available for a majority of developing coun-
tries. Since fiscal returns to education are an important policy parameter, it might be useful
to construct such data for many more countries.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
HH	Consumption	per	
capita	(in	NPRs)
Direct	tax	(in	NPRs) VAT	(in	NPRs)
Subsidy	at	end	
point	of	the	
interval	(in	NPRs)
Years	of	
education	of	the	
household	head
Proportion	of	
households	heads	in	
the	formal	sector
Count 3,787 3,787 3,787 353 3,787 3,787
Median 26,768 0 15,296 7,209 0 0
25th	percentile 18,292 0 10,710 7,209 0 0
75th	percentile 40,345 0 22,692 7,209 2 0
Mean	 33,859 1,061 18,833 7,192 1.09 0.05
Standard	deviation 26,132 9,187 14,267 325 1.78 0.22
Count 1,081 1,081 1,081 292 1,081 1,081
Median 38,760 0 22,877 30,510 8 0
25th	percentile 25,950 0 15,331 30,510 7 0
75th	percentile 59,864 0 33,747 30,510 10 0
Mean	 49,303 7,766 28,653 29,816 8.16 0.21
Standard	deviation 40,675 36,016 27,315 4,438 1.41 0.41
Count 893 893 893 222 893 893
Median 64,898 0 32,969 30,385 12 0
25th	percentile 43,100 0 21,547 30,385 11 0
75th	percentile 97,275 16,105 49,276 30,385 15 1
Mean	 80,091 23,718 40,877 27,277 12.29 0.46
Standard	deviation 58,555 61,512 30,782 6,356 1.62 0.50
Note:	This	table	presents	the	summary	statistics	of	the	main	variables	used	in	the	analysis.	The	rest	of	the	variables	are	
described	in	the	appendix.	The	primary	data	source	is	Nepal	Living	Standards	Survey	-	2010.	The	subsidy	data	comes	from	
National	Education	Accounts	reports	compiled	by		International	Institute	for	Educational	Planning	(IIEP),	UNESCO	Institute	for	
Statistics	(UIS)	and	Global	Partnership	for	Education	[IIEP	Reports	2016a	2016b].	This	data	can	be	accessed	at	
http://uis.unesco.org/en/news/national-education-accounts
Table	1:	Summary	Stats
Panel	A:	Primary	Education	(Grades	0-5)
Panel	B:	Secondary	Education	(Grades	6-10)
Panel	C:	Higher	Education	(Grade	11	to	Bachelor's	Degree)
Note: This table presents the summary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis. The rest of the
variables are described in the appendix. The primary data sourc is Nepal Livi g Standards Survey-2010.
The ubsidy data com s from Nation l E ucation Accounts reports compiled by International Institute for Ed-
ucational Planning (IIEP), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and Global Partnership for Education [IIEP
Reports 2016a 2016b]. This data can be accessed at http://uis.unesco.org/en/news/national-education-
accounts
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Table 2.2: Estimated Fiscal Benefits and Costs for a Year of Education
Median		 25th	%ile 75th	%ile	 Mean
Years	of	Schooling 610*** 511*** 836*** 870***
(92) (74) (176) (188)
Opportunity	Cost	at	Grade	5 18747*** 14199*** 26069*** 23294***
(392) (315) (751) (841)
Subsidy	at	Grade	5 7209 7209 7209 7192
Diff	between	MB	and	MC -169** -131** -163 -44
(81) (65) (156) (165)
(MB-MC)	/	Consumption	per	capita -0.005 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001
Years	of	Schooling 547 220 1354 2221*
(415) (224) (830) (1172)
Opportunity	Cost	at	Grade	10 26415*** 18445*** 41544*** 40505***
(959) (516) (1917) (3023)
Subsidy	at	Grade	10 30510 30510 30510 29816
Diff	between	MB	and	MC -1161*** -1249*** -808 111
(393) (211) (785) (1094)
(MB-MC)	/	Consumption	per	capita -0.026 -0.039 -0.012 0.002
Years	of	Schooling 3737*** 2000*** 7623*** 8875***
(941) (489) (2398) (1937)
Opportunity	Cost	at	Grade	15 52675*** 33080*** 99141*** 88647***
(2945) (1532) (7508) (6658)
Subsidy	at	Grade	15 30385 30385 30385 27277
Diff	between	MB	and	MC 1245 96 3737* 5398***
(865) (450) (2206) (1752)
(MB-MC)	/	Consumption	per	capita 0.014 0.002 0.027 0.05
Note	-	This	table	calculates	the	difference	between	MB	and	MC	(fiscal	gap)	at	the	end-point	of	each	level	of	education.	The	
dependent	variable	is	total	tax	payments	-	income	and	consumption	tax	(VAT).	We	assume	that	only	people	in	the	formal	sector	
pay	income	tax.	Everyone	pays	VAT.	Main	coefficient	of	interest	is	"years	of	schooling"	of	the	household-head	which	is	equal	to	
the	MB.	"Opportunity	cost"	is	the	tax	forgone	due	to	an	additional	year	of	schooling	at	the	end-point	of	the	interval.	"Subsidy"	is	
non-household	expenditure	per	student	which	includes	central	and	local	government	expenditure,	international	and	local	NGO,	
external	loans	and	grants,	off-budget	assistance	and	internally	generated	funds	by	the	schools.			Other	controls	include	quadratic	
terms	of	the	age	of	the	household-head	and	the	sum	of	education	level	of	all	the	other	family	members.	We	demean	the	controls	
so	that	the	marginal	cost	is	the	discounted	value	of	the	sum	of	opportunity	cost	and	subsidy.	We	use	a	discount	rate	of	three	
percent.	In	the	final	row	of	each	panel,	we	take	the	average	per-capita	consumption	of	households	whose	head	has	education	
level	equal	to	the	end-point	of	the	interval,	and	use	it	to	standardize	the	fiscal	gap.	In	2010-11,	the	year	of	the	analysis,	1	USD	
was	equal	to	72	Nepalese	rupees.	The	primary	data	source	is	Nepal	Living	Standards	Survey	-	2010.	The	subsidy	data	comes	from	
National	Education	Accounts	reports	compiled	by	International	Institute	for	Educational	Planning	(IIEP),	UNESCO	Institute	for	
Statistics	(UIS)	and	Global	Partnership	for	Education	[IIEP	Reports	2016a	2016b].	This	data	can	be	accessed	at	
http://uis.unesco.org/en/news/national-education-accounts.	Standard	errors	are	shown	in	parentheses.	Three	stars	denotes	
signifigance	at	the	1%	level;	two	stars,	5%;	and	one	star,	10%.
Panel	C:	Higher	Education	(Grade	11	to	Bachelor's	Degree),	N=893
Table	2.1	:	Estimated	Fiscal	Benefits	and	Costs	for	a	Year	of	Education
Panel	B:	Secondary	Education	(Grades	6-10),	N=1081
Panel	A:	Primary	Education	(Grades	0-5),	N=3787
Note:This table calculates the difference between MB and MC (fiscal gap) at the end-point of each level of
education. The dependent variable is total tax pay ents - income and consumption tax (VAT). We assume
that only eople in the formal ector pay in ome tax. Everyone pays VAT. Main c efficient of interest is ”years
of schooling” of the household-head which is equal to the MB. ”Opportunity cost” is the tax forgone due to
an additional year of schooling at the end-point of the interval. ”Subsidy” is non-household expenditure
per student which includes central and local government expenditure, international and local NGO, external
loans and grants, off-budget assistance and int rnally generated funds by th schools. Other controls include
quadratic terms of the age of the household-head and he m f ed cation level of all the other family
members. We demean the controls so that the marginal cost is the discounted value of the sum of opportunity
cost and subsidy. We use a discount rate of three percent. In the final row of each panel, we take the average
per-capita consumption of households whose head has education level equal to the end-point of the interval,
and use it o standardize the fi c l g p. In 2010-11, the year f the analysis, 1 USD was equal o 72 Nepalese
rupees. The prim ry data source is Nepal Living Standards Survey - 2010. The subsidy data comes from
National Education Accounts reports compiled by International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP),
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and Global Partnership for Education [IIEP Reports 2016a 2016b].
This data can be accessed at http://uis.unesco.org/en/news/national-education-accounts. Standard errors
are shown in parentheses. Three stars denotes signifigance at the 1% level; two stars, 5%; and one star,
10%.
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Table 2.4: Alternate Discount Rates
Median	 25th	%ile	 75th	%ile	 Mean
Primary 350*** 297*** 503*** 565***
(88) (71) (169) (180)
Secondary -23 -270 633 1518
(408) (219) (815) (1146)
Higher 2906*** 1365*** 6328*** 7716***
(915) (476) (2333) (1875)
Primary -688*** -559*** -828*** -654***
(74) (60) (142) (149)
Secondary -2300*** -2228*** -2249*** -1295
(378) (204) (756) (1043)
Higher -416 -1174*** 1147 3079*
(816) (425) (2082) (1630)
Primary -1726*** -1416*** -2159*** -1873***
(61) (49) (117) (119)
Secondary -4577*** -4186*** -5131*** -4108***
(350) (189) (700) (944)
Higher -3738*** -3712*** -4034** -1558
(723) (376) (1845) (1392)
Table	2.3	 lternate	Discount	rates
Note:	This	table	presents	estimates	of	the	gap	between	fiscal	marginal
benefits	and	marginal	costs	of	education	under	different	assumptions
about	alternative	discount	rates.	(The	discount	rate	used	in	the	original
analysis	is	3	percent.)	See	notes	from	Table	2.1	for	specifications.
Standard	errors	are	shown	in	parentheses.	Three	stars	denotes
signifigance	at	the	1%	level;	two	stars,	5%;	and	one	star,	10%.
Panel	A:	Discount	of	1	percent
Panel	B:	Discount	of	5	percent
Panel	C:	Discount	of	9	percent
Note: This table presents estimates of the gap between fiscal marginal benefits and marginal costs of edu-
cation under different assumptions about alternative discount rates. (The discount rate used in the original
analysis is 3 percent.) See notes from Table 2.2 for specifications.Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Three stars denotes significance at the 1% level; two stars, 5%; nd one star, 10%
61
Table 2.5: Gap between MB and MC, adjusted for migration
Median	 25th	%ile	 75th	%ile	 Mean
Primary -381*** -224*** -503*** -443***
(74) (61) (135) (141)
Secondary -866*** -869*** -700 31
(301) (162) (612) (850)
Higher 1437** 23 4306** 5506***
(699) (379) (1817) (1506)
Table	3:	Gap	between	MB	and	MC,	adjusted	for	migration
Note	-	In	this	table	we	use	the	same	specification	as	Table	2.1.	
The	dependent	variable	is	adjusted	for	migration	by	using	the	
formula	given	in	the	note	of	Appendix	Table	2.	Standard	errors	
are	shown	in	parentheses.	Three	stars	denotes	signifigance	at	the	
1%	level;	two	stars,	5%;	and	one	star,	10%.
Note: In this table we use the same specification as Table 2.2. The dependent variable is adjusted for
migration by using the formula given in the appendix. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Three
stars denotes significance at the 1% level; two stars, 5%; and one star, 10%
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2.8 Figures
Figure 2.1: Education subsidies, by level, in Nepal and its comparison with Uganda
	
																	 	
	
																	 	
	
	
	
Figure	1:	Education	subsidies,	by	level,	in	Nepal	and	its	comparison	with	Uganda	
	
Note:	The	data	for	these	graphs	is	sourced	from	National	Education	Accounts	(NEA)	reports.	For	
Nepal,	primary	education	goes	from	grades	1-5,	lower	secondary	from	6-8,	secondary	from	9-
10,	upper	secondary	from	11-12	and	higher	education’s	duration	is	of	three	years	(Source:	
National	Education	Accounts	In	Nepal	Expenditure	for	Education	2009-	2015.	Kathmandu,	
2016).	For	Uganda,	primary	education	is	from	grades	1-7,	lower	secondary	from	8-11,	upper	
secondary	from	11-13	and	three	years	of	higher	education	(Source:	National	Education	
Accounts	Report.	Kampala,	2016).		
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Note: The data for these graphs is sourced from National Education Accounts (NEA) reports. For Nepal,
primary education goes from grades 1-5, lower secondary from 6-8, secondary from 9- 10, upper secondary
from 11-12 and higher education’s duration is of three years (Source: National Education Accounts In Nepal
Expenditure for Education 2009- 2015. Kathmandu, 2016). For Uganda, primary education is from grades
1-7, lower secondary from 8-11, upper secondary fro 11-13 and three years of higher education (Source:
National Education Accounts Report. Kampala, 2016).
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Figure 2.2: Formality and Education Level
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	2:	Formality	and	Education	Level	
	
Note:	This	figure	graphs	the	change	in	proportion	of	formal	labor	force	according	to	education	
level.	For	our	analysis,	formality	is	synonymous	with	being	compliant	with	tax	laws.	Definition	1,	
which	is	used	in	the	analysis,	includes	a	wage	earner	in	the	formal	sector	if	her	income	is	reported	
to	 the	 government	 by	 the	 employer	 or	 if	 she	 receives	 benefits	 from	 the	 social	 security	 net.	
Additionally,	businesses	registered	with	the	government	are	also	included	in	the	formal	sector.	
Informal	sector	consists	of	rest	of	the	workforce	including	workers	engaged	in	agriculture.		This	
graph	is	based	on	calculations	using	the	data	from	Nepal	Living	Standards	Survey	2010.	
	
	
	
	
	
Note: This figure graphs the change in proportion of formal labor force according to education level. For
our analysis, formality is synonymous with being compliant with tax laws. Definition 1, which is used in
the analysis, includes a wage earner in the formal sector if her income is reported to the government by
the employer or if she receives benefits from the social security net. Additionally, businesses registered with
the government are also included in the formal sector. Informal sector consists of rest of the workforce
including workers engaged in agriculture. This graph is based on calculations using the data from Nepal
Living Standards Survey 2010.
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Figure 2.3: Taxes, Benefits and Education
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Figure	3:	Taxes,	Benefits	and	Education	
	
Note:	This	figure	plots	the	mean	of	benefits	received	under	various	cash-transfer	schemes	and	
taxes	paid,	according	to	the	education	level.	Based	on	calculations	using	the	income	tax	
schedule	of	Nepal	and	data	from	Nepal	Living	Standards	Survey	2010.	
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Note: This figure plots the mean of benefits received under various cash-transfer schemes and taxes paid,
according to the education level. Based on calculations using the income tax schedule of Nepal and data
from Nepal Living Standards Survey 2010.
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CHAPTER III
The Big-Brother Effect: Intra-household Determinants of
Learning Crisis in India
Abstract
Does learning crises in developing countries affect all children within a family equally? Us-
ing nationally representative Indian data and exploiting within-family variation, this paper
finds that elder children have a learning advantage over their younger siblings. Eldest sons
have higher levels of learning than their younger brothers, and the gap widens in districts
with stronger elder-son preferences as captured by district-level Sex Ratio at Last Birth.
This results in a steeper birth-order gradient in those districts. Additionally, controlling
for birth-order, boys outperform girls, pointing towards general son-preferences. Societal
preferences affect learning through differential allocation of educational resources within
a family.
JEL Codes: I21, J13, J16, O15, Z13
Keywords: Learning outcomes, Intra-household Allocation, Birth-order
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3.1 Introduction
Despite substantial gains in school enrollment, a learning crisis has emerged in the de-
veloping world. The World Bank Development Report (2018) points out – “the average
student in low-income countries performs worse than 95 percent of the students in high-
income countries”. The current literature has largely focused on exploring the reasons for
low average levels of learning. These reasons include: inadequate school infrastructure
(Duflo (2001)), poor teacher quality (Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005), Duflo, Hanna
and Ryan (2012)), low health investments in early childhood (Black et al. (2017), Almond
and Currie (2011)), among others. In contrast, this study asks whether there are differ-
ence in learning among the children of the same household in an environment where the
average learning levels are low. It is an important question because the heterogeneity in
learning arising from taste-based factors may not be mitigated by addressing problems that
cause poor overall learning outcomes .
Specifically, I ask the following questions : 1) Is there intra-household variation in
learning outcomes with respect to birth-order, gender and sibling composition? 2) Can
gender-preferences partially explain the intra-household variation? and 3) What are the
mechanisms through which these preferences influence actual learning?
India provides an excellent setting for this study for three reasons. First, the country
has made great strides in improving access to primary education, however the quality of
education remains low (see figure 3.1). Second, like many other countries in Asia such
as China and South Korea, Indian parents have a strong son-preference. Among sons, the
eldest son has a higher place in the social hierarchy because he is expected to take care
of parents in their old age, perform parents’ last rites, and also helps his younger brothers
(Das Gupta et al. (2003), Jayachandran (2015), Dyson and Moore (1983)). Third, there
are significant regional differences in the gender preferences across the country which
allows us to isolate the effects of these preferences on learning outcomes.(North India has
stronger preference for sons as compared to south and north-east India. See figure 3.2)
The primary data source used in the empirical analysis is the Annual Status of Edu-
cation Report (ASER) 2014; it is a nationally representative household-level survey con-
ducted in all the rural districts of India. I also use this survey to calculate the sex ratio at
last birth (SRLB) at the district level, which measure not only absolute son-preference but
also preference for the eldest son.1 I model the learning outcomes as a function of birth
1SRLB is defined as the number of boys per girl at the district level, by considering only the youngest
children across families. For instance, if there are 10 families in a district and the youngest children across
the ten families comprise of 8 boys and 2 girls, then the district-level SRLB takes a value of 4. SRLB increases
before Sex ratio at Birth in settings like India where there is limited access to abortion (Yoo, Hayford and
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order, gender and sibling composition. Then, I analyze how the effect of these factors
change as the gender preferences change across Indian districts. I use several controls at
the child and parent’s level that influence learning outcomes such as such as school grade,
parent’s education and age, among others. To control for unobservable factors such as
fertility decisions, I use two strategies. First, I include mother fixed effects in the model to
control for time-invariant family-level unobservables. This strategy is similar to one used
by Jayachandran and Pande (2017), henceforth referred to as JP(2017), in analyzing the
height differences of children within the family. Second, I only include those families in
the sample where the mother has completed fertility. Such mothers are identified using
their age and the number of years since the birth of last child. I also include fixed effects
for the year of birth and the district of residence as additional controls. Finally, I check if
the results are robust to alternate model specifications and different definitions of learning
outcomes.
There are three main findings of this study. First, there is a negative birth order gradient
in learning outcomes for both the genders, with the first-borns having the highest learning
outcomes. This result is consistent with Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) who find
that increased family size affects the educational attainment of only the later born, and
doesn’t affect the average years of education of other siblings. Second, boys learning
outcomes are higher than girls at each birth-order. The learning gap increases in districts
with higher SLRB and indicates the role of absolute son-preferences in explaining the gap.
Third, there is a significant effect of having an elder brother on the learning outcomes
of boys. The eldest son is 2.1 percentage points more likely to attain the required level
of learning according to the grade in which he is studying than a boy who has an elder
brother – “the big-brother effect”2. This effect if positively correlated with the elder son
preferences of the Indian parents. In fact, in the top decile of districts, ranked according
to SRLB, the eldest son is 3.8 percentage point learning advantage over a boy who has an
elder brother. For girls, the effect of having an elder brother is ambiguous. According to
JP (2017), on one hand, if the girl has an elder brother, then the resources will be diverted
towards him instead of the girl. They call it the “Sibling rivalry effect”. On the other hand,
if the girl doesn’t have a brother, then the family might conserve resources in anticipation
of a male child, which again adversely affects the education on the girl. This is called the
“Fertility stopping effect”. In India, the two effects seem to have an equal negative effect
on the girl’s education.
Agadjanian (2017)). The mean and standard deviation of the district-level SRLB is 1.41 boys per girl and
0.34, whereas the corresponding figures for district-level Sex Ratio of population from 0 to 6 years, according
to 2011 census, is 1.08 boys per girl and 0.05
2For the entire sample, 38 percent of children reach the adequate leaning level
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Next, I show that differential investment in education is an important channel through
which birth order and sibling composition influence what children learn. Parents are more
likely to send their elder children and the eldest sons to more expensive private schools
and enroll them in private tuition. Thus, the parental preferences not only differentially
affect the human capital outcomes of children at the post-natal stage (JP 2017), but they
have an effect at the later stages of childhood too.
This study speaks to three strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature of
birth-order effects on education by proposing a novel explanation for such affects, that is,
gender preferences. We know that there are several studies which document the effects
of the birth order on outcomes such as education, earnings, height, among others (Black,
Devereux and Salvanes (2005), Savage et al. (2013), JP (2017)). There is a nascent
literature on the mechanisms through which birth order effects affects education such as
time spent by parents on children (Price (2008), Pavan (2016)) and discipline imposed
by parents (Hotz and Pantano (2015)). I show that elder son preference can cause a
declining birth order gradient among boys and the desire of have at least one son can
result in declining birth order among girls. By taking advantage of the large sample size
of the ASER data and regional variation in gender preferences, this paper also shows the
spatial heterogeneity in the birth order effects.
Second, I make a methodological contribution. Sibling composition is extensively used
as an instrument for family size to estimate the effect of family size on education (Kugler
and Kumar (2017), Kang (2011),Lee (2008)). Azam and Saing (2018) have questioned the
exclusion restriction of using the sex of the first child as an instrument. By discovering an
independent effect of sibling composition on learning outcomes, this paper lends support
to their hypothesis.
Finally, there are studies which document gender differences in intra-household al-
location of education resources like enrollment in secondary school (Azam and Kingdon
(2013)) and private school enrollment (Sahoo (2017)). However, a less documented fact
is the gender gap in learning outcomes, given that learning is influenced by several fac-
tors. We show that not only do such gaps exist across the two genders but also within a
gender based on sibling composition. Eldest sons in the family have higher learning as
compared to sons who do have elder brother. Relatedly, this result has implications for the
substantial literature on calculating the returns to education (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos
(2018)). Since, the correlation between years of education and learning varies by gender,
sibling composition and birth order, there is a case for exploring the effect of these factors
on returns to education.
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3.2 Related Literature and Context
The quantity-quality trade-off as postulated by Becker and Lewis (1973) has been ex-
tended by recent literature which stresses on the importance of accounting for birth-order
(Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005), Azam and Saing (2018)). However, there is am-
biguity regarding the exact effect of birth-order. Older children might be at an advantage
if the younger siblings suffer from DNA impairment, mother’s body has suffered physically
from previous births, or parents are older and have less energy (Blake (1989)). Addition-
ally, parents might have already chosen their favorite child for resource allocation putting
the later-born at a disadvantageous position. Kantarevic and Mechoulan (2006) find that
the firstborns have more years of education and higher earnings over a lifetime.
On the other hand, the later-borns might get an advantage if the parents are less credit
constrained and well-settled in their careers (Parish and Willis (1993)). They can also
benefit from elder sibling’s education, particularly if the parents are not educated. Ejrnæs
and Po¨rtner (2004) find positive birth order effects with youngest children having higher
years of schooling. Coffey and Spears (2019) document an increased survival rate among
the later-borns due to better health and social status of women. Thus, the net effect of
birth-order on human capital formation in children is an open question.
A preferred strategy to estimate the quantity-quality trade-off in education is to use
sibling composition as an instrument for variation in the family size [Kugler and Kumar
(2017), Azam and Saing (2018)]. For instance, Conley and Glauber (2006) find that the
families where all the children are of same sex are more likely to increase their family
size than families with children of both genders. The crucial assumption is that “sibling
sex mix affects educational measures only through an increase in sibship size?”. This
paper investigates and finds that the sibling composition independently affects the learning
outcomes, and thus, casts doubt on the above assumption.
A few studies have estimated the effect of sibling composition on education in dif-
ferent contexts like Pakistan (Qureshi (2018)), USA (Butcher and Case (1994)), Turkey
(Dayiog˘lu, Kirdar and Tansel (2009)) etc. However, the above studies have not explicitly
looked at the influence of gender preferences on the effect of birth order and sibling com-
position on education. Moreover, the sample size is small which doesn’t allow the authors
to investigate spatial heterogeneity in the birth-order and sibling composition effects.
Preference for sons, more for elder sons.
In India, there is son-preference because of various reasons – son’s perform last rites of
parents, they “carry on one’s family line”, patrilineality (passing productive assets through
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the male line) and patrilocality (parents residing in son’s house) (Das Gupta et al. (2003)
and Jayachandran (2015)). Often, among the sons, it is the eldest son present who is
entrusted to do these tasks. Anukriti (2018) while analyzing a financial incentive scheme
in Haryana (a state in north India) finds that as “fertility decreases, the sex ratio at birth
worsens as high son preference families are unwilling to forgo a son despite substantially
higher benefits for a daughter”. Jayachandran (2017) finds a “strong desire to have at
least one son and a preference for gender balance thereafter” in the north Indian state of
Haryana.
There is stronger son-preference as one moves from south to north India (Figure 3.2).
Dyson and Moore (1983) argue that in the north, women have to migrate farther after
marriage and parents can expect little help from them after marriage. Moreover, women
have limited property rights in north as compared to south India. Eldest son has higher
socio-economic status in the north because “males tend to cooperate with and receive help
from other males to whom they are related by blood, frequently their adult brothers”.
There is a vast literature documenting the existence of gender bias in allocation of var-
ious economic resources in India (Sen and Sengupta (1983), Behrman (1988), Jayachan-
dran and Kuziemko (2011)). Within education, several studies document gender differ-
ences in intra-household allocation of education resources like enrollment in secondary
school (Azam and Kingdon (2013)) and private school enrollment (Sahoo (2017)). This
paper contributes to this literature by looking at an important outcome variable (learning),
and investigating the impact of gender preferences on it.
3.3 Predictions
Intra-household variation in learning is a function of birth order, gender of the child
and the gender of its siblings. The functional form can change as the underlying gender
preferences change. If there is son-preference, in particular, elder son preference, then we
should see the following patterns in the data:
1. The learning outcomes for boys should be higher than girls, conditional on birth
order.
2. The slope of the birth order gradient would be more negative for boys in districts
where there is a stronger elder son preference. The elder sons might get more re-
sources for education and hence, have a significant advantage over their younger
brothers.
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3. Relatedly, boys who don’t have an elder brother - they are first born or have only
female siblings, will have higher learning outcomes as compared to boys who do
have an elder brother. Again this effect should be larger in areas with stronger elder
son preference.
4. For girls, having no elder brother versus having one is theoretically ambiguous. JP
(2017) call this “sibling rivalry” versus “fertility stopping” effect. The girls who have
an elder brother will suffer from the disproportionate allocation of resources towards
the brother. On the other hand, if they have only elder sisters, then households might
exceed their desired level of fertility to have at least one son.
5. The households who have only girls should be larger than households that have at
least one son, as households might exceed their desired fertility to have at least one
son (also pointing towards limited access/use of sex-selective abortion). This effect
will be more pronounced in areas with stronger son-preference.
3.4 Data description
In the analysis, I use the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) 2014 data 3 which
captures the learning outcomes of children - the key variable of interest.4 It is a household-
level survey done in all the rural districts of India with 600 households surveyed in each
district of the 31 states and union territories. Within each district, 30 villages are chosen
and 20 households per village are surveyed. Information of all the children aged between
3-16 years is collected, with learning outcomes recorded for those in the age group of 5-16
years. Data is also collected for certain paternal and household characteristics. For this
study, I am using the data from 2014 survey, the latest year for which it is available.
One way to gauge what children learn at school is to assess their math aptitude. In the
data, five levels of math aptitude are recorded with the lowest ranging from no knowledge
of arithmetic to the highest being able to divide a three digit number by a single digit.5
I standardize the math level by creating a new binary variable - Standard Math Level
(StdMath), which takes a value of 1 if the child has attained the requisite math level
according to the grade in which she is studying, and 0 if she hasn’t attained that level.6
3The report can be accessed using the link http://www.asercentre.org/Keywords/p/234.html. The data
is available upon request
4IHDS II is another potential data source but is not entirely suitable as it only records learning outcomes
of children aged between 8 to 11 years and has a much smaller sample size as compared to ASER data.
5Level 1 = No Arithmetic, 2 = Recognize numbers 1-9; 3 = Recognize numbers 11-99; 4 = two-digit
subtraction; 5 = division
6Grade 1 and 2 children should be able to recognize numbers from 1 to 99; grade 3 students should be
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The aforementioned method assigns the StdMath dummy a value of one to any child
who can do division and is in grade 3 or above. Thus, children in higher classes will have
a higher probability of having the value of dummy equal to one. The data shows that
there is variation in the dummy for all school grades7. I also control for child age and
school class in the regressions to alleviate the above concern. In the robustness checks, I
also use non-standardized math scores with grade fixed effects, and the main results don’t
change. Finally, the standardized math learning outcome variable can be calculated only
for children who go to school.
Additionally, the original sample had 642,911 child-level observations. I drop house-
holds that have either missing mother characteristics or child characteristics. This reduces
the sample to 348,465 which is 52.8 percent of the original data. Thus, I have to assume
that data is Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) to infer that the results are unbiased.
Moreover, in the regressions with mother fixed effects, the missing data should not result
in biased coefficients, as I drop the entire household whenever the data is missing even for
a single child.
In the analysis, the birth order is defined according to the age of the child. Since the
data exists only for children from 3-16 years, therefore, the assigned birth order may not
be an accurate measure of the actual birth order as there can be children in the household
who are younger than 3 years and not captured in the data. This is not a major concern
as very young and very old children might not directly compete for resources with the
school-going children. To define the birth order, I restrict it to three categories - firstborn
(oldest), the second born and later born. I also drop twins from the data as it is difficult to
assign birth order to them. Other child-level characteristics include child age and the class
standard. Other important covariates include parent and household-level characteristics.8
Another variable of interest is Sex Ratio at Last Birth (SRLB) - which captures prefer-
ence to have at least one son. I calculate this variable at the district-level by calculating
the sex ratio using only the youngest children in the families where mothers might have
completed their fertility. The survey doesn’t ask if the woman has completed her fertility.
I proxy for such mothers by restricting the sample to women who are at least 35 years old
or who haven’t had children for more than 4 years. Appendix Figure C.1 shows that the
number of children born to a mother rises with the mother’s age till the age of 35 years
able to do subtraction, and any child above grade 3 should be able to do division. The metric is decided
using NCERT textbooks
7Even in grade 12, only 73 percent of the students are able to do division.
8Paternal characteristics - Parent’s age and schooling. Household wealth is proxied by an infrastructure
index created using principal component analysis. Infrastructure index uses dummies indicating if the house
has electricity, toilet and television.
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and after that, there is a slight negative trend as older children are not captured in the
data. Appendix Figure C.2 shows that less than 14 percent of children in the restricted
data (households with more than one child) have birth space between their closest sib-
ling of more than 4 years. Figure C.2 shows heterogeneity across India in terms of SRLB
with the northern states showing worse SRLB as compared to southern and north-eastern
states. The top 10 percent of districts ranked according to the SRLB have more than 1.88
boys per girl.
The summary statistics in Table 3.1 show that 48 percent of all the children are girls.
The average age of the child in the sample is 9.3 years. The average number of children
per mother is 2.26 according to the sample, which is slightly lower than the national Total
Fertility Rate (TFR) of 2.3 in 2013 9. The average age of mothers in the sample is 33 years
with 58 percent of them having attended school. Additionally, 55 percent of the children
are first born, 30 percent are second born, and the rest are later born.
3.5 Empirical Strategy and Results
3.5.1 Birth Order
To calculate the magnitude and direction of the birth order gradient on standardized
math learning outcome, I use a multi-variate fixed effects regression framework. I create
birth order dummies - with the oldest child being assigned the first child dummy. To
control for child-level characteristics that can affect the learning outcomes - child age and
the school standard in which she is studying are included. I also control for parental
education and household-infrastructure which can influence the learning of the children.
District Fixed Effects are included in some of the specifications to control for time-invariant
district level factors that affect the educational attainment.
However, as JP(2017) point out - households can still vary in terms of unobservables
like fertility decisions. The birth order dummies can pick up the effect of family size which
will lead to biased coefficients. To control for the family size, I employ two strategies.
First, the sample is restricted to mothers who may have completed their fertility10, and
then the total number of children in a family is included as a control variable. The other
strategy is to use Mother FEs, which controls for fertility preferences of the families (this
is similar to the estimation strategy of JP(2017)). I also include birth year fixed effects to
account for differences in the environment in which the children were born. For example,
9Sample Registration System Statistical Report (2013)
10Women who are more than 35 years old or haven’t had children for the last 4 years are considered to
have completed their fertility (See Appendix Figures C.1 and C.2).
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children born in the years with good monsoon, might get more nutrition due to an increase
in their family income, and thus, have higher cognitive ability. Lastly, the standard errors
are clustered at the village level. The underlying assumption is that the unobservables
in the regression are correlated at the village level. The preferred specification takes the
following form:
StdMathimt = β1SecondChildimt + β2LaterChildimt + θ1ChildAgeimt+
θ2SchoolClassimt + ηm + νt + imt
(3.1)
where StdMathimt represents the standardized math outcomes of child i born to mother
m in year t. The first child is the reference category. β1 and β2 are the main coefficients of
interest with ηm and νt denoting the mother and birth-year fixed effect respectively. imt
represents the error term. Household-level variables drop from the regression due to no
variation at the mother level.
Table 3.2 column 1 shows the results from regression controlling for only child-level
characteristics, whereas column 2 also includes household-level characteristics. Columns
3 and 4 include village FEs, with column 4 also restricting the sample to mothers with
completed fertility and controlling for the total number of children. Column 5 includes
Mother FEs, and thus can only include households who have more than one child.
The results point to a negative birth order gradient among the Indian children with the
second and later-born children having a learning deficit as compared to the firstborn. As
mentioned before, the advantage to firstborns can come from factors like greater paternal
attention, the biological condition of the mother, etc. If we focus on results from column 5,
as it controls for all the time-invariant mother-level characteristics, then the second born
children are 5.5 percentage points less likely to attain the math level they are supposed to
have, as compared to the firstborns. The magnitude of the learning gap for the later-borns
increases to 11.9 percentage points. Since 43 percent of the firstborns reach the desired
level of learning, the birth order effect reduces the learning outcome by 12.8 percent and
27.7 percent for the second and the later-born as compared to the firstborn. Moreover, the
birth order gradient becomes steeper after the inclusion of Mother FEs implying that the
omitted variables in other specifications were biasing the coefficients upwards. Reassur-
ingly, the other covariates have expected signs (Columns 1-4) . Mother’s age and parent’s
education have positive and statistically significant effect on learning. Household infras-
tructure also has a positive and significant result. Consistent with the result obtained by
Black et al (2005), the coefficient of family size is very small in magnitude after controlling
for birth order. Thus, even in the context of an overall low learning environment, there is
75
a steep birth order gradient.
3.5.2 Birth Order and Gender
Now, I test if being a girl has a negative impact on learning (Prediction 1), and if the
birth order gradient varies across gender. To do this, I add a dummy for being a girl child
and its interaction with the birth order dummies in the Equation(1) :
StdMathimt = β1SecondChildimt + β2LaterChildimt + θ1ChildAgeimt+
θ2SchoolClassimt + γ1Girlimt + γ2(Girlimt ∗ SecondChildimt)+
γ3(Girlimt ∗ LaterChildimt) + ηm + νt + imt
(3.2)
Here, γ1 captures the difference in learning outcomes between boys and girl - absolute
son preference. γ2 and γ3 capture any difference in the birth order gradient between boys
and girls. Table 3.3 column 3 shows the coefficients of interest for the above specification.
Across various specifications, there is an absolute disadvantage to girls as compared to
boys, conditional on birth order. The dummy for the girl child is negative and significant.
The magnitude of the coefficient is, in fact, comparable to the second child dummy. This
validates prediction 1 - there is an absolute son preference in India which translates into
lower learning outcome for girls as compared to boys, conditional on birth order. Figure
3.3 plots the relative learning outcomes of both boys and girls with respect to the first-born
boy.
Moreover, allowing for birth order to vary by gender leads to steeper birth order gra-
dient for boys, that is, the coefficients on birth order dummies are more negative in table
3.3 than table 3.2. A potential reason could be the elder son preference, over and above
general son preference, which is investigated in the next section.
3.5.3 Birth Order, Gender and Elder son preference
In this section, I explore if there is heterogeneity in the birth-order gradient according
to changes in the district-level elder son preference. Moreover, I test if the elder son
preference translates into elder-son advantage in learning which leads to changes in birth-
order gradient.
To test prediction 2, I modify Equation 2 to allow the gender-specific birth order gradi-
ent to vary with SRLB - measure of elder son preference. A triple interaction of birth order,
gender and SRLB is included in the regression. The modified equation takes the following
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form:
StdMathimt = β1SecondChildimt + β2LaterChildimt + θ1ChildAgeimt+
θ2SchoolClassimt + γ1Girlimt + γ2(Girlimt ∗ SecondChildimt)+
γ3(Girlimt ∗ LaterChildimt) + τ1(Girlimt ∗ SRLB)+
τ2(SecondChildimt ∗ SRLB) + τ3(LaterChildimt ∗ SRLB)+
τ4(SecondChildimt ∗Girlimt ∗ SRLB)+
τ5(LaterChildimt ∗Girlimt ∗ SRLB) + ηm + νt + imt
(3.3)
The γ coefficients have the same interpretation as before. τ1 estimates if the absolute son
preference changes with SRLB. τ2 and τ3 capture the change in the birth order gradient of
boys, while τ4 and τ5 capture the relative change in girls’ birth order gradient with respect
to boys as the SRLB changes. Moreover, if the SRLB is 1, then the birth order gradient
between the second and first boy is given by β1 + τ2. The change in gradient between the
second and the first born girl as compared to the similar gradient between boys, when
SRLB is equal to 1, is given by γ2 + τ4.
First, we would expect absolute discrimination against girls to increase with SRLB be-
cause stronger elder son preference also implies stronger general son preference. Table
3.4 shows that the interaction term between the girl dummy and SRLB (τ1) is negative and
significant across specifications. The first three rows of Appendix Table C.1 calculate the
magnitude of the girl dummy at different levels of SRLB, and indeed the discrimination
against girls increases as the elder son preference becomes stronger.11
Second, the effect of SRLB on the birth order gradient of boys is negative and signifi-
cant - given by the coefficients for the interaction between the birth order dummies and
the SRLB (τ2 and τ3) in Table 3.4 column 3 (the most preferred specification). The learn-
ing disadvantage for the second born as compared to the firstborn increases from 5 to 8
percentage points as SRLB increases from 1 to 1.88 boys per girl. For the later-borns, the
disadvantage increases from 10 to 15 percentage points for a similar rise in SRLB (see
Appendix Table C.1). Moreover, the relative difference in the birth order gradient between
boys and girls is insignificant (the last six rows of Appendix Table C.1), except in column 3
where the birth order gradient between first and second girls is slightly flatter than boys.
The more negative slope of birth order gradient for girls with an increase in SRLB cannot
be explained by stronger elder son preference, which is a limitation of this paper. Figure
3.4 plots the relative learning outcomes of boys and girls with respect to the first born boy,
11I calculate the size of the coefficients at three points of the district-level SRLB – gender parity (SRLB=1
boy per girl), median level (SRLB = 1.36 boys per girl), and 90th percentile (SRLB = 1.88 boys per girl).
77
at different levels of SRLB.
Next, to establish the presence of eldest-son advantage in the learning, I construct a
dummy for no-elder-brother (as done by JP (2017)). This takes a value of 1 if the boy
is first born or has only female siblings and 0 otherwise. The no-elder-brother dummy is
also interacted with the gender dummy to isolate the heterogeneous impact of having no
elder brother on the two genders. I also control for the birth order effects and use mother
Fixed effects to control for total fertility in the regression. The estimation equation takes
the following form:
StdMathimt = β1SecondChildimt + β2LaterChildimt + θ1ChildAgeimt+
θ2SchoolClassimt + γ1Girlimt + δ1NoElderBroimt+
δ2(Girlimt ∗NoElderBroimt) + ηm + νt + imt
(3.4)
Here the coefficient of interest is δ1, which gives the magnitude of no-elder-brother effect
for boys. For girls, the magnitude is given by δ1 + δ2. While we expect δ1 to be positive, the
sign of δ1 + δ2 is ambiguous due to the presence of two opposing effects - Sibling rivalry
effect and fertility stopping rule (JP(2017)).
Across all the specifications in Table 3.5, the coefficient for no-elder-brother is positive
and significant. The eldest son has 2.1 percentage point learning advantage over a boy
who does have an elder brother (Table 3.5 column 3). For girls, the magnitude of the
no-elder-brother effect is small and insignificant. Thus, the sibling rivalry and the fertility
stopping rule seem to be equally strong for the entire sample.
Finally, I investigate if the no-elder-brother effect increases in areas with stronger son
preference to explain the steeper birth order gradient. I modify equation 4 to include the
interaction of no-elder-brother dummy with SRLB. The modified equation is:
StdMathimt = β1SecondChildimt + β2LaterChildimt + θ1ChildAgeimt+
θ2SchoolClassimt + γ1Girlimt + δ1NoElderBroimt+
δ2(Girlimt ∗NoElderBroimt) + λ1(NoElderBroimt ∗ SRLB)+
λ2(Girlimt ∗NoElderBroimt ∗ SRLB) + ηm + νt + imt
(3.5)
According to Prediction 3, the sum of the coefficients δ1 + λ1 should be positive in areas
with high SRLB, and λ1 itself should be greater than 0. Table 3.6, columns 1 to 3 show
that the coefficient for the interaction term of no-elder-brother and SRLB is positive and
significant across specifications. The bottom panel calculates the total no-elder-brother
effect for boys (δ1 + λ1) at different levels of SRLB. At SRLB equal to 1 (gender parity)
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- there is zero no-elder-brother effect, but at the 90th percentile of SRLB (strong son-
preference) the magnitude of the effect increases to 3.8 percentage points.
Moreover, the effect of having an elder brother is muted for girls (see figure 3.5). The
total no-elder-brother effect for girls in equation 5, is given by δ1 + δ2 + λ1 + λ2. Bottom
panel for table 3.6 column 3, shows the sum of the coefficients to be insignificant at gender
parity and the median value of SRLB. It is positive and significant at 90th percentile with
the magnitude smaller than boys. For the rest of the specifications (columns 1 and 2),
the coefficient is not statistically different from 0 at all levels of SRLB. The absence of no-
elder-brother effect can be explained by the combined and equal effect of sibling rivalry
and fertility stopping rule (Prediction 4).
3.6 Mechanisms and underlying assumptions
In this section, I identify potential mechanisms through which gender preferences in-
fluence the learning outcomes. JP (2017) show that “girls in India receive fewer postnatal
resources if their family does not yet have a son.” Lower investments in early childhood
could lead to lower cognition later in life. Another potential channel can be differential
investments directly into the education of the child. I measure educational investments
in 2 ways - the probability of giving child out-of-school tuition by a private tutor, and the
probability of enrolling the child in a private school. In India private schools tend to be
more expensive than the public schools. Ha¨rma¨ (2009) estimates the full cost to parents of
sending their kids to private schools in the range of $22.42-26.44 per annum as compared
to a cost of $3 per annum in government schools.
Empirically, I test if the no-elder-brother effect exists in the probability of accessing
private tuition or getting enrolled in a private school. I modify Equation 4 by having these
two measures of school investment as the dependent variable. The results are reported in
Table 3.7.12
Girls have a lower probability of getting enrolled for both private tuition and school-
ing. Moreover, the birth order gradient is downward sloping for educational investments -
the coefficients of the birth order dummies are negative (except column 3 where they are
insignificant). Finally, there is a positive and significant no-elder-brother effect for boys
similar to the one in learning outcomes.13 For girls, the effect of having an elder brother
versus not ranges from null to negative. It seems that the negative effect of fertility stop-
12In the first three columns, the dependent variable is a dummy for the child getting private tuition and in
the next three, it is a dummy for enrollment in private school.
13The no-elder-brother dummy is insignificant in column 6, after the inclusion of Mother fixed effects.
However, it does become significant at the top decile of SRLB, which is not in the table.
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ping rule dominates the negative effect of sibling rivalry effect for educational investment
in girls, but the evidence is not conclusive.
Finally, the Sex Ratio at Last Birth (SRLB) indeed represents elder son preference if
families exceed their desired fertility to have at least one son. This assumption can be
tested by asking if the families whose two oldest children are girls are larger than the
ones who have at least one son. I restrict the sample to households who have at least 2
children14, and then create a dummy which takes a value of 1 if the oldest two children
are both girls and 0 otherwise. I also interact the dummy with SRLB, to check if the desire
of having at least one son is increasing with rising SRLB. The following regression in run
at the household-level:
TotalChildrenmv = β1BothGirlsmv + τ1(BothGirlsmv ∗ SRLB)+
X′mvδ + ηv + mv
(3.6)
TotalChildrenmv represents the total number of children born to mother m in village v.
Xmv represents vector of mother/household level controls and ηv indicates village FEs. We
expect β1 + τ1 to be jointly positive and τ1 to be individually positive.
Table 3.8 documents the results. Column 2 includes village Fixed effects while Column
3 also restricts the sample to women who might have completed their fertility. The house-
hold size is significantly larger if the first two children are girls as compared to having at
least one boy among the first two children. Moreover, the interaction term is positive and
significant which implies that the family size becomes larger with higher SRLB.
3.7 Robustness
3.7.1 Alternate Specification
The dependent variable used is a dummy which takes a value of 1 if the child has
reached the requisite level of learning according to the grade in which she is studying.
However, the highest math ability captured in the ASER survey is doing division which
every child above grade 3 should be able to do. As a result, for any child above grade 3,
the probability of learning outcome dummy getting a value of 1 increases mechanically
with the grade of the child. I control for that by including the child age and school grade
as explanatory variables. To alleviate any concern, I also test the main specifications of
14The total fertility rate for India is 2.3 according to Sample Registration System Report (2013)
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the analysis, by taking the raw scores in the data15, and flexibly controlling for the school
grade by introducing the school-grade fixed effects. This approach has been used by Shah
and Steinberg (2017) who use ASER data to look at the impact of rainfall on human capital
formation.
The results are reported in Appendix table C.2 which replicate the main specifications.
The results are consistent with the primary analysis, although the coefficients are not com-
parable as raw scores instead of a dummy variable are used as the dependent variable.
Girls have lower learning outcomes than boys, and there is a negative birth order gradient.
The no-elder-brother dummy is positive and significant indicating the advantage of being
the eldest son in the family. For girls, the sibling rivalry effect and fertility stopping rule
effect tends to cancel out resulting in statistically insignificant no-elder-brother effect for
girls.
3.7.2 Using Reading Scores
ASER survey also documents the reading skills of children which can be an alternate
way to define the learning outcomes. I create a dummy for standardized learning outcome
for reading, which takes a value of 1 if the child has attained the level which she should
have according to the grade in which she is studying.16I replicate the main specifications by
using the standardized reading level as the dependent variable. Table C.3 in the appendix
documents the regression results. There is a birth order gradient in learning outcomes with
the oldest child having the highest learning outcomes. In line with previous results, the
no-elder-brother effect is positive and significant for boys. For girls, it is ambiguous and
statistically similar to zero. The sign of the girl dummy is positive which is a bit surprising,
but this advantage attenuates in areas with higher SRLB. Thus, the effect of birth order
and sibling composition on learning outcomes are invariant to the dimension on which
these outcomes are measured.
3.8 Conclusion and Policy Prescription
In conclusion, there is a declining birth order gradient in learning outcomes with the
older children having learning advantage over their younger siblings. Gender and sibling
composition also affect learning outcomes, which varies according to the change in the
15Level 1 = No Arithmetic, 2 = Recognize numbers 1-9; 3 = Recognize numbers 11-99; 4 = two-digit
subtraction; 5 = division
16Original reading levels in the data are: level 1 = cannot read anything; level 2 = identify letters; level 3
= can read words; level 4 = can read Standard 1 text; level 5 = can read Standard 2 level text.
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underlying preference for elder sons. For boys, having no elder brother improves their
learning outcomes, and this advantage rises with an increase in district-level sex ratio at
last birth (SRLB) – a proxy for elder son preference. It also results in steeper birth-order
gradient for boys. The no-elder-brother effect is muted for girls due to two opposing ef-
fects – fertility stopping rule and sibling rivalry effect. Preferences affect learning through
differential investment in schooling with the eldest son more likely to go to private school
and get private tuition.
There are some policy implications of this analysis. This study proves that the assump-
tion of common gender bias across all children in the household is flawed. In fact, even
boys can be disadvantaged within a family if they have an elder brother. Such taste-based
discrimination cannot be mitigated by policies like wage equality laws. Therefore, data
can be collected on observables like sibling composition and birth order to specifically tar-
get disadvantaged children. For instance, private schools in Delhi (capital of India) collect
data on birth order and siblings as part of their admission process. Such data can also
be collected while implementing schemes that provide remedial classes to disadvantaged
children.
There is evidence of son preference in developed countries like USA (Dahl and Moretti
(2008)). Future research should investigate if the patterns of learning that emerge in de-
veloping countries, also exist in more developed countries. Moreover, gender preferences
have been found to be persistent even in the presence of positive economic shocks. Al-
mond, Edlund and Milligan (2013) have documented the presence of strong son-preference
among the immigrants from South and East Asia to Canada, even though they tend to be
much richer than the average inhabitants of their native countries. Do gender preferences
affects the learning outcomes of the children in these immigrant populations? – is an open
question. Thus, it is possible that the effect of intra-household discrimination on learn-
ing crisis, that is quantified in this study, may not be mitigated by the economic growth
witnessed by the developing world.
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3.9 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Count Mean SD Min Max
School Class 259109 5.20 2.98 1 12
Standardized Math level 259109 0.38 0.49 0 1
Total No. of Children 339461 2.26 1.06 1 8
Girl 339461 0.48 0.50 0 1
Child Age 339461 9.27 3.87 3 16
Dummy of First Child 339461 0.55 0.50 0 1
Dummy of Second Child 339461 0.30 0.46 0 1
Dummy of Later Child 339461 0.14 0.35 0 1
Dummy of Girl x Second Child 339461 0.14 0.35 0 1
Dummy of Girl x Later Child 339461 0.07 0.25 0 1
Dummy of No Elder Brother 339461 0.76 0.43 0 1
Dummy of Girl x No Elder Brother 339461 0.37 0.48 0 1
Dummy of Mother School 339461 0.58 0.49 0 1
Mother Age 339461 33.06 6.89 17 80
Father Age 339461 38.22 7.73 17 85
Dummy of Father School 339461 0.77 0.42 0 1
HH Infrastructure Index 339461 0.00 1.35 -2.38 1.39
Dummy of Private Tuition 274960 0.22 0.41 0 1
Dummy of Private School 287145 0.33 0.47 0 1
Sex Ratio of Last Birth(District level) 577 1.41 0.34 0.73 2.79
[Source] ASER 2014
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Table 3.2: Effect of Birth Order
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(Math Level) OLS OLS Village FE Village FE Mother FE
Whole Sample Whole Sample Whole Sample Completed # of
fertility children>1
Second Child -0.0441*** -0.0383*** -0.0347*** -0.0272*** -0.0548***
(0.00217) (0.00217) (0.00204) (0.00259) (0.00356)
Later Child -0.120*** -0.0866*** -0.0829*** -0.0732*** -0.119***
(0.00352) (0.00345) (0.00315) (0.00441) (0.00651)
Child Age 0.0231*** 0.0268*** 0.0253*** 0.0197*** 0.0228***
(0.00108) (0.00105) (0.000944) (0.00122) (0.00158)
School Class 0.0153*** 0.00579*** 0.00958*** 0.0155*** -0.00186
(0.00111) (0.00107) (0.000946) (0.00105) (0.00140)
Dummy Mother School 0.103*** 0.0958*** 0.0976***
(0.00290) (0.00263) (0.00310)
Mother Age 0.00614*** 0.00149*** 0.000628*
(0.000342) (0.000301) (0.000340)
Father Age -0.00198*** 0.000209 -0.000381
(0.000297) (0.000267) (0.000304)
Dummy Father School 0.0775*** 0.0626*** 0.0659***
(0.00302) (0.00270) (0.00316)
HH Infra 0.0529*** 0.0459*** 0.0449***
(0.00121) (0.00115) (0.00136)
Total No. of Children -0.00716***
(0.00150)
Constant 0.0686*** -0.170*** -0.0853*** 0.0197 0.197***
(0.00764) (0.00949) (0.00932) (0.0161) (0.0150)
Hh Controls NO YES YES YES NO
Observations 259,109 259,109 259,109 198,963 202,793
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors (clustered at village level) in parentheses. Average learning outcome of first
born child (omitted category) in the data is 0.43. The coefficients should be interpreted as change
in the probability of attaining the minimum level of learning. Column 4 restricts the sample to
mothers who might have completed their fertility and thus, allows to control for total number of
children. Column 5 uses mother Fixed effects to control for mother-level time invariant factors. All
the regressions also include birth year Fixed effects.
[Source] All the data for this table is derived from ASER-2014.
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Table 3.3: Effect of Birth Order and Gender
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
(Math Level) Village FE Village FE Mother FE
Whole Sample Completed # of
fertility children>1
Girl -0.0467*** -0.0490*** -0.0551***
(0.00242) (0.00282) (0.00389)
Second Child -0.0369*** -0.0330*** -0.0657***
(0.00277) (0.00332) (0.00443)
Later Child -0.0828*** -0.0789*** -0.127***
(0.00401) (0.00527) (0.00726)
Girl x Second Child 0.00273 0.00499 0.0198***
(0.00383) (0.00442) (0.00520)
Girl x Later Child -0.00421 -0.00452 0.00847
(0.00507) (0.00597) (0.00634)
Constant -0.0587*** 0.0368** 0.225***
(0.00940) (0.0161) (0.0151)
Hh Controls YES YES NO
Observations 259,109 198,963 202,793
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors (clustered at village level) in parentheses. Av-
erage learning outcome of first born male child (omitted category)
in the data is 0.46. The coefficients should be interpreted as change
in the probability of attaining the minimum level of learning. Col-
umn (2) restricts the sample to mothers who might have completed
their fertility and thus, allows to control for the total number of chil-
dren. All the regressions also include birth year Fixed effects. Child
level controls include the age and the class in which she is studying.
Household level controls include the parents’ education, parents’ age
and index for household infrastructure.
[Source] All the data for this table is derived from ASER-2014.
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Table 3.4: Heterogeneity in effect of Birth Order and Gender
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
(Math Level) Village FE Village FE Mother FE
Whole Sample Completed # of
Fertility children>1
Girl -0.0154 -0.0156 -0.0241
(0.0105) (0.0122) (0.0177)
Second Child -0.0222* -0.0163 -0.0140
(0.0119) (0.0132) (0.0159)
Later Child -0.0376** -0.0316 -0.0361
(0.0185) (0.0216) (0.0242)
Girl x Second Child 0.0115 0.00459 0.00113
(0.0173) (0.0197) (0.0240)
Girl x Later Child 0.0239 0.0280 -0.00506
(0.0256) (0.0299) (0.0314)
Girl x Dist. SRLB -0.0219*** -0.0234*** -0.0217*
(0.00720) (0.00841) (0.0120)
Second child x Dist. SRLB -0.0103 -0.0118 -0.0353***
(0.00797) (0.00880) (0.0104)
Later child x Dist. SRLB -0.0313** -0.0331** -0.0620***
(0.0125) (0.0144) (0.0159)
Girl x Second child x Dist. SRLB -0.00633 .00006 0.0125
(0.0118) (0.0135) (0.0163)
Girl x Later child x Dist. SRLB -0.0199 -0.0233 0.00889
(0.0175) (0.0205) (0.0213)
Constant -0.0585*** 0.0356** 0.222***
(0.00940) (0.0161) (0.0151)
Hh Controls YES YES NO
Observations 259,109 198,963 202,793
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors (clustered at village level) in parentheses. Sex Ratio at
Last Birth (SRLB) is number of boys per girl in a district, conditional on being
the last born. This ratio is calculated using families where mothers might have
completed their fertility. Average learning outcome of first born male child (omitted
category) in the data is 0.46. The coefficients should be interpreted as change in
the probability of attaining the minimum level of learning. Column (2) restricts
the sample to mothers who might have completed their fertility and thus, allows
to control for total number of children. All the regressions also include birth year
Fixed effects. Child level controls include the age and the class in which she is
studying. Household level controls include the parents’ education, parents’ age and
index for household infrastructure.
[Source] All the data for this table is derived from ASER-2014.
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Table 3.5: Effect of “No Elder Brother” on Learning Outcomes
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
(Math Level) Village FE Village FE Mother FE
(Robust SE Whole Sample Completed # of
in parentheses) Fertility children>1
Girl -0.0351*** -0.0357*** -0.0313***
(0.00348) (0.00400) (0.00406)
Second Child -0.0330*** -0.0257*** -0.0490***
(0.00242) (0.00304) (0.00422)
Later Child -0.0808*** -0.0736*** -0.112***
(0.00369) (0.00503) (0.00738)
No Elder Brother 0.0127*** 0.0174*** 0.0208***
(0.00323) (0.00367) (0.00422)
Girl x No Elder Brother -0.0144*** -0.0154*** -0.0119**
(0.00395) (0.00458) (0.00573)
Constant -0.0697*** 0.0219 0.200***
(0.00990) (0.0164) (0.0157)
(p-value in parentheses)
NEB + Girl x NEB -0.002 0.002 0.009
(0.630) (0.642) (0.202)
Hh Controls YES YES NO
Observations 259,109 198,963 202,793
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level. NEB stands for
No Elder Brother dummy. Average math level in the data is 0.38. The
coefficients should be interpreted as change in the probability of attaining
the minimum level of learning. Column (2) restricts sample to the moth-
ers who might have completed their fertility and thus, allows to control for
total number of children. All the regressions also include birth year Fixed
effects. Child level controls include age and the class in which she is study-
ing. Household level controls include the parents’ education, parents’ age
and index for household infrastructure.
[Source] All the data for this table is derived from ASER-2014.
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Table 3.6: Heterogeneity in the Effect of “No Elder Brother” on Learning Outcomes according to
District-level Sex Ratio at Last Birth (SRLB)
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
(Math Level) Village FE Village FE Mother FE
(Robust SE in parentheses) Whole Sample Completed # of
Fertility children>1
Girl -0.0355*** -0.0363*** -0.0321***
(0.00348) (0.00401) (0.00406)
Second Child -0.0331*** -0.0261*** -0.0486***
(0.00242) (0.00305) (0.00421)
Later Child -0.0810*** -0.0743*** -0.111***
(0.00369) (0.00503) (0.00738)
No Elder Brother -0.0305*** -0.0319*** -0.0371***
(0.0108) (0.0122) (0.0130)
Girl x No Elder Brother 0.0247** 0.0264** -0.0250
(0.00991) (0.0115) (0.0157)
No Elder Brother x Dist. SRLB 0.0299*** 0.0340*** 0.0400***
(0.00713) (0.00803) (0.00841)
Girl x No Elder Brother x Dist. SRLB -0.0271*** -0.0290*** 0.00938
(0.00635) (0.00745) (0.00999)
Constant -0.0689*** 0.0221 0.199***
(0.00990) (0.0164) (0.0157)
(p-value in parentheses)
NEB + NEB x SRLB -0.001 0.002 0.003
(0.890) (0.676) (0.609)
NEB + NEB x SRLB x 1.36 0.010 0.014 0.017
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
NEB + NEB x SRLB x 1.88 0.026 0.032 0.038
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NEB + NEB x SRLB + Girl x NEB + Girl x NEB x SRLB -0.003 0.000 -0.013
(0.521) (0.930) (0.162)
NEB + NEB x SRLB x 1.36 + Girl x NEB + Girl x NEB x SRLB x 1.36 -0.002 0.001 0.005
(0.559) (0.762) (0.469)
NEB + NEB x SRLB x 1.88 + Girl x NEB + Girl x NEB x SRLB x 1.88 -0.001 0.004 0.031
(0.896) (0.529) (0.000)
Hh Controls YES YES NO
Observations 259,109 198,963 202,793
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level. NEB and SRLB stand for No Elder Brother dummy and Sex Ratio at Last Birth
which is defined as number of boys per girl in a district, conditional on being the last born. This ratio is calculated using families where
mothers might have completed their fertility. 1.36 is median value and 1.88 is top decile value of SRLB across districts. Average math level
in the data is 0.38. The coefficients should be interpreted as change in the probability of attaining the minimum level of learning. Column
(2) restrict sample to the mothers who might have completed their fertility and thus, allows to control for total number of children. All the
regressions also include birth year Fixed effects. Child level controls include age and the class in which she is studying. Household level
controls include the parents’ education, parents’ age and index for household infrastructure.
[Source] All the data for this table is derived from ASER-2014.
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Table 3.7: Potential Mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Pvt Tuition Pvt Tuition Pvt Tuition Pvt School Pvt School Pvt School
(Village FE) (Village FE) (Mother FE) (Village FE) (Village FE) (Mother FE)
(Robust SE Whole Completed # of Whole Completed # of
in parentheses) Sample Fertility children>1 Sample Fertility children>1
Girl -0.0291*** -0.0279*** -0.0250*** -0.0472*** -0.0433*** -0.0479***
(0.00282) (0.00319) (0.00251) (0.00311) (0.00349) (0.00281)
Second Child -0.0230*** -0.0162*** -0.00200 -0.0395*** -0.0230*** -0.0321***
(0.00187) (0.00233) (0.00250) (0.00203) (0.00254) (0.00299)
Later Child -0.0499*** -0.0316*** 0.000266 -0.0826*** -0.0494*** -0.0589***
(0.00317) (0.00398) (0.00455) (0.00359) (0.00447) (0.00526)
No Elder Brother 0.00609** 0.00691** 0.0142*** 0.0102*** 0.0147*** 0.00426
(0.00257) (0.00289) (0.00254) (0.00279) (0.00316) (0.00285)
Girl x No Elder Brother -0.0146*** -0.0166*** -0.00987*** -0.0159*** -0.0159*** -0.0113***
(0.00324) (0.00372) (0.00348) (0.00354) (0.00399) (0.00399)
Constant 0.141*** 0.186*** 0.135*** 0.170*** 0.232*** 0.358***
(0.00866) (0.0145) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0164) (0.0120)
(p-value in parentheses)
NEB + Girl x NEB -0.008 -0.010 0.004 -0.006 -0.001 -0.007
(0.009) (0.011) (0.304) (0.104) (0.765) (0.151)
Hh Controls YES YES NO YES YES NO
Observations 245,103 188,700 191,436 258,505 198,557 202,327
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level. NEB stands for No Elder Brother dummy. Mean of the dummy for
attending private tuition and private school is 0.22 and 0.33 respectively. The coefficients should be interpreted as change
in the probability of attending private tuition or private school. Columns 2 and 5 restrict sample to the mothers who might
have completed their fertility and thus, allows to control for total number of children. All the regressions also include birth
year Fixed effects. Child level controls include age and the class in which she is studying. Household level controls include
the parents’ education, parents’ age and index for household infrastructure.
[Source] All the data for this table is derived from ASER-2014.
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Table 3.8: Test of Fertility Stopping Rule at Family Level
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
(Total No. of Children) OLS Village FE Village FE
(Robust SE No. of children ≥ 2 No. of children ≥ 2 No. of children ≥ 2
in parentheses) & Completed Fertility
Dummy for Both Girls -0.155*** -0.156*** -0.236***
(0.0240) (0.0252) (0.0337)
Dummy for Both Girls x SRLB 0.312*** 0.317*** 0.384***
(0.0168) (0.0176) (0.0238)
Mother Age 0.0111*** 0.00511*** 0.00325***
(0.000702) (0.000761) (0.000958)
Father Age -0.000979 0.00355*** -0.000634
(0.000616) (0.000659) (0.000838)
Dummy Mother School -0.157*** -0.0929*** -0.0654***
(0.00583) (0.00626) (0.00800)
Dummy Father School -0.0121* -0.0167** -0.00887
(0.00689) (0.00722) (0.00911)
HH Infra -0.0741*** -0.0376*** -0.0449***
(0.00218) (0.00274) (0.00363)
Constant 2.168*** 2.157*** 2.348***
(0.0150) (0.0167) (0.0242)
(p-value in parentheses)
DBG + DBG x SRLB 0.157 0.161 0.148
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DBG + DBG x SRLB x 1.36 0.269 0.275 0.286
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DBG + DBG x SRLB x 1.88 0.433 0.442 0.487
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hh Controls YES YES YES
Village FE NO YES YES
Observations 103,337 103,337 66,344
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level. DBG stands for Dummy for Both Girls . It takes a value
of 1 if the two oldest children in the family are girls and 0 otherwise. SRLB stands for Sex Ratio at Last Birth
which is defined as the number of boys per girl in a district, conditional on being the last born. 1.36 is the median
value and 1.88 is the top decile value of SRLB across districts. Each observation is one family. Sample is restricted
to households who have at least 2 children. Column 3 further restricts the sample to women who might have
completed fertility i.e. above 35 years of age or not had children for more than 4 years.
[Source] All the data for this table is derived from ASER-2014.
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3.10 Figures
Figure 3.1: Trends in School Enrollment and Learning
The graph on the left panel depicts the percent of children going to school and their standardized learning
outcomes. The learning outcome variable is a dummy which takes a value of 1 if the child has attained the
learning according to the grade in which she is studying. Right panel depicts the difference between boys
and girls in terms of enrollment and learning outcomes over the years.
[Source] ASER reports 2007 to 2014. Based on author’s calculations.
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Figure 3.2: Average district-level SRLB across Indian states.
Sex Ratio at Last Birth (SRLB) is defined as the number of last born boys per girl at the district level. The
map shows the average of district-level SRLB for each state. SRLB is calculated using ASER data.
[Source] ASER 2014.
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Figure 3.3: Gender-wise birth order gradient of learning outcomes
The graph plots the coefficients and their 95 percent confidence interval from Table 3.3, column 3. The
omitted category is the first born boy in the family. The first born is given birth order value of 1, second-born
a value of 2, and all the other children a value of 3.
[Source] Data for the analysis comes from ASER 2014.
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Figure 3.4: Birth Order effect and son-preferences
The Sex Ratio at Last Birth(SRLB) is defined as the number of last-born boys per girl at the district level.
Higher SRLB implies stronger elder son preference. The graph uses coefficients from column 3 of Table 3.4
and Appendix Table C.1. The left panel depicts the birth order gradient at the gender-parity level of SRLB.
The right-most panel shows the birth order gradient for the districts with SRLB equal to highest decile value.
[Source] Data for the analysis comes from ASER 2014.
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Figure 3.5: No-Elder-Brother effect and son-preferences
The Sex Ratio at Last Birth(SRLB) is defined as the number of last-born boys per girl at the district level.
Higher SRLB implies stronger elder son preference. The graph plots coefficients and confidence intervals
from Table 3.6, column 3.
[Source] Data for the analysis comes from ASER 2014.
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APPENDIX A
Chapter I Supporting Material
A.1 Appendix
A.1.1 Differences between private and public company.
In this study, we label private firms as restricted share transfer (RST) firms and public
firms as non-RST firms.The Company Act (2013) defines a public company as i)Not a pri-
vate company and ii) has a minimum paid-up share capital of Rs.500K. Private company
differs from a public company as they have restrictions on raising capital by selling shares.
Section 2(68) requires private companies to restrict the sale of shares under Articles of
Association. On the other hand, Section 58(2) provides that the securities or other interest
of any member in a public company shall be ‘freely transferable’, unless there is a suffi-
cient cause. Second, a private company must have at least 2 shareholders, while a public
company must have at least 7 shareholders. Additionally, a private company must have
at least 2 directors whereas a public company must have at least 3 directors. There are
no restrictions on the managerial remunerations of a private company whereas they are
capped at 11 percent of the net profit for the public company. These differences imply that
managers of public company face a potential moral hazard where they have to split the
gains of tax evasion with more shareholders but incur the same penalty as that of private
company’s manager if they get caught.
If a public company wants to raise capital by selling its shares, then it has to issue a
prospectus. Among other things, it has to provide information on “reports by the auditors
of the company with respect to its profits and losses and assets and liabilities..” and “any
litigation or legal action pending or taken by a Government Department or a statutory
body during the last five years immediately preceding the year of the issue of prospectus
against the promoter of the company”.
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In our context, a public company has incentive to report honestly to the tax-authorities
even when it doesn’t undergo third-party tax audit because it might have to issue a prospec-
tus at some point in the future. The Chartered Accountants also have an incentive to per-
form statutory-audit more rigorously as their reports will become public once the company
decides to raise capital in a stock exchange.
A.1.2 Model of evasion with dynamic considerations.
In this appendix, we present a stylized model which develops the intuition that firms
misreport their income in a staggered way if they believe that their chances of getting
caught increases when they report zero-growth to the tax-authorities.
Static case - Consider a two-period model where a firm has to choose reported income,
y¯1 and y¯2 at period t = 1 and t = 2. For analytical simplicity, assume that firm’s true income
y doesn’t change in both the periods. Thus, the under-reporting in time periods 1 and 2 is
given by u1 = y − y¯1 and u2 = y − y¯2, respectively.
Let τ be the tax rate on reported profit. There is a strictly increasing, continuous and
convex resource cost of under-reporting given by k(u). The probability of the firm getting
caught, in any period, is given by δ = φh(u), where φ is the effective audit intensity faced
by the firm. h(.) is increasing and convex in u. If the firm get caught, it faces a penalty rate
of θ on evaded taxes.
In the static model, the firm maximizes identical objective function in both the periods
: E[pi] = (1− τ)[y − u]− k(u) + u− φh(u)[τu + θτu]. The FOC characterizing the optimal
level of under-reporting is given by:
ku(u) + τu(1 + θ)φhu(u)− τ [1− φh(u)(1 + θ)] = 0 (1)
Let u∗ and y¯∗be the optimal level of under-reporting and reported income in the static-
model.
Dynamic Case: To model the strategic concern, we assume that the probability of getting
caught in time period 2 also depends on the growth of reported income. Let δ1 = φh(u1)
and δ2 = φh(u2) + f(g), where g = (y¯2 − y¯1)/y¯1. Lower reported growth results in higher
probability of getting caught which implies that f ′(g) < 0. The firm now jointly chooses u1
and u2 to maximize:
E[pi] =(1− τ)[y − u1]− k(u1) + u1 − δ1[τu1 + θτu1]
+ (1− τ)[y − u2]− k(u2) + u2 − δ2[τu2 + τθu2]
The FOCs with respect to u1 and u2 is given by:
97
ku(u1) + τu1(1 + θ)φhu(u1)− τ [1− φh(u1)(1 + θ)] + [τu2y¯2(1 + θ)f ′(g)]/y¯21 = 0 (2)
ku(u2) + τu2(1 + θ)φhu(u2)− τ [1− φh(u2)(1 + θ)] + τ(1 + θ)[f(g)− u2f ′(g)/y¯1] = 0 (3)
Let u∗1 and u
∗
2 solve the above equations. Now, assume that A(u) represents the LHS of
equation 1, then equation 2 can be written as:
A(u1) +B(u1, u2) = 0,
where B(u1, u2) = [τu2y¯2(1 + θ)f ′(g)]/y¯21 < 0. Simple comparative stats reveal that
∂A
∂u
> 0. Combining the fact that A(u∗) = 0 , B(u1, u2) < 0 and ∂A∂u > 0 gives us the result
that,
u∗1 > u
∗ =⇒ y¯∗1 < y¯∗
Similarly, we can argue that
u∗2 < u
∗ =⇒ y¯∗2 > y¯∗
Thus, if the firms believe that reporting zero growth will increase the probability of
getting caught, then they don’t report the same level of income across different time peri-
ods and stagger their growth. For our main analysis, this implies that the excess mass of
bunchers can be diffused rather than concentrated at the notch.
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A.1.3 Appendix Tables
Table A.1: Test for change in probability in the treatment bins versus control bins
Appendix Table 1: Test for change in probability in the treatment bins versus control bins.
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
(Proportion of firms RST Firms RST Firm RST Firms Non-RST Firms
in bunching region)
Treatment Bin x After 0.0218*** 0.00755 0.00857 0.0161
(0.00336) (0.00551) (0.00517) (0.02244)
After 0.000861 0.00643** 0.00470 -.00038
(0.00144) (0.00274) (0.00406) (0.00575)
Constant 0.00926*** 0.04734*** 0.0391*** 0.0105***
(0.000640) (.0013735) (0.00197) (0.00257)
Treatment Bins [k1, k2] [8,15] [17.5,21] [21.5,26.5] [8,15]
Control Bins [1,8) [ (15,20] [15,17.5) [ (21,25] [20,21.5) [ (26.5,29] [1,8) [ (15,20]
Bunching Region [9,10) [18,19) [24,25) [9,10)
Observations 105,499 26,153 19,209 3,473
R-squared 0.980 0.851 0.779 0.702
Robust standard errors clustered at bin-level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note–The bin value represents revenue of firms in million of Rupees. In this table we do a bin-level di↵erence-in-
di↵erences analysis as described by equation 5. We test if firms that report revenue in the treatment bins are more
likely to be in the bunching region after the policy change in 2012 as compared to firms that are in the control
bins. In all the specifications, we use bin fixed e↵ects. In column 1, we restrict the sample to RST firms. If the
firm has revenue between Rs.8-15 million in 2011, then it is in the treatment bin (see Figure 2). We test if there is
higher probability that it reports revenue in the bunching region defined as area below the notch Rs.9-10 million.
The control group is firms having revenue in the control bins in 2011. The baseline is probability of reporting
revenue in the bunching region in 2011 based on revenue in 2009. In columns 2 & 3 we conduct a placebo test
by incorrectly specifying the bunching region. The treatment bins for these columns are inferred from Appendix
Figures 3A and 3B. Finally, in column 4, we repeat the analysis for non-RST firms. We use the same treatment
and control bins as column 1 to show that non-RST firms are not as responsive to notch as RST firms. All the
data for this table is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-13.
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Robust standard errors (clustered at firm level) i r t eses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note–The bin value represents revenue of firms in million of Rupees. In this table we do a bin-level
difference-in-differences analysis as described by equation 1.5. We test if firms that report revenue in the
treatment bins are more likely to be in the bunching region after the policy change in 2012 as compared to
firms that are in the control bins. In all the specifications, we use bin fixed effects. In column 1, we restrict
the sample to RST firms. If the firm has revenue between Rs.8-15 million in 2011, then it is in the treatment
bin (see Figu e 1.4). We test if there is higher probability that it reports revenu in the bunching regio de-
fined as ar a below the otch Rs.9-1 million. Th control group is firms having revenue in the control bins
in 2011. The baseline is proba ility of p rting rev nu in the bunching region in 2011 based on revenue
in 2009. In columns 2 & 3 we conduct a placebo test by incorrectly specifying the bunching region. The
treatment bins for these columns are inferred from Appendix Figures A.10 and A.11. Finally, in column 4,
we repeat the analysis for non-RST firms. We use the same treatment and control bins as column 1 to show
that non-RST firms are not as responsive to notch as RST firms. All the data for this table is derived from
Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-13.
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Table A.2: Sensitivity of estimates to the restrictions on the sampleAppendix Table 2: Sensitivity of estimates to the restrictions on the sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PBITD Taxable Income Tax Paid Audit Fee
Panel A: Variables winsorized at 95th percentile
Treat x Post2012 -522,468*** -58,884* -23,960** -2,197***
(114,964) (35,565) (11,268) (624.2)
Panel B: Variables winsorized at 99th percentile
Treat x Post2012 -1.100e+06*** -195,057** -87,277*** -2,868***
(232,121) (75,811) (25,411) (1,022)
Panel C: Unbalanced sample of firms
Treat x Post2012 -638,932*** -79,117* -34,297*** -2,393***
(132,366) (41,867) (13,297) (693.1)
Panel D: Inactive firms are included in the sample
Treat x Post2012 -843,848*** -77,235* -33,644** -2,518***
(150,410) (43,137) (13,680) (666.7)
Panel E: Including firms that switch between RST and non-RST status
Treat x Post2012 -197,062*** -72,561*** -23,108*** -730.4**
(47,535) (19,266) (6,072) (328.1)
Panel F: No restrictions on the sample
Treat x Post2012 -223,985*** -50,204*** -14,794*** -708.7**
(47,118) (16,080) (5,130) (283.2)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note–In this table, we test the sensitivity of estimates to the sample selection.
Each panel relaxes a restriction on the sample used in the main analysis. For
specification details, please refer to notes below Tables 2 and 3. All the data
for this table is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-16.
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Robust standard errors (cluster d at firm level) in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note–In this tabl , we te t the sensitivity of stimates to the sample selection. Each panel relaxes a restriction
on the sample used i the main analysis. For specification details, please refer to notes below Tables 1.2 and
1.3. All the data for this table is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-16.
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Table A.3: Estimates using a sub-sample of firms that have no potential selection bias.
Appendix Table 3: Estimates using a sub-sample of firms that have no potential selection
bias.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PBITD Taxable Income Tax Paid Audit Fee
Treat x Post2012 -831,327*** -183,172** -48,566** -4,121***
(235,198) (74,799) (22,320) (1,195)
Observations 89,379 89,379 89,379 89,379
R-squared 0.581 0.609 0.611 0.733
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note- In this table, the treated group consists of RST firms with revenue
between Rs.10-15 million in 2011, a year before the notch was moved from Rs.6
million to Rs.10 million. The comparison group consists of non-RST within
the same revenue bandwidth in 2011. We want to test if excluding the firms
between Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million changes the coe cients qualitatively.
There is a potential concern that firms between Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million
had an opportunity to bunch in 2011, when the notch was at Rs.6 million.
Excluding these firms from the sample will remove any potential bias from the
estimates. For specification details, please refer to notes below Tables 2 and
3. All the data for this table is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns
from 2009-16.
60
Robust standard errors (clustered at firm lev l) in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note- In this table, the treated group consists of RST firms with revenue between Rs.10-15 million in 2011,
a year before the notch was moved from Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million. The comparison group consists
of non-RST within the same revenue bandwidth in 2011. We want to test if excluding the firms between
Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million changes the coefficients qualitatively. There is a potential concern that firms
between Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million had an opportunity to bunch in 2011, when the notch was at Rs.6
million. Excluding these firms from the sample will remove any potential bias from the estimates. For
specification details, please refer to notes below Tables 1.2 and 1.3. All the data for this table is derived from
Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-16.
Table A.4: Placebo test by mis-specifying the treatment neighborhood.
Appendix Table 4: Placebo test by mis-specifying the treatment neighborhood.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PBITD Taxable Income Tax Paid Audit Fee
Treat x Post2012 -368,030 -100,730 -44,932 -2,316*
(246,508) (97,147) (31,412) (1,206)
Observations 114,138 114,138 114,138 114,138
R-squared 0.611 0.615 0.616 0.737
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note– In this table, we show estimates from equation 3 on a group of firms
that are una↵ected by the policy change. The treatment group consists of
restricted share transfer (RST) firms with revenue between Rs.16-28 million
in 2011, a year before the audit threshold was moved from Rs.6 million to
Rs.10 million. The comparison group consists of non-RST firms within the
same revenue bandwidth in 2011. The treatment is removal of third-party
audit requirement because of the change in the threshold. All the regressions
in the table include firm fixed e↵ects, year fixed e↵ects and sector-specific time
trends. The data comes from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-16.
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Robust standard errors (clustered at firm level) in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p 0.1
Note– In this table, we show estimates from equation 1.3 on a group of firms that are unaffected by the
policy change. The treatment group consists of restricted share transfer (RST) firms with revenue between
Rs.16-28 million in 2011, a year before the audit threshold was moved from Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million.
The comparison group consists of non-RST firms within the same revenue bandwidth in 2011. The treatment
is removal of third-party audit requirement because of the change in the threshold. All the regressions in
the table include firm fixed effe ts, ye r fixed effects and ec or-specific time trends. The data comes from
Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-16.
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Table A.5: Differences in the effect of removal of third-party audit between MAT and CIT
firms.
Appendix Table 5: Di↵erences in the e↵ect of removal of third-party audit between MAT
and CIT firms.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Tax Paid Taxable Income Tax Paid Taxable Income
Treat x Post2012 -44,559 -95,218 -34,019** -121,723**
(31,946) (78,613) (16,425) (52,457)
Sample MAT firms MAT firms CIT firms CIT firms
Observations 22,115 22,115 148,012 148,012
R-squared 0.695 0.595 0.638 0.640
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note– In this table we divide the sample between firms that pay taxes under
regular corporate income tax (CIT) and the ones that have to pay the min-
imum alternate tax (MAT).The treatment group consists of restricted share
transfer (RST) firms with revenue between Rs.6-15 million in 2011, a year
before the audit threshold was moved from Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million. The
comparison group consists of non-RST firms within the same revenue band-
width in 2011. The treatment is removal of third-party audit requirement
because of the change in the threshold. All the regressions in the table include
firm fixed e↵ects, year fixed e↵ects and sector-specific time trends. The data
comes from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-16.
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Robust standard errors (clustered at firm level) in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note– In this table we divide the sample between firms that pay taxes under regular corporate income tax
(CIT) and the ones that have to pay the minimum alternate tax (MAT).The treatment group consists of
restricted share transfer (RST) firms with revenue between Rs.6-15 million in 2011, a year before the audit
threshold was moved from Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million. The comparison group consists of non-RST firms
within the same revenue bandwidth in 2011. The treatment is removal of third-party audit requirement
because of the change n e threshold. All the regressions in the table include fir fixed effects, year fixed
effects and sector-specific time trends. The data comes from Corporate Inco e Tax returns from 2009-16.
Table A.6: Static bunching analysis using different bin-sizes
Appendix Table 6: Static bunching analysis using di↵erent bin-sizes.
(1) (2) (3)
Bin Size (million Rs.) 0.1 mil 0.3mil 0.5mil
Upper Bound 12 13 11.5
(Standard Error) (8.204) (4.548) (8.795)
Note- This table provides estimates of the upper-bound
of the treatment neighborhodd using di↵erent bin-sizes
for the static analysis. The standard errors are estimated
using a bootstrap procedure using 50 iterations. The bin-
size used in the main analysis is Rs.0.5 million. All the
data for this table is derived from Corporate Income Tax
returns from 2012-16.
Appendix Table 7: Estimates using the upper bound of treatment neighborhood from static
bunching analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PBITD Taxable Income Tax Paid Audit Fee
Treat x Post2012 -649,838*** -81,007 -40,462** -1,641*
(173,333) (55,502) (18,002) (891.2)
Observations 113,336 113,336 113,336 113,336
R-squared 0.579 0.595 0.594 0.722
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note – In this table, we use the upper bound of the treatment neighborhood ob-
tained by static bunching analysis instead of di↵erence in probabilities method.
The treatment group consists of restricted share transfer (RST) firms with rev-
enue between Rs.6-11.5 million in 2011, a year before the audit threshold was
moved from Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million. The comparison group consists of
non-RST firms within the same revenue bandwidth in 2011. The treatment is
removal of third-party audit requirement because of the change in the thresh-
old. All the regressions in the table include firm fixed e↵ects, year fixed e↵ects
and sector-specific time trends. The data comes from Corporate Income Tax
returns from 2009-16.
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Note- This table provides estimates of the upper-bound of the treatment neighborhood using different bin-
sizes for the static analysis. The standard errors are estimated using a bootstrap procedure using 50 iter-
ations. The bin-size used in the main analysis is Rs.0.5 million. All the data for this table is derived from
Corporate Income Tax returns from 2012-16.
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Table A.7: Estimates using the upper bound of treatment neighborhood from static bunch-
ing analysis.
Appendix Table 6: Static bunching analysis using di↵erent bin-sizes.
(1) (2) (3)
Bin Size (million Rs.) 0.1 mil 0.3mil 0.5mil
Upper Bound 12 13 11.5
(Standard Error) (8.204) (4.548) (8.795)
Note- This table provides estimates of the upper-bound
of the treatment neighborhodd using di↵erent bin-sizes
for the static analysis. The standard errors are estimated
using a bootstrap procedure using 50 iterations. The bin-
size used in the main analysis is Rs.0.5 million. All the
data for this table is derived from Corporate Income Tax
returns from 2012-16.
Appendix Table 7: Estimates using the upper bound of treatment neighborhood from static
bunching analysis.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PBITD Taxable Income Tax Paid Audit Fee
Treat x Post2012 -649,838*** -81,007 -40,462** -1,641*
(173,333) (55,502) (18,002) (891.2)
Observations 113,336 113,336 113,336 113,336
R-squared 0.579 0.595 0.594 0.722
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note – In this table, we use the upper bound of the treatment neighborhood ob-
tained by static bunching analysis instead of di↵erence in probabilities method.
The treatment group consists of restricted share transfer (RST) firms with rev-
enue between Rs.6-11.5 million in 2011, a year before the audit threshold was
moved from Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million. The comparison group consists of
non-RST firms within the same revenue bandwidth in 2011. The treatment is
removal of third-party audit requirement because of the change in the thresh-
old. All the regressions in the table include firm fixed e↵ects, year fixed e↵ects
and sector-specific time trends. The data comes from Corporate Income Tax
returns from 2009-16.
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Robust standard errors (cluster d at firm level) in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note – In this table, we use th upper bound of the treatment neighborhood obtained by static bunching
analysis instead of difference i probabilities metho . The t atme t group con ists of restricted share
transfer (RS ) firms with revenue between Rs.6-11.5 million in 2011, a year before the audit threshold
was moved from Rs.6 million to Rs.10 million. The comparison group consists of non-RST firms within the
same revenue bandwidth in 2011. The treatment is removal of third-party audit requirement because of
the change in the threshold. All the regressions in the table include firm fixed effects, year fixed effects and
sector-specific time trends. The data comes from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-16.
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Table A.8: Table of upstream ratios of industries.
Description ITR Code Upstream Ratio
Automobile and Auto parts 102 0.33
Cement 103 0.99
Drugs and Pharmaceuticals 105 0.74
Electronics including Computer Hardware 106 0.38
Engineering goods 107 0.15
Fertilizers, Chemicals, Paints 108 0.84
Flour & Rice Mills 109 0.85
Petroleum and Petrochemicals 113 0.87
Power and energy 114 0.79
Printing & Publishing 115 0.45
Rubber 116 0.89
Steel 117 0.88
Sugar 118 0.17
Tea, Coffee 119 0.69
Textiles, handloom, Power looms 120 0.45
Tobacco 121 0.54
Vanaspati & Edible Oils 123 0.53
Chain Stores 201 0
Retailers 202 0
Wholesalers 203 1
Builders 401 0.06
Estate Agents 402 0.12
Property Developers 403 0.56
Others 404 0.12
Civil Contractors 501 0.12
Legal professionals 603 0.50
Medical professionals 604 0
Nursing Homes 605 0
Specialty hospitals 606 0
Beauty Parlours 702 0
Continued on next page
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Description ITR Code Upstream Ratio
Consultancy services 703 0
Courier Agencies 704 0
Computer training/educational and coaching institutes 705 0.02
Forex Dealers 706 0.00
Hospitality services 707 0.43
Hotels 708 0.43
I.T. enabled services, BPO service providers 709 0.03
Security agencies 710 0
Software development agencies 711 0.03
Transporters 712 0.27
Banking Companies 801 0.67
Chit Funds 802 0.67
Financial Institutions 803 0.67
Financial service providers 804 0.67
Leasing Companies 805 0.67
Non-Banking Finance Companies 807 0.67
Cable T.V. productions 901 0.06
Film distribution 902 0.06
Film laboratories 903 0.06
Motion Picture Producers 904 0.06
Television Channels 905 0.06
Note – This table was created by matching the description of industry codes in Income
Tax forms to the Supply-Use Tables compiled by the Ministry of Statistics and Program
Implementation in 2011. The upstream ratio is the proportion of sales to the intermediate
consumer to the total consumption.
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A.1.4 Appendix Figures
Figure A.1: Distribution of RST firms in 2009 when audit threshold was Rs.4 million.
Appendix A. Supplemental Figures and Tables
Appendix Figure 1.1: Distribution of RST firms in 2009 when audit threshold was Rs.4
million.
Appendix Figure 1.2: Distribution of RST firms in 2010 when audit audit threshold was
Rs.6 million.
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]Figure A.2: Distribution of RST firms in 2010 when audit threshold was Rs.6 million.
Appendix A. Supplemental Figures and Tables
Appendix Figure 1.1: Distribution of RST firms in 2009 when audit threshold was Rs.4
million.
Appendix Figure 1.2: Distribution of RST firms in 2010 when audit audit threshold was
Rs.6 million.
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Figure A.3: Distribution of RST firms i 2011 when audit threshold was Rs.6 million.
Appendix Figure 1.3: Distribution of RST firms in 2011 when audit threshold was Rs.6
million.
Appendix Figure 1.4: Distribution of RST firms in 2012 when audit threshold was Rs.10
million.
51
107
Figure A.4: Distribution of RST firms in 2012 when audit threshold was Rs.10 million.Appendix Figure 1.3: Distribution of RST firms in 2011 when audit threshold was Rs.6
million.
Appendix Figure 1.4: Distribution of RST firms in 2012 when audit threshold was Rs.10
million.
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Figure A.5: Distribution of RST firms in 2013 when audit threshold was Rs.10 million.
Appendix Figure 1.5: Distribution of RST firms in 2013 when audit threshold was Rs.10
million.
Appendix Figure 1.6: Distribution of RST firms in 2014 when audit threshold was Rs.10
million.
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Figure A.6: Distribution of RST firms in 2014 when audit threshold was Rs.10 million.
Appendix Figure 1.5: Distribution of RST firms in 2013 when audit threshold was Rs.10
million.
Appendix Figure 1.6: Distribution of RST firms in 2014 when audit threshold was Rs.10
million.
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Figure A.7: Distribution of RST firms in 2015 when audit threshold was Rs.10 million.
Appendix Figure 1.7: Distribution of RST firms in 2015 when audit threshold was Rs.10
million.
Appendix Figure 1.8: Distribution of RST firms in 2016 when audit threshold was Rs.10
million.
53
109
Figure A.8: Distribution of RST firms in 2016 when audit threshold was Rs.10 million.Appendix Figure 1.7: Distribution of RST firms in 2015 when audit threshold was Rs.10
million.
Appendix Figure 1.8: Distribution of RST firms in 2016 when audit threshold was Rs.10
million.
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Figure A.9: Histograms of RST and non-RST firms from 2012-16.
Appendix Figure 2: Histograms of RST and non-RST firms from 2012-16.
Note – In this graph, we show the di↵erence in bunching behavior between RST and non-RST firms
using data from 2012-16. The third-party audit threshold was Rs.10 million during this period. All
the data for this graph is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2012-16.
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Note – In this graph, we show the difference in bunching behavior between RST and non-RST firms using
data from 2012-16. The third-party audit threshold was Rs.10 million during this period. All the data for
this graph is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2012-16.
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Figure A.10: Placebo test for difference in probabilities method
Appendix Figure 3A: Placebo test for di↵erence in probabilities method
Note–In this graph, we plot the probability of being in a placebo region based on two-year lagged
revenue. The notch was introduced at Rs.10 million in 2012. The blue line represents the probability
of reporting revenue between Rs.18-19 million (region unrelated to the audit threshold) in 2013,
conditional on revenue in 2011. Similarly, the red line represents the probability of reporting revenue
in the same range in 2011, conditional on revenue in 2009 – both the years are before the change
in policy. The bin size used in this graph is Rs.0.5 million. All the data for this graph is derived
from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-13.
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Note–In this graph, we plot the probability of being in a placebo region based on two-year lagged revenue.
The notch was introduced at Rs.10 million in 2012. The blue line represents the probability of reporting
revenue between Rs.18-19 million (region unrelated to the audit threshold) in 2013, conditional on revenue
in 2011. Similarly, the red line represents the probability of reporting revenue in the same range in 2011,
conditional on revenue in 2009 – both the years are before the change in policy. The bin size used in this
graph is Rs.0.5 million. All the data for this graph is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns from
2009-13.
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Figure A.11: Placebo test for difference in probabilities method
Appendix Figure 3B: Placebo test for di↵erence in probabilities method
Note–In this graph, we plot the probability of being in another placebo region, Rs.24-25 million,
based on two-year lagged revenue.
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Note–In this graph, we plot the probability of being in another placebo region, Rs.24-25 million, based on
two-year lagged revenue.
113
Figure A.12: Estimating upper bound using the difference in probability method for non-
RST firms
Appendix Figure 4: Estimating upper bound using the di↵erence in probability method for
non-RST firms
Note–In this graph, we plot the probability of being in the bunching region based on two-year
lagged revenue. The notch was introduced at Rs.10 million in 2012. The blue line represents the
probability of reporting revenue between Rs.9-10 million (bunching region) in 2013, conditional on
revenue in 2011. Similarly, the red line represents the probability of reporting revenue in the same
range in 2011, conditional on revenue in 2009 – both the years are before the change in policy. The
di↵erence between the two probabilities shows the e↵ect of the notch on firm’s bunching response.
The upper bound estimated from this graph is Rs.15 million, which is larger than the upper bound
estimated by static bunching analysis. The bin size used in this graph is Rs.1 million. All the data
for this graph is derived from Corporate Income Tax returns from 2009-13.
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Note–In this graph, we plot the probability of being in the bunching region based on two-year lagged rev-
enue. The notch was introduced at Rs.10 million in 2012. The blue line represents the robabil ty of report-
ing revenue between Rs.9-10 million (bunching region) in 2013, conditional on revenue in 2011. Similarly,
the red line represents the probability of reporting revenue in the same range in 2011, conditional on rev-
enue in 2009 – both the years are before the change in policy. The difference between the two probabilities
shows the effect of the notch on firm’s bunching response. The upper bound estimated from this graph is
Rs.15 million, which is larger than the upper bound estimated by static bunching analysis. The bin size used
in this graph is Rs.1 million. Al the data for this graph is d rived from Corpora e Income Tax returns from
2009-13.
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B.1 Appendix
B.1.1 Various Definitions of Formality
The third round of Nepal Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), conducted in
2010-11, asks every respondent if she is engaged in self or wage employment and further
if the employment is in agriculture or non-agriculture sector. We construct four different
definitions of formality using this information. While we use the first definition of formality
in the main analysis, we also test if our results are robust to alternative definitions in the
sensitivity analysis.
• Definition 1 - A wage-earning person is assigned to the formal sector if any of the jobs
she works in displays any of the following features - tax is deducted by the employer,
employee contributes to the employee provident fund, employee will receive pension
on retirement, or subsidized medical care. Further, if the person is self-employed
and the firm is registered with the government, then also she gets assigned to the
formal sector. Conversely, if the person is engaged in agriculture then she is assigned
to informal sector, as the agricultural income is exempt from personal income-tax
in Nepal. Unemployed, household workers and students are also assigned to the
informal sector.
• Definition 2 - A person who is wage-employed is assigned to formal sector only if any
of the jobs she works in displays all the job features listed above. All else is similar
to Definition 1.
• Definition 3 - For this definition, we consider one more job criterion mentioned in
the survey - if the employer has more or less than 10 workers employed. Several
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labor law regulations, particularly those pertaining to hiring and firing of workers
are only applicable to firms that employ more than 10 workers. All else is similar to
Definition 1.
• Definition 4 - In this case, all the self-employed people are considered to be in the
informal sector. All else is similar to Definition 1.
B.1.2 Methodology of Imputing Income Tax Payments
We impute and assign the income tax payments to each household by constructing a
tax table and merging it with the LSMS data. We only do this for households heads that
are employed in the formal sector as defined in the previous appendix. Households heads
who are employed in the informal sector, including agriculture, are assumed to pay zero
income tax.
First, we create an income tax table that shows tax payments for each possible level
of income by using the income tax schedule of Nepal. Then, household’s consumption, c,
equals f(s)− T (s), where f(s) is the taxable income and T (s) is the income tax payment.
For example, if the taxable income of a single male is NPR 2,00,000, then the income
tax—according to the tax schedule—is NPR 7,600 and the after-tax consumption is NPR
192,400.
Next, we merge the income tax table with the LSMS data by matching the imputed
consumption from the tax table to the reported consumption in the LSMS data. The in-
come tax schedule of Nepal, like most countries, has a non-decreasing average tax rate
over income. This ensures a monotonic relation between consumption and taxable in-
come. Thus, we can assign the taxable income and tax payment to each household in the
LSMS data using the tax table. Using the previous example, if some household(s) reports
consumption of NPR 192,400 in the LSMS survey, then the income tax payments of that
household is imputed as NPR 7,600. In this exercise, we are making three assumptions.
First, it is the household head who is earning all the income and therefore, a single tax
return is filed per household. Second, a proportion of the household consumption may
be deductible from income for tax purposes. For instance, a self-employed person might
claim business expenses as itemized deductions. In the absence of access to administrative
data, we do not know whether such claims are made. Third, we assume that there is full
tax compliance by people employed in the formal sector.
Finally, in the above analysis we create separate income tax tables for married and
single household heads as they face different tax schedules according to the income tax
law. Furthermore, single women face the same tax schedule as single men, however, they
116
get a 10% deduction from their total tax liability. Thus, we create separate tax tables for
each category of taxpayers and match them to the LSMS data using the process described
above. The income tax schedules are described below:
Table B.1: Marginal income tax schedule for a single male filer
Taxable Income (In NPRs) Marginal tax rate(In percent)
Less than 160,000 1
Between 160,000 & 260,000 15
Between 260,000 & 2,500,000 25
Above 2,500,000 35
Marginal income tax schedule for joint filing by a married couple
Taxable Income (In NPRs) Marginal tax rate(In percent)
Less than 200,000 1
Between 200,000 & 300,000 15
Between 300,000 & 2,500,000 25
Above 2,500,000 35
B.1.3 Construction of variables used in the analysis.
1. Identity and demographics of the household head – We use the “household roster”
of the LSMS survey to determine the identity of the household head. This section
also has information on the age and gender of the family members. Additionally,
we create a unique id for each respondent using the PSU id, household id and serial
number of the respondent. This id is used to merge other relevant sections of the
LSMS to the household roster.
2. Education – We use the “education” module of the LSMS questionnaire to construct
this variable. For the grades 1 to 12, the years of education completed is equal to the
education grade. Household members with bachelors and masters degree are coded
as having completed 15 and 17 years of education, because the duration of bachelors
and masters degree in Nepal is of three and two years respectively. We assume that
professional degree holders have completed 15 years of education.
3. Public Schools – All the schools that are coded as Community/Government; com-
munity (public) campus; constituent campus and others, in the LSMS data are con-
sidered as public schools. The rest of the schools are considered as private schools.
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4. Jobs and Formality – The “Wage jobs” section of LSMS documents job characteris-
tics of household members who report themselves as wage earners, as opposed to
self-employed. Using the job characteristics, we construct several measures of for-
mality (details are given in the section B.1.1). All the self-employed members are
also considered as part of the informal sector. If any person is working in a non-
agricultural enterprise, we use the “Non-agriculture enterprises/activities” section to
ascertain whether the enterprise is registered with the government or not. Persons
working in the registered enterprises are also considered to be in the formal sector.
Finally, we use the “Jobs and time use” section of the LSMS to identify household
members who are engaged in household work or not employed at all. Such members
are considered to be in the informal sector.
5. Household Consumption – We construct measures of annual food and total con-
sumption by multiplying the annual per capita consumption of each household,
recorded in the “Poverty” file of the LSMS, with the total number of household mem-
bers.
6. Benefits –The benefits received by each member of the household are recorded in
the “Transfers, social assistance and Other Income” section of the LSMS. First, we
annualize the benefits received by each member of the household under all the pro-
grams mentioned in the section. Then, we create a measure of total annual benefits
received by the household by adding the benefits received by all the members of the
household. This allows us to deduct the annual benefits from the annual tax pay-
ments to calculate the net tax payments of a household. We use this measure in the
sensitivity analysis as the main dependent variable. We also create a dummy variable
for benefits received under programs where transfers are given in-kind rather than
in cash. This variable is used to measure the gradient of take-up of welfare programs
with respect to the education level.
7. Value Added Tax – The Value Added Tax, in our analysis, is equal to 13 percent
of the total household consumption. An alternate measure of VAT excludes food
consumption from the total consumption, because essential food items are zero-rated
in Nepal.
8. Mean remittances -– We use the “Absentees information” section of the LSMS data to
calculate the average remittances sent by migrants across different education levels.
9. Education subsidies -– We use National Education Accounts complied by the Nepalese
government, UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), International Institute for Educa-
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tional Planning (IIEP) and Global Partnership for Education (GPE), to measure the
subsidies incurred on education. Education subsidies are equal to the non-household
expenditure which is defined as the expenditure by federal, state and local govern-
ments; NGOs, and school. The expenditure by government includes money spent
by the ministry of education, district and village development committees, grants on
budget, technical assistance off budget and administrative offices. Expenditure by
NGOs includes both local and international NGOs. Finally, expenditure by schools
is recorded under the header of “Internally generated funds” in the data. We merge
this data with the LSMS data using the education level of the household head and
the type of school attended by him (public or private).
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B.1.4 Appendix Tables
Table B.2: Summary Statistics of variables not included in Table 2.1
Age	(in	years)
Sum	of	education	
grades,	in	years,	of	
other	household	
members	(excluding	
the	head)
Highest	grade	of	
education,	in	years,	
within	the	
household	
(excluding	the	head)
Household	Size
Male	Dummy	for	
Household	head
Benefit	received	
(In	NPRs)
Dummy	for	
Benefits	
received
Dummy	for	In-
Kind	Transfers
Count 3,787 3,787 3,635 3,787 3,787 3,787 3,787 3,787
Median 48 10 7 5 1 0 0 0
25th	percentile 38 3 3 3 0 0 0 0
75th	percentile 59 20 10 6 1 0 0 0
Mean	 48.60 13 6.60 4.86 0.67 1,043 0.16 0.09
Standard	deviation
13.74 12.83 4.36 2.37 0 2,940 0.37 0.28
Count 1,081 1,081 1,067 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,081
Median 40 14 9 5 1 0 0 0
25th	percentile 32 8 5 3 1 0 0 0
75th	percentile 50 25 12 6 1 0 0 0
Mean	 41.37 18 8.29 4.94 0.82 784 0.14 0.06
Standard	deviation
11.62 14.60 4.26 2.18 0 2,223 0.35 0.24
Count 893 893 862 893 893 893 893 893
Median 40 19 11 4 1 0 0 0
25th	percentile 32 11 9 3 1 0 0 0
75th	percentile 50 30 15 5 1 0 0 0
Mean	 41.31 22 10.82 4.41 0.86 711 0.12 0.05
Standard	deviation
12.20 16.92 4.23 2.19 0 2,293 0.33 0.22
Appendix	Table	1:	Summary	Stats	of	variables	not	included	in	Table	1
Panel	A:	Primary	Education	(Grades	0-5)
Panel	C:	Higher	Education	(Grade	11	to	Bachelor's	Degree)
Panel	B:	Secondary	Education	(Grades	6-10)
Note	:	The	primary	data	source	is	Nepal	Living	Standards	Survey	-	2010.	The	subsidy	data	comes	from	National	Education	Accounts	reports	
compiled	by		International	Institute	for	Educational	Planning	(IIEP),	UNESCO	Institute	for	Statistics	(UIS)	and	Global	Partnership	for	Education	
[IIEP	Reports	2016a	2016b].	This	data	can	be	accessed	at	http://uis.unesco.org/en/news/national-education-accounts
Note: The primary data source is Nepal Living Standards Survey - 2010. The subsidy data comes from
National Education Accounts reports compiled by International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP),
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and Global Partnership for Education [IIEP Reports 2016a 2016b].
This data can be accessed at http://uis.unesco.org/en/news/national-education-accounts
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B.1.5 Appendix Figures
Figure B.1: Marginal Benefit versus Marginal Cost
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
		
	
Appendix	Figure	1.1:	Marginal	Benefit	versus	Marginal	Cost	
	
Note:	This	figure	uses	the	coefficients	from	Table	2.1	regression	at	the	mean.	It	plots	the	different	
components	of	marginal	cost	and	marginal	benefit.	The	discount	rate	used	in	the	analysis	 is	3	
percent.	Primary	Education	is	from	0	to	5	grade,	secondary	from	6	to	10	and	higher	from	11	to	
Bachelors.	
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Note: This figure uses the coefficients from Table 2.2 regression at the mean. It plots the different compo-
nents of marginal cost and marginal benefit. The discount rate used in the analysis is 3 percent. Primary
Education is from 0 to 5 grade, secondary from 6 to 10 and higher from 11 to Bachelors.
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Figure B.2: Marginal Benefit versus Marginal Cost
	
	
Appendix	Figure	1.2	:	Marginal	Benefit	versus	Marginal	Cost.	
	
Note:	This	figure	uses	the	coefficients	from	Table	2.1	regression	at	the	median.	
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Note: This figure uses the coefficients from Table 2.2 regression at the median.
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C.1 Appendix
C.1.1 Appendix Tables
Table C.1: Value of coefficients of Table 4 at different levels of SRLB
Specifications same as (1) (2) (3)
Table 4 Village FE Village FE Mother FE
Whole Sample Completed # of
Fertility children>1
(p-value in parentheses)
Girl + Girl x SRLB -0.037 -0.039 -0.046
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Girl + Girl x SRLB x 1.36 -0.045 -0.047 -0.054
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Girl + Girl x SRLB x 1.88 -0.057 -0.060 -0.065
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Second Child + Second child x SRLB -0.033 -0.028 -0.049
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Second Child + Second child x SRLB x 1.36 -0.036 -0.032 -0.062
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Second Child + Second child x SRLB x 1.88 -0.042 -0.039 -0.081
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Later Child + Later child x SRLB -0.069 -0.065 -0.098
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Later Child + Later child x SRLB x 1.36 -0.080 -0.077 -0.120
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Later Child + Later child x SRLB x 1.88 -0.097 -0.094 -0.153
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Girl x Second Child + Girl x Second child x SRLB 0.005 0.005 0.014
(0.411) (0.520) (0.125)
Girl x Second Child + Girl x Second child x SRLB x 1.36 0.003 0.005 0.018
(0.454) (0.299) (0.001)
Girl x Second Child + Girl x Second child x SRLB x 1.88 0.000 0.005 0.025
(0.953) (0.535) (0.006)
Girl x Later Child + Girl x Later child x SRLB 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.663) (0.658) (0.737)
Girl x Later Child + Girl x Later child x SRLB x 1.36 -0.003 -0.004 0.007
(0.541) (0.551) (0.286)
Girl x Later Child + Girl x Later child x SRLB x 1.88 -0.014 -0.016 0.012
(0.147) (0.151) (0.300)
This table calculates the magnitude of the coefficients from the regressions in Table 3.4 at different levels
of Sex Ratio at Last Birth (SRLB) which is defined as number of boys per girl in a district, conditional
on being the last born. This ratio is calculated using families where mothers might have completed their
fertility. 1.36 boys per girl is the median value and 1.88 is the top decile value of SRLB across districts.
The coefficients should be interpreted as change in the probability of attaining the minimum level of
learning.
[Source] All the data for this table is derived from ASER-2014.
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Table C.2: Robustness Check – Using Raw Math Scores and Flexibly Controlling for School
Grade
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
(Raw Math Score) Village FE Mother FE Village FE Mother FE
(Robust SE Completed # of Completed # of
in parentheses) fertility children>1 fertility children>1
Girl -0.117*** -0.145*** -0.0906*** -0.0791***
(0.00552) (0.00733) (0.00842) (0.00802)
Second Child -0.0852*** -0.200*** -0.0651*** -0.155***
(0.00651) (0.00836) (0.00600) (0.00807)
Later Child -0.206*** -0.370*** -0.195*** -0.332***
(0.0108) (0.0141) (0.0103) (0.0143)
Girl x Second Child 0.0106 0.0567***
(0.00881) (0.00970)
Girl x Later Child -0.0254** 0.0251**
(0.0126) (0.0123)
No Elder Brother 0.0466*** 0.0530***
(0.00744) (0.00814)
Girl x No Elder Brother -0.0331*** -0.0344***
(0.00945) (0.0110)
Constant 1.274*** 1.745*** 1.235*** 1.681***
(0.0361) (0.0310) (0.0367) (0.0319)
(p-value in parentheses)
NEB + Girl x NEB 0.0135 0.0185
(0.137) (0.169)
Hh Controls YES NO YES NO
Observations 198,963 202,793 198,963 202,793
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level. The learning outcome
is the raw score which ranges discretely from 1 to 5. The average score is 3.25.
The coefficients should be interpreted as change in the raw score. Column (1)
and (3) restricts the sample to the mothers who might have completed their
fertility and thus, allows to control for the total number of children. Column
(2) and (4) use Mother Fixed effects. All the regressions also include birth year
Fixed effects. They also include school grade Fixed effects to flexibly control
for class in which child is studying. Child level control includes the child age.
Household level controls include the parents’ education, parents’ age and index
for household infrastructure.
[Source] All the data for this table is derived from ASER-2014.
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Table C.3: Robustness Check – Using Standardized Reading Score as Learning Outcome
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
(Standard Reading Level) Village FE Mother FE Village FE Mother FE
(Robust SE Completed # of Completed # of
in parentheses) fertility children>1 fertility children>1
Girl 0.00539** -0.00255 0.0171*** 0.0125***
(0.00244) (0.00347) (0.00367) (0.00371)
Second Child -0.0346*** -0.0688*** -0.0257*** -0.0619***
(0.00313) (0.00408) (0.00284) (0.00388)
Later Child -0.0566*** -0.106*** -0.0550*** -0.107***
(0.00494) (0.00671) (0.00476) (0.00685)
Girl x Second Child 0.00752* 0.0123**
(0.00407) (0.00480)
Girl x Later Child -0.0142*** -0.00499
(0.00539) (0.00587)
No Elder Brother 0.0177*** 0.00945**
(0.00343) (0.00392)
Girl x No Elder Brother -0.0139*** -0.0150***
(0.00422) (0.00531)
Constant -0.0720*** 0.0951*** -0.0870*** 0.0861***
(0.0134) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0143)
(p-value in parentheses)
NEB + Girl x NEB 0.0038 -0.006
(0.331) (0.395)
Hh Controls YES NO YES NO
Observations 198,739 202,572 198,739 202,572
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level. The learning out-
come is the reading score standardized according to the class in which the
child is studying. The average score is 0.48. The coefficients should be in-
terpreted as the change in the probability of attaining the minimum level of
learning. Columns (1) and (3) restrict the sample to mothers who might have
completed their fertility and thus, allows to control for the total number of chil-
dren. Columns (2) and (4) use Mother Fixed effects. All the regressions also
include birth year Fixed effects. Child level controls include the child age and
school class. Household level controls include the parents’ education, parents’
age and index for household infrastructure.
[Source] All the data for this table is derived from ASER-2014.
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C.1.2 Appendix Figures
Figure C.1: Distribution of total children in a family according to the age of the mother
The average number of children per mother increases till the mother’s age is 35, and then declines. This is
used to determine the age by which women might have completed their fertility.
[Source] Data for the analysis comes from ASER 2014.
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Figure C.2: Frequency distribution of years between birth of closest siblings
This graph shows cumulative frequency of the gap between closest siblings in terms of years. More
that 86 percent of the siblings are born less than 5 years apart. This is used to identify women who
might have completed their fertility.
[Source] Data for the analysis comes from ASER 2014.
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